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 In the past decade, the world has seen a shift in the determining factor for 
power and authority. Religion and land have been influential factors deciding who or 
who does not have power across continents, time, and civilizations. In the 21st 
century, these two sources of influence have lost their supremacy in determining a 
nation’s power or authority. Power and authority are now defined by a nation’s access 
to and influence over resources. Resources define the position of a nation in terms of 
its economy, society, and political structure and influence. The Middle East exists as 
a perfect microcosm for studying the complex relationship of resources with the 
dichotomy of power, seen in the conflict over oil and water. The region’s resource 
conflicts are often emphasized due to its extreme amount of and geopolitical status of 
resources. Oil is found in large quantities in the Persian Gulf, specifically in Saudi 
Arabia, while water is found in relatively scarce quantities in the region, specifically 
in Palestine.  
 To mask the competition for oil and water in the Middle East, civilizations 
and religion are often blamed for having a substantial role in the atmosphere of the 
conflict-ridden region. The common conception of the clash between the US and the 
Muslim world is portrayed as the source of conflicts. Through the theory of the “clash 
of civilizations” by Samuel Huntington, tensions arise because of  differences in 
religious views, correlated with disagreements in practices, moral beliefs, and 
lifestyles. In the Middle East, Islamic fundamentalism (a Muslim minority) becomes 
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the face of modern resistance to the US. The Islamic response of resistance to the 
modernizing world should not be attributed to differing civilizations and religions, but 
to the opposition of structural pressures experienced in the Muslim world and 
encouraged by the “rationalized,” “Western” world. The grievance of Islamic 
fundamentalists who ask for a revival of society are reacting against the influence of 
Western colonialism, seen through the influence and effect of resources, like oil and 
water, that support the institution of structure pressures of one nation onto another. 
 The world’s dependence on oil has exponentially grown due to the evolution 
of technology that needs a constant influx of energy to sustain its activities. The 
world’s oil dependence began in 1859 when the United States developed the first 
large-scale petroleum industry, which maintained the US’ economic growth through 
the 20th century. The Standard Oil Company, Aramco, and Atlantic Richfield were 
established as the first large multinational corporations to capitalize on the discovery 
of the profitable resource of oil.1 Before World War II, the United States was one of 
the few nations that possessed oil, which helped to build the US’ economy 
domestically and internationally.2 Looking at the US’ success, other nations began to 
invest in the oil industry for the development and protection of their nation, 
increasing the international demand for oil dramatically. At the same time, due to the 
discovery and development of the oil industry, the Middle East became an important 
region for the US due to the emerging oil reserves that would be vital to the US’ 
future national security.  
                                                
1 Michael Klare. Blood and Oil (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2004), 8 
2 Ibid. 9 
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 Saudi Arabia was one of the first nations in the Middle East to be drastically 
affected by US influence. Rich in oil reserves, the kingdom was one of the first 
nations in the Gulf to have the US military stationed within its borders to ensure the 
free flow of oil. An alliance between the US and Saudi Arabia was initiated to ensure 
the safety of the kingdom’s oil reserves, while generating at the same time an 
emerging radical Islamic response to the structural pressures exerted by the US. The 
development of this resource and its ensuing influence in the Middle East has kept the 
world in a constant battle over the power, availability, and protection of oil ever 
since. 
 The conflict over water in Palestine lies at both the Israelis and Palestinians’ 
desire for an independent nation. Water is a fundamental source of life and is 
essential for structuring, developing, and modernizing a state, the goal for both the 
Israelis and Palestinians. The harsh, desert climate of Palestine posses numerous 
problems concerning the conflict over water since both identities share the similar 
environmental obstacle. The severe climate produces difficult and complex conditions 
for water usage as well as the sustainability of human water supplies and ecosystems. 
In the Middle East, each region’s ecosystem must find a way to sustain its needs for 
the populations, whether through terrestrial or aquatic water sources. Presently, Israel 
has control of the majority of water sources in Palestine, while the Palestinians are 
given substantially fewer rights to water sources. These sources include the Mountain 
Aquifer and the Jordan River, which are equally needed by both groups for their 
population’s basic human needs. The West Bank proves to be the center region for 
water rights of the Jordan River that are predominantly controlled by Israel, putting 
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Palestine in the subservient position. The position of Israel’s control over water rights 
and sources in Palestine is due to certain structural pressures that elevate the 
complexity of the conflict. Water is the determining factor of power and rests at the 
heart of the conflict in Palestine.   
 The two resources, oil and water, fuel the world as it modernizes and 
globalizes. The struggle over resources underscores the conflict that occurs in 
response to Western influence in the Middle East and the numerous individuals upset 
by its current economic and political order.  
 
2. Subject of Thesis 
 While the introduction lays out the general idea of the struggle over resources, 
the deeper subtext discusses the origins for the US’ drive to maintain control over 
resources in the Middle East and the reactions to the Western-style society from the 
Muslim world. The US holds the dominant force in the world for numerous reasons, 
which nations often attempt to imitate due to its political and economic success. Its 
dominant role is attributed to two reasons: first, to the need for resource security to 
maintain its high-consumption rate and second, the maintenance of the US dollar’s 
position in the international oil market. A different economic strategy results from the 
US’ international force driven by the US’ neoconservative movement for “Pax 
Americana,” or total American domination. The US’ hidden agendas for resource 
domination are hidden by the way the Muslim world is portrayed seen similarly to the 
depictions of Soviets during the Cold War.  
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 Thus when the Muslim world responds to the industrialized world of 
modernization and globalization, Islamic fundamentalism (or political Islam) is 
fatally misunderstood in its attempt to respond to the modern, rationalized world of 
the US interests in the Middle East. A small Muslim minority of Islamic 
fundamentalists became the face of Islam, obscuring and misinterpreting Islam’s 
entire message at the price of starting a ‘cosmic war.’ The response calls for a 
reemergence of Islam in societies seen as too modern or too “Western,” and Islam 
existing as the savior for the world’s problems of corruption, materialism, and 
immorality. The 18th century leader of the Wahhabi movement in Saudi Arabia, al-
Wahhab, and the 20th century Egyptian radical thinker, Sayyid Qutb, both played 
influential roles in Islamic fundamentalism in the 21st century. Both articulate the 
struggle against invading forces framed by their own experiences with foreign 
powers, which hinder the proselytization of Islam. However, the reality lies in the fact 
that conflict results from the hatred of certain radical Islamic fundamentalists towards 
the modernization of their world as a result of structural powers applied to societies 
seen with oil and water.  
  The conflicts over resources stress the noteworthy concern over the effect of 
Western structural pressures in Muslim societies. The concern of Islamic 
fundamentalists over the US’ international influence represents a clash of human 
interests rather than a clash of civilizations or religions. Illuminating the US’ 
excessive consumption and exploitation of the world’s resources, the US’ hidden 
structural pressures are demystified as a tangible force as the protection of resources.3  
                                                
3 David Orr. “Millennial Hope: Climate Change and Far Horizon for Possibility.” 2008 Hart Institute 
Lecture Series, Pomona College, Claremont, California 
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 Organization 
 Chapter 1 is a discussion of the theoretical position of religion in modern 
society using the two hypotheses, Max Weber’s “secularization theory” and Samuel 
Huntington’s “clash of civilizations.” The secularization theory states that the modern 
world in the 20th century has experienced a decline of religion in society, religious 
beliefs, practices, and institutions. The chapter begins with criticisms of the theory 
that it is a valid premise for argument, seen in the articles, “Toward Desacrilizing 
Secularization Theory,” by Jeffrey K. Hadden, and, “The Case Against Secularization 
Theory: A Rebuttal,” by Frank J. Lechner4. A discussion follows of the varying 
opinions regarding the secularization theory and whether or not it is correct. Peter 
Berger and Mark Chaves support secularization theory, while David Brooks and 
Rodney Stark refute the argument and believe religion is thriving.  
 The “clash of civilizations” presents the hypothesis that our world’s conflicts 
are over differing civilizations, cultures, and religions. Huntington’s argument is 
explained and elaborated on, followed by a criticism and rejection of the legitimacy 
of the argument. Edward Said’s article titled, “The Clash of Definitions,”5 and Roy P. 
Mottahedeh’s article titled, “The Clash of Civilizations: An Islamicist’s Critique,”6 
are used to negate the “clash of civilizations” hypothesis. The chapter ends with a 
                                                
4 Jeffrey K. Hadden. “Toward Desacralizing Secularization Theory,” Social Forces, Vol. 65, No. 3 
(Mar., 1987), Frank J. Lechner. “The Case against Secularization: A Rebuttal.” Social Forces, Vol. 69, 
No. 4 (Jun., 1991) 
5 Edward W. Said, “The Clash of Definitions,” in The New Crusades: Constructing the Muslim Entity, 
ed. Emran Qureshi and Michael A. Sells (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003) 
6 Roy P. Mottahedeh, “The Clash of Civilizations: An Islamicist’s Critique,” in The New Crusades: 
Constructing the Muslim Entity, ed. Emran Qureshi and Michael A. Sells (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2003), 133. 
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discussion of the sacred and how it has changed during the modern age. Max L. 
Stackhouse’s article, “The Location of the Holy,”7 is used to discuss this argument 
that the sacred and the holy are seen differently that its past uses in society. 
 In order introduce Islamic fundamentalism, I used Roxanne L. Euben’s book 
Enemy in the Mirror to discuss its relationship with the “rationalized” society that 
influences the movement’s very existence, purpose, and actions, however creating a 
culturally constructed discourse. The “rationalism” denotes a “progress of reason” 
from 19th century theories of rationalization, linked first to the advance of Western 
culture that results in a modernized narrative. 8  Rationalized societies create the 
phenomenon of Islamic fundamentalism as a functional, epiphenomenal paradox by 
assuming its reactions are solely politically or socio-economically motivated, which 
further reinforces the neglect of the fundamentalist view as being valid and justified. 
Likewise, the vital characteristics of the movement’s religious faith and inspiration 
are disregarded, and become “functionalized” to the point that its true meaning is 
misconstrued into an “irrational,” distorted meaning. The resistance of Islamic 
fundamentalism to the struggle against Western structural pressures uses a cultural 
and political context to mobilize their protest against modernization through the claim 
of religious reform.  
 The purpose of the chapter is to expose the reality of the place of religion and 
Islamic fundamentalism in the context of conflict. Natural resources, intertwined with 
political mobilization, are the tangible influences acting upon the Middle East that 
Islamic fundamentalism resists to in the name of religious revival. Oil and water stand 
                                                
7 Max L. Stackhouse. “The Location of the Holy.” The Journal of Religious Ethics. Vol. 4, No. 1 
(1976) 
8 Roxanne L. Euben. The Enemy in the Mirror. (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999), 21. 
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as the two most important natural resources in the Middle East, and create a torrent of 
charged interests to the region. 
 Chapter 2 is a discussion of the new religion of the world from the Western 
perspective, the “religion of the market,” where the globalization and modernization 
takes the place of the holy and sacred. The obscured view of the “war on terror” 
occurs as a result of the US’ concern to protect and secure their economic, social, and 
geopolitical powers on the world scene, specifically in the Middle East. The US’ 
current world economic strategy, known as “McWorld”, is represented through the 
US’ frantic concern to control the world’s dwindling natural resources and to lock the 
US dollar as the primary form of currency. Neo-conservatism and its founding father, 
Leo Strauss, are discussed to provide a basis for where the US began its 
interventionalist approach to foreign policy, followed by its percolation into the 
White House beginning with President Ronald Reagan. The US’ current policies on 
foreign affairs are elaborated on, looking at universality, the promotion of democracy, 
and the agenda used to achieve its hidden interests.  
  Chapter 3 deconstructs the Islamic fundamental resistance to the world’s 
current political systems and wielded structural pressure, described in Chapter 2. The 
Wahhabi movement and Sayyid Qutb have influenced the Islamic fundamental 
mindset in the Middle East due to their reaction against imperial forces through the 
incorporation of religion and political mobilization. The Wahhabi movement began in 
Saudi Arabia in the 18th century as a puritanical form of Islam, which traveled to 
Afghanistan during the war in 1979 and remained a central facet to many of the 
mujahidin trying to bring about a global Wahhabi campaign. Sayyid Qutb was an 
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Egyptian Islamist fundamental thinker in the 20th century that called for a 
revitalization of the jahiliyyah society, or state of barbarous ignorance that opposes 
the Islamic constitution, state, and laws,9  which Qutb saw as the root for the world’s 
current state of affairs. Both the Wahhabi movement and Sayyid Qutb called for a 
reinstatement of Islam into the Western-influenced society that has strayed from 
Islam’s values and morals according to shar’ia law, and fallen into a state of 
jahiliyyah. The chapter concludes with a dialogue over these influential voices on 
current Islamic fundamental mindsets, seen with Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda. 
The current movement’s response to the West is framed in a similar fashion to the 
previous thinkers’ responses to imperial influence. Conflict in the Middle East does 
not concern differing civilizations or religions, but calls attention to the rapidly 
changing world that, in some eyes, is seen as hazardous to all aspects of life.  
 Chapter 4 and 5 explain the tangible examples (natural resources), rather than 
solely differing civilizations or religions, to explain the conflicts between the US and 
Islamic fundamentalism. Chapter 4 details the complex relationship of the US and the 
Persian Gulf, specifically in Saudi Arabia, over the control and flow of oil. A 
historical outline of the US’ dependence on foreign oil is charted, followed by the 
attempt of the US to create and maintain a force over oil and power in the Middle 
East against the “oil sword” of Saudi Arabia. Chapter 5 describes the place of water 
within the Israeli-Palestinian peace conflict and its force that remains at the heart of 
the Israeli and Palestinian claim to nationhood.  Palestine’s sources of water are 
described, followed by its allocation to Israeli and Palestinian populations. Each 
                                                
9 Wanttoknow.info. DaanSpeak. “Power of Nightmares-The Rise of the Politics of Fear.” Episode 1, 
“Baby It’s Cold Outside.” http://www.daanspeak.com/TranscriptPowerOfNightmares1.html (Accessed 
April 2, 2009) 
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group equally needs adequate water sources to support the possibility of a strong and 




 The general methodological theories that permeate through this thesis are ones 
that discuss the misleading dichotomy of the “West” versus the “East” or “us” versus 
“them.” Samuel Huntington and Bernard Lewis introduce the simplistic reason of the 
“clash of civilizations” to explain the world’s conflicts in their articles titled “Clash of 
Civilizations?” and “The Roots of Muslim Rage.” Their work is used to show the 
subjective accusation that simplifies the conflict into a theoretical and mystified 
concept, which rapidly grows in the general public opinion largely unnoticed. 
  Edward Said’s Orientalism, published in 1978, is used to analyze the Western 
view towards the Middle East regarding the “us” versus “them” paradigm.10 The 
definition of “Orientalism” is important for this discussion due to this topic’s 
rejection of this imperialistic and oversimplified Orientalist view. Said’s work sheds 
light on the break down of the Orientalist view that oversimplifies the differing 
civilizations and cultures.   
 The literature in Chapter 1 is organized into the subsections of the two 
theories, the secularization theory and the “clash of civilization.” Even though the 
decline of religion has been hypothesized since the Enlightenment, and later 
thoroughly defined as the secularization theory by Max Weber in the first half of the 
                                                
10 Edward Said. Orientalism (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978)  
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20th century, the majority of literature discussing the theory was published after 1960. 
Articles from the two magazines, Sociology of Religion and Social Forces, are used to 
deconstruct the validity of the theory in order to give an accurate foundation for 
readers concerning the secularization theory. Similarly from these two articles, I 
looked at 20th century authors that refuted and supported the secularization theory and 
thematically set up the chapter accordingly. Contributing authors to The Atlantic 
Monthly supported and refuted the secularization theory, like David Brooks and Peter 
Berger, which proves that literature on the theory is (first), expansive and has been 
thoroughly analyzed, and (second), has transcended from solely academic circles to 
media and political ones.  
 The literature for the subsection of the “clash of civilizations” begins in 1990 
with Bernard Lewis’ article, “The Roots of Muslim Rage.”11 Samuel Huntington 
develops Lewis’ theory of the “clash of civilizations” in his own article published in 
Foreign Affairs in 1993 titled, “The Clash of Civilizations?” These two articles blend 
together opinion and historical fact to weave a seemingly logical explanation for the 
reasons why the “West” is in conflict with the “East.” Literature used to criticize the 
theory comes from the author of Orientalism, Edward Said, and the Islamicist, Roy P. 
Mottahedeh, and together are highly critical of Huntington’s generalizing methods 
when explaining world conflict.  
 In order to bridge the chapter’s discussion of religion with Islam, two books 
are used to introduce Islam and the Islamic fundamentalist movement. Francis 
Robinson’s Max Weber and Islam is used to discuss Islam from Weber’s point of 
view. Roxanne L. Euben’s Enemy in the Mirror is used to demonstrate Islamic 
                                                
11 Bernard Lewis. “The Roots of Muslim Rage.” The Atlantic Monthly. 1990. 
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fundamentalism as a social science model rather than a solely theological one. 
Modern rationalism influences the movement’s definition as a social science model, 
which provides vital insight into the Islamic fundamental mindset. The rationalist 
viewpoint also influences structural pressures exerted on Muslim nations. This 
section of Chapter 1 helps lead into Chapter 2’s discussion of the US’ influence in 
international affairs, explaining the origins and tangible policies of the rationalist 
perspective.  
 The literature for Chapter 2 is comprised of quantitative and qualitative 
research used to bolster the US’ interest for control over resources and power 
internationally. Benjamin R. Barber’s term of “McWorld” is used to explain the US’ 
type of interest, while Noam Chomsky, Michael Klare, and William R. Clark are used 
to detail the US’ dependence on foreign oil and its desire to maintain the US dollar’s 
global position. For a historical understanding of the origins of the US’ foreign 
policies and rationalized world, literature on Leo Strauss’ “natural right” is employed. 
The documentary, The Power of Nightmares, is used to show one perception of the 
US’ hidden international agenda, in addition to the basis for the final section 
discussing the formed “hidden enemy.” 
 Chapter 3 uses primary and secondary sources to delve into the meaning 
behind the grievances from the Muslim perspective concerning the modernized and 
rationalized world. To frame the discussion on Islamic fundamentalism, the 
Gramscian approach is used as a methodological tool to explain the Islamic 
fundamentalist response to the US’ international strategy and perspective, seen in 
Thomas R. Bates’ article titled, “Gramsci and the Theory of Hegemony.” Muslim 
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perspectives from the 18th and 20th century reacting to imperial powers frames the 
current Islamic fundamental mindset using the primary sources of Kitab al-Tawhid by 
Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab  as well as Social Justice in Islam and Milestones by 
Sayyid Qutb. Secondary sources provide analysis for each thinker’s rationale, seen in 
Richard Booney’s Jihad, from Qur’an to Bin Laden and John Esposito’s Unholy War: 
Terror in the Name of Islam. Stephen Schartz’s The Two Faces of Islam and the 
documentary, The Power of Nightmares, are controversial sources due to their 
subjective perspectives, yet are carefully used for their historical explanations. The 
effect of these past Islamic thinkers is exposed through a discussion of Osama bin 
Laden  and Al-Qaeda, using Bruce Lawrence’s Messages to the World: The 
Statements of Osama bin Laden as a primary source.  
 The literature of Chapter’s 4 and 5 also include quantitative and qualitative 
data to demonstrate the influence of resources in conflicts in the Middle East. 
Concerning Chapter 4’s discussion of oil, in 2004 and 2005 alone, twenty books were 
published about the emerging crisis of oil as a dwindling natural resource.12 For this 
thesis, I used two of Michael Klare’s books titled, Blood and Oii, and Resource Wars. 
Blood and Oil discusses the relationship between the US and its dependence on oil, 
mainly foreign, and the numerous consequences it will have for the US’ future. 13 
Resource Wars discusses oil and other natural resources that are being demanded by 
the world’s growing populations and consumption rates. 14 Klare highlights the 
sizeable influence that resources have on conflicts in regions around the world, 
                                                
12 “The Power of Community: How Cuba Survived Peak Oil.” Copyright Community Service, Inc. 53 
mins. www.communitysolution.org/cuba accessed April 6, 2009 
13 Michael Klare. Blood and Oil 
14 Michael Klare. Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict (New York: Metropolitan 
Books, 2001) 
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clashing over oil, water, timber, gems and minerals. Resources become a geopolitical 
concern for nations that depend on the resources for their nation’s livelihood.  
 Matthew R. Simmons’ book titled, Twilight in the Desert, and Steven 
Emerson’s book titled, The American House of Saud: The Secret Petrodollar 
Connection, both touch on the US’ alliance with the kingdom of Saudi Arabia over 
the control and availability of oil. 15  While Emerson’s book must be looked at as a 
subjective source due to its slanted perspective on the Saudi regime, the two works 
give extensive history and background on the US’ influence over oil and control in 
Saudi Arabia at the beginning of the 20th century.  
 For the discussion of water, the article titled, “Religion, State, and the 
International System in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,” provides an important 
groundwork for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, highlighting the nationalist and statist 
relations as the source of conflict rather than for religious or theological reasons. 16 
Water rights directly influence the goal of a nation or state, yet in Palestine are 
unequally distributed throughout the region’s populations siding either with the plight 
of the Israelis or Palestinians. Herbert C. Kelman’s chapter in the book, Islam, 
Judaism, and the Political Role of Religion the Middle East17, deconstructs the idea of 
national identity and its meaning for each group. 
                                                
15 Matthew R. Simmons. Twilight in the Desert: The Steven Emerson. The American House of Saud: 
The Secret Petrodollar Connection (New York: New Republic, 1985) Coming Saudi Oil Shock and the 
World Economy (New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2005), 
16 Hillel Frisch, Shmuel Sandler, “Religion, State, and the International System in the Israeli-
Palestinian Conflict.” International Political Science Review, Vol. 25, no. 1 (January 2004), 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1601623, 
17 Herbert C. Kelman. “National Identity and the Role of the ‘Other’ in Existential Conflicts: The 
Israeli-Palestinian Case,” in Islam, Judaism and the Political Role of Religion in the Middle East, 
edited by John Bunzl, 61-74. Florida: University Press of Florida, 2004.  
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 I used three articles that provide quantitative data for understanding the water 
sources in Palestine, and the allotted amount for Israelis and Palestinians. Hillel 
Shuval’s article in the spring 2000 edition of Arab Studies Quarterly gives a general 
overview of the quantitative data of the region’s wells and springs, amount of, 
sources of, and its production and consumption rates of water. 18 Nadav Morag’s 
article the Middle Eastern Quarterly in 200119 offers the discussion of water rights 
from the Israeli perspective, while Munther J. Haddadin’s article in The Geographical 
Journal in 200220 presents the water rights from the Palestinian perspective. The three 
authors are crucial for their quantitative research concerning the water sources in 
Palestine.  
 By bridging together topics ranging from philosophy, politics, Islamic theory, 
and natural resources, my thesis proves to demonstrate the power and influence of 
natural resources in our current world. In the 21st century, the current conflicts are the 
Islamic fundamentalist response to the structural pressures from natural resources 
controlled by Western influences. This perceived confrontation is not due to differing 
religions or civilizations, but to an evolving society that deems tradition as more 






                                                
18 Hillel I. Shuval. “A proposal for an equitable resolution to the conflicts between the Israelis and the 
Palestinians over the shared water resources of the mountain aquifer.” Arab Studies Quarterly. 
Belmont: Spring 2000, Vol. 22, Iss. 2, pg. 33. 
19 Nadav Morag. “Water, Geopolitics and State Building: The Case of Israel.” Middle Eastern 
Quarterly, Vol. 37, no. 3, (July 2001). 
20 Munther Haddadin. “Water in the Middle East Peace Process.” The Geographical Journal, Vol. 168, 
No. 4, Water Wars? Geographical Perspectives. December 2002. 324-340. 
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Chapter 1 




 Since the Enlightenment of the 17th century, the place of religion in society 
has been the subject of much debate. Thomas Woolston, an English deist of the 17th 
century, theorized that modernity would prevail over the Christian faith by 1900.21 
Yet in the 20th century, a German sociologist named Max Weber pioneered the term 
“the secularization theory” stating that society in the 20th century is less dependent on 
the authority of religion as a position of authority and religion has lost its past social 
significance.22 According to A Dictionary of Sociology, religion is measured “by 
religious attendance, commitment to orthodox belief, support for organized religion in 
terms of payments, membership, and respect.”23 Frank J. Lechner, a critic of the 
actual premise of the theory, defines secularization as “a general theory of societal 
change, consisting of a coherent body of empirical generalizations that rests on 
fundamental Weberian premise.” Lechner notes that religion in Western societies 
experienced a decline “in cultural and social influence of religious ideas and 
institutions.”24 Lechner also observes the importance of the emergence of 
rationalization that changes certain societies transcendental worldviews, becoming 
deeply sacralized.25  
                                                
21 Rodney Stark. “Secularization, R.I.P.” Sociology of Religion, Vol. 60, No. 3 (Autumn, 1999), 249. 
22 Andrew Giddings. “The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion by Peter 
Berger.” INDS 581: Christian Faith and Practice in a (Post) Modern World. Craig M. Gay 
23 Gordon Marshall. “secularization.” A Dictionary of Sociology, 1998. 
http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1O88-secularization.html accessed April 11, 2009 
24 Frank J. Lechner. “The Case against Secularization: A Rebuttal.” Social Forces, Vol. 69, No. 4 
(Jun., 1991), 1106. 
25 Ibid. 1104. 
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 The root of the secularization theory developed from the Weberian view of 
rationality within the Christian West. According to the theory, rationality increases 
with the “human capacity to calculate and to control all aspects of life without appeals 
either to traditional norms or to charismatic enthusiasm.”26 As the economy, legal 
system, and society move towards a more rational and technological form of living, 
individuals rely less on religion to control their lives, known as Weber’s 
“disenfranchisement of the world”27. “To find direction, and to win security in this 
world and the next, the human being no longer needs either to revere or coerce the 
spirits.”28 Science also explains natural and cultural facets of the world, downgrading 
religion’s importance in public life, and creating a “fragmentation of human 
[understandings] of the world.”29  Religion is forced out of economic, political, and 
social conduct, is separated from private and public life, and no longer stands as one 
large, cohesive entity. Disenchantment and fragmentation of human understandings 
of the world characterize the secularization theory as its main themes concerning the 
change of religion in society.  
 The majority of Max Weber’s work is a unique Western development 
centering in Western Europe, yet holds great importance for looking at secularization 
theory in the Islamic world. Through the Weberian lens of the modern Western vision 
of studying the civilizations, rationalist views, and capitalist theories, Islam is used as 
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the anomaly to explain why they did not developed in Islam.30  While S.N. Eisenstadt 
believes that Weber’s understanding and description of Islam in civilizations is 
wrong31, his concept of Islam in relation to the secularization in societies is vital for 
our discussion. 
 The next section will look at the secularization theory, including a general 
critique of the theory, followed by its rejection and support by numerous authors, and 
ending with the application of secularization to the Islamic world. Samuel 
Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” will follow the Weberian perspective on 
secularization in the Islamic world to further understand religion’s place.  
  
Criticisms of the actual theory of secularization 
 In Jeffrey K. Hadden’s article, “Toward Descralizing Secularization Theory,” 
Hadden finds numerous challenges to the secularization theory. The basis for Weber’s 
theory rests on the ‘presuppositions . . . [that] represent a taken-for-granted ideology’ 
of social scientists ‘rather than a systematic set of interrelated propositions.’”32 It is 
“causally” used as a link between the decline of religion and modernization, yet no 
definitive link is given to hold the two together other than the proposition of their 
relation as an “orienting concept.”33  Religion is also difficult to qualitatively measure 
because of its subjective nature, noting Charles Glock’s opinion: “It is extremely 
                                                
30 S.N. Eisenstadt. “Weber’s Analysis of Islam and the Specific Pattern of Islamic Civilizations.” In 
Max Weber and Islam, ed. Toby E. Huff and Wolfgang Schluchter (New Jersey: Transaction 
Publishers, 1999), 281. 
31 Ibid. 282. 
32 William H. Jr Swatos and Kevin J. Christiano. “Secularization Theory: The Course of a Concept.” 
Sociology of Religion, Fall 1999, 211. 
33 Jeffrey K. Hadden. “Toward Desacralizing Secularization Theory,” Social Forces, Vol. 65, No. 3 
(Mar., 1987) 598. 
  23 
doubtful that accurate statistics can be produced through manipulating the unreliable 
ones.”34 Religious movements of the 1960’s and 1970’s in the US and Europe, like 
the new Christian and Eastern religious revivals, are improperly used to support the 
theory, and instead are the result of a socially constructed counterculture. Finally, 
religion is described in privatized terms, or the religion meant for the individual, 
which downplays its influence in politics, seen in issues such as Catholics versus 
Protestants in Northern Ireland, Muslims versus Jews in Palestine, and the fanatical 
overthrow of the Shah of Iran.35 Reasons for conflict are reduced to ethnic hostilities 
rather than taking into account the effect of religion.  
 Hadden’s four challenges to the secularization theory draw back to his 
conclusion that the theory is “very much a product of the social and cultural milieu 
from which it emerged.” Corresponding to Hadden’s critical stance against the 
theory, the works of a professor of sociologist at Emory University, Frank J. Lechner, 
is used to discern criticisms concerning the secularization theory. Frank J. Lechner 
provides five criticisms for the theory in his article titled, “The Case Against 
Secularization Theory: A Rebuttal.”36 Lechner’s main argument against 
secularization theory states that the theory claims “to account for societal variations in 
secularization, relying on contingent features of social change and religious 
arrangements in different societies.”37 Lechner supports Hadden’s criticism as 
valuable insights to the discussion of secularization, yet disagrees with the way in 
which he approaches the debate.  
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 Contrary to Hadden, Lechner views the secularization theory as more of a 
“coherent theory, Weberian in inspiration and based on a century of collective 
scholarly activity.”38 The historical presupposition of religion having a “golden age” 
ignores the fact that new religions and religious behaviors have not ceased and are 
reoccurring. The secularization theory interprets religious decline in Western societies 
to degeneration rather than to religious transformation that brings about a search for 
new gods. 
 Looking generally at the secularization theory, Lechner criticizes the status 
and existence of the theory. He believes that religious revivals do not have an indirect 
relationship with secularism, and are based off of local phenomena. Religious 
fundamentalism exists to reverse secularization and to restore a religious order to the 
secularized world. It is given a purpose to desecularize in the purpose-lacking secular 
world. Social and cultural strengths of religious institutions account for the local 
phenomenon of religious fundamentalism, rather than on account of the actual 
secularization process.39 
 Lechner’s final claim is that secularization theory is irrelevant, and globalism 
is the culprit for creating a new world order and global change. The secularization 
theory must be treated “as at best a partial account of a part of the overall process of 
global change and as a problematic component of global culture.”40 The 
secularization theory cannot merely apply to individual societies, but must encompass 
a new ‘global theory.’ It  needs to move out of the idea that everything initially came 
from the Middle Ages “Christendom” as Western-centered, rooted in Christian origin. 
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Whether the secularization theory is true or false, a discussion of both sides will be 
necessary to supplement religion’s role in world. 
 
Is religion is declining or thriving? 
 There is a varied amount of scholarship concerning the support of the 
secularization theory, seen by authors such as Bryan Wilson, Thomas Luckman, 
Karel Dubbelaere, Mark Chaves, and Peter Berger. The opinions of Mark Chaves and 
Peter Berger in support of the secularization theory will follow that add valuable 
insights to this side of the theory.   
 Seen in Peter Berger’s book titled, The Sacred Canopy, Berger supports 
secularization theory and sees religion as declining. He argues that humans require a 
“‘sacred canopy’ in order to make sense of the world, because meaninglessness is a 
threat to our need for an orderly universe.”41 Berger agrees to an extent that religion is 
reemerging due to the importance of religion as an “internal supporting structure,” to 
society, known as a process of legitimating. His notion of reality and individuals 
creates legitimizations that “answer the ‘why’ questions concerning ‘institutional 
arrangements.’”42 Legitimating “reinforce the what’s and the why’s of society” as 
new people become a part of the religion as well as during a crisis, either collective or 
individual, where “the veil between meaning and chaos grows particularly thin.” 
Legitimations are supported by plausibility structures, being specific social processes 
that reinforce and reconstruct the legitimate world, such as religion. If a plausibility 
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structure is weak, legitimations must be strong and sophisticated, speaking of 
religion’s influence to explain the why’s and what’s about life. And likewise, if the 
plausibility structure is strong, then a relatively simple legitimation is needed, thus 
possibly a relatively simple explanation of the what’s and why’s of the world. 
Berger’s view of religion is one that is described by religions power to “ ‘locate’ 
human phenomena within a cosmic frame of reference.”   
 However, theodicy, defined by Berger as the explanations given of suffering, 
evil, and death in terms of religious legitimations, is the greatest task when explaining 
religious legitimation because of anthropodicy. With the move away from 
Catholicism, Protestantism divided the world into secular and sacred spheres that 
pluralized society. Competition within the religious realm over plausibility structures 
broke down the order of the world that used to have an “over-arching idea of truth,” 
while in the end religion became relativized. Theology as a whole becomes criticized, 
with the orthodox side trying to “[assert] the objectivity of Biblical revelation.” These 
orthodox resurgences are “merely interruptions in the secularization process.”  
 Interestingly, in 1997 Berger took back his support for the secularization 
theory, noting the improper correlation between secularization and modernity. “There 
is some evidence for it. But I think it’s basically wrong. Most of the world today is 
certainly not secular. It’s very religious.”43  
  Through the work of Mark Chaves, secularization theory has evolved from 
the decline in religion to the decline in religious authority.44 In Chaves’ article titled, 
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“Secularization as Declining Religious Authority,”45 he describes secularization 
theory as reformulated in a differing manner in his “new differentiation theory”46 than 
its classical perception portrays.47 Within religion’s new definition, societal spheres 
that secularization theory claims to harm religion, like the state or science, do not 
undermine religion. “ Secularization occurs, or not, as the result of social and political 
conflicts between those social actors who would enhance or maintain religion’s social 
significance and those who would reduce it.”48 A religious authority’s legitimation 
can exist from this power, while its power is called upon by a supernatural referent. 
“Secularization as declining religious authority, then, will refer to the declining 
influence of social structures whose legitimation rests on reference to the 
supernatural.”49  
 Numerous individuals believe that humanity is experiencing a growth in 
religious zeal opposite the secularization theory that hypothesized the decline of 
religion. The first to deny secularization theory was in 1965 by David Martin, a 
contemporary sociologist.50  
 The contemporary journalist for The Atlantic Monthly, David Brooks, holds 
the anti-secularist view in the article, “Kicking the Secularist Habit.”51 Brooks notes 
numerous successes in the religious world concerning an increase in religious fervor. 
For instance, “Orthodox Judaism grows among young people, and Israel has gotten 
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more religious as it has become more affluent,”52 as well as the success of Philip 
Jenkins’s career as a proponent for Christianity’s international growth in the 20th 
century. Brooks also claims that denominations that refuse to adapt to secularism are 
growing the fastest, including ecstatic forms of Christianity and “anti-modern” Islam.  
 Rodney Stark, a fellow Atlantic reporter and sociologist, also argues against 
the secularization theory, stating that “the vision of a religionless future is but 
illusions.”53 Stark does not agree with the secularization theory’s reciprocal 
relationship between modernization and religious belief. In his article titled, 
“Secularization R.I.P.,” he attributes and disproves five notions against the theory: the 
myth of the religious decline, the myth of past piety, the failure to Christianize, 
subjective religiousness, and the relationship of science and religion.  
 First, there is a universal agreement that modernization, which includes 
industrialization, urbanization, and rationalization, will lead to a religious decline. 
This assumes that modernization is a short, quick and immediate process, when in 
fact it’s a “long, gradual, relatively constant process,”54 making the secularization 
theory extraneous. Societies are affected by multiple reasons other than 
modernization that can affect religious participation. A “myth” of religious decline, as 
well as a decline in religious piety, is created due to false and inaccurate data “ based 
in part on very exaggerated perceptions of past religiousness.”55 
 Second, the secularization theory focuses on individual piety and belief, and 
does not concern institutional differentiation. Today religious institutions, like the 
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Catholic Church, have less political power than they once had. Likewise, 
secularization theorists believe that as the power of religious institutions decrease, so 
will personal piety.  However, Stark feels that this focus is historically false and 
insincere, and cites Karel Dobbelaere’s criticism that personal piety is not a valid 
indicator of religiosity. “The religiousness of individuals is not a valid indicator in 
evaluating the process of secularization.”56 For Dobbelaere, secularization is a 
societal-level process, “driven by functional differentiation, to which religious 
organizations and individuals react.”57 Important to note is Stark’s mention of the 
subjectivity of religiosity for every individual, which should follow a certain doctrine. 
The lack of stereotypical religious participation, like attending church, does not 
correlate with the extent of a church goers faith.58 
 Third, there is a presumed incompatibility between religion and science, and 
that science “has the most deadly implications for religion.”59 By using a 
questionnaire from the 1914 article in Nature by American psychologist James 
Lueba, Stark noted that scientists are not “notably irreligious.”60 The findings 
concluded that, “over an 82-year period, there has been no decline in a very literal 
belief in God among scientists.”61 Thus according to Lueba and used by Stark, 
religion has not been on the decline in the science community, which further negates 
the secularization theory.   
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 Fourth, Stark notes the secularization theory’s focus on Christianity. 
Discussion of the secularization theory must be broader than just Christianity and 
must study other religions and cultures globally.62 With respect to Islam’s religious 
revival, Stark claims the compatibility of the Islamic faith and modernization, and 
even its religious commitment, as increasing with modernization.63 A study done by 
Joseph Tamney looking at Islam in Java, Indonesia, concluded that “religious 
commitment was positively correlated with education and with occupational 
prestige.”64 People with a college education or with a high status occupation were 
more likely to participate in Islamic practices than people with little education and 
low status occupations. Stark concludes that modernization will not be the reason for 
the demise of faith, and the secularization theory will remain as a “product of wishful 
thinking.”65 
 The two sides to over secularization theory represent the expansive influence 
that religion, or the lack of religion, has on a society. The US and Europe represent 
societies that have become more secular in the past 100 years, while many poor 
developing nations show a surge in religiosity such as nations in Africa and Asia. Phil 
Zuckerman, a professor of sociology at Pitzer College, asserts that secularization 
theory must only be thought of as a possibility since no social phenomenon is 
inevitable. A society is constantly moving in a circular motion regarding social 
phenomenon, including religion’s place within a society. Religion is regarded as one 
possible perspective concerning secularization in the West, according to Francis 
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Robinson in “Secularization, Weber, and Islam.”66 Secularization theory holds many 
different pathways concerning ideology, nationalism, and religious change.67 
  
Secularization Theory in the Islamic World 
 In the current discussion of religion’s place in the Islamic world, the 
secularization theory is both supported and refuted. Ernest Gellner’s forward to Islam, 
Globalization, and Postmodernity states that the secularization theory applies to Islam 
and argues that the Islamic world holds religion to a different degree for its 
incorporation into everyday life. It varies from country to country, and occurs in 
socially radical countries as well as fundamental ones as a result to modernization. 
However, in Abubaker A. Bagader’s chapter titled, “Contemporary Islamic 
movements in the Arab world,” 68 he refutes the notion that secularization theory 
applies to Islam, stating that Islam retains control between the secular and the sacred 
keeping them indivisible.69  
 By adopting Weber’s perspectives of disenfranchisement and fragmentation, a 
clearer picture is illustrated when understanding the secularization theory from the 
perspective from the Islamic world. As Francis Robinson noted, disenfranchisement 
and fragmentation occur on structural levels concerning the law, learning and power, 
as well as in subjective terms from the consciousness of human beings. However, 
these classifications are from the Christian Europe perspective in addition to the fact 
that secularization “was a consequence of the projection of Western capital and power 
                                                
 
67 Gordon Marshall. “secularization.”  
68 Ernest Gellner. Postmodernism, reason, and religion xiv. 
69 Abubaker A. Bagader. “Contemporary Islamic movements in the Arab world.” 114. 
  32 
into the Islamic world from 1800 onward.”70 Muslim societies learned to adapt to the 
Christian West’s form of secularization rather than creating their own due their 
entanglement with Western economic influence, power, and thought. The 
secularization theory develops with Islam as a different world than Weber’s Christian 
West. 
 According to Weber’s secularization theory Islam, must be looked at in terms 
of its society in which Islam exists. The level of religiosity in Islamic societies should 
be measured by the extent to which they follow shari’a (the body of Islamic law as a 
theocracy), and its secularity should be looked at according the degree that it does not 
follow shari’a.71 However, the use of the shari’a in the 19th and 20th centuries has 
changed dramatically for numerous reasons in every Muslim society, including the 
“[fuelling] by continuing movements of reform, by vast increases in the availability 
of Islamic knowledge, and by favourable economic and social changes, which have 
brought Muslims to live lives closer to the shari’a.”72  A process of Islamization 
occurs, which supports the notion of secularization in Islamic terms as well as 
existing as “notable a feature of recent Islamic developments, as one fo 
secularizations, following Weber’s theory of secularization.”73 
 As an example of “extremist factions,” Islamic fundamentalism must be 
understood in terms of its definition to oppose modern rationalism.74 According to 
Roxanne Euben, discourse surrounding Islamic fundamentalism “interprets and 
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structures political life through the opposition of a notion of rationality to irrationality 
derived from distinctively Western moments in modern political and social 
thought.”75 The grievances among Islamic fundamentalists are generated from the 
reactions against the process of modernization and from their expectations of greater 
opportunities for advancement.76 Roxanne Euben also notes the emerging Islamic 
fundamentalists as the overeducated and underemployed class that might have led the 
modernization process, and are now gravitating towards “the extremes of political 
action, attracted toward the instruments of propaganda, agitation and violence.”77 
 Through this understanding, the resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism is 
deconstructed to reveal the power of the movement to perceive itself as solely 
situated in “the imperative of divine sovereignty and absolute truths of revelation.”78 
The often-misinterpreted assumption that Islamic fundamentalism is a reaction to 
political or socioeconomic circumstances reinforce the neglect of the movement’s 
system of ideas “as a substantive vision for the world.”79 The total effects acting on 
Islamic fundamentalism must be looked at to determine the origins of the movement. 
 By examining the different views on secularization theory, one can conclude 
that the level of religiosity of a culture or society cannot alone explain current 
conflicts. While religion holds a significant place in society, the degree of a religion’s 
place in a culture cannot be correlated with conflict since religion and culture are 
subjective for every individual and nation.  The following section will discuss 
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alternative reasons for conflict, such as Samuel Huntington’s theory of the “clash of 
civilizations,” which theorizes that civilizations, cultures, and religions collide 
because of their differing civilizations, cultures, and religions.  
 
A Clash of Civilizations? 
 In the post-Cold War era of the 20th century, Samuel Huntington was the 
leading American political scientist to explain the world’s current state of conflict. 
From his well-known thesis on the new world order outlined in an article published in 
Foreign Affairs in 1993 titled,  “The Clash of Civilizations?” Huntington asserts that 
culture, rather than ideological or economic reasons, is the fundamental source of 
conflict.80 In the article, Huntington fleshed out the phrase, “the clash of 
civilizations,” from Bernard Lewis’ coinage of it in the latter article’s titled, “The 
Roots of Muslim Rage,” which appeared in the September 1990 issue of The Atlantic 
Monthly. Lewis stresses that “Muslim rage” is targeted at the US due to “ [an] 
irrational but surely historic reaction of an ancient rival against our Judeo-Christian 
heritage, our secular present, and the worldwide expansion of both.”81 After 
September 11, the “clash of civilizations” theory was used to explain the motives for 
the attack, attributing it to “a new war between the Islamic world and the (mostly) 
Christian West.”82 Seen in an October 2001 interview with bin Laden and Taysir 
Alluni, al-Jazeera’s most celebrated reporter, bin Laden agrees that the conflict is a 
“clash of civilizations.”83 “This [Clash of Civilizations] is a very clear matter, proven 
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in the Qur’an and the traditions of the Prophet, and any true believer who claims to be 
faithful shouldn’t doubt these truths, no matter what anybody says about them.”84 Not 
only is this theory accepted in Western mindset, but in Muslim perspectives as well.  
 Huntington defines a civilization as a cultural entity that belongs to a village, 
region, ethnic group, nationality and religious group, which is “the highest cultural 
grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity.”85 According to 
Huntington, these differences will separate civilizations from one another, resulting in 
world conflict. Under the subtext of culture, Huntington notes religion to be the most 
important difference: “[Religious differences] are far more fundamental than 
differences among political ideologies and political regimes.”86 After the fall of the 
Iron Curtain, the world became divided into two religious civilizations: Western 
Christianity on one side, and Orthodox Christianity and Islam on the other.87 
Separation because of religion became the culprit for conflict, further instigating the 
idea of “us” versus “them,” and idea for which Huntington was highly criticized. His 
hypothesis builds on this notion of difference to imply that these cultural and 
religious differences indicate an equal difference over policy issues, ranging from 
human rights, territory claims, and political systems. Groups, governments, and 
nations will attempt to appeal to the “common religion and civilization identity” of 
the battle in order to rally support for “relative military and economic power, struggle 
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over the control of international institutions and third parties, and competitively 
promote their particular political and religious values.”88  
 Huntington does not see the “clash of civilizations” as a recent event, but one 
that has existed for 1,300 years. With the foundation of Islam in the seventh century, 
the civilization moved westward, conflicted with the Crusaders from the eleventh to 
the thirteenth centuries, and later experienced a surge of tension between the Ottoman 
Empire and the colonial powers of the nineteenth and early twentieth century. “In the 
Arab world, in short, Western democracy strengthens anti-Western political forces . . 
. [complicating] relations between Islamic countries and the West.”89 
 The discourse to explain Huntington’s hypothesis is inherently set up to 
differentiate the “West” from the “the rest,” based off of Kishore Mahbubani’s 
phrase. 90 A discriminating and polarized image of the US as a ‘superpower’ is 
created, which is problematic to the rest of the world that cannot compare in its 
policies of economics, politics, military, society etc. Differences in the power and 
struggle for military, economic, and institutional power are the sources for conflict, 
and are a consequence of one’s civilization.91 In conclusion, Huntington views 
civilization and culture as the basis for the majority of world conflict, and sees it as  
“a central focus of conflict for the immediate future [to be] between the West and 
several Islamic-Confucian states.”92 
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Critiques of the “Clash of Civilizations” 
 Currently, Huntington’s explanation for conflict is widely disputed and often 
disregarded as a credible commentary for modern political theory. The two essays, 
“The Clash of Definitions,” by Edward Said, literary critic and author of Orientalism, 
and, “The Clash of Civilizations: An Islamicist’s Critique.” by Roy P. Mottahedeh, 
provide a literary critic’s of Western and an Islamicist’s assessment, respectively, to 
which we can turn for the noteworthy critiques of Huntington’s article and latter, 
book.     
 The authors’ initial complaints are Huntington’s generalizing language and its 
attempted use ineffective evidence. According to Said, Huntington does not remain 
neutral in his rhetoric and oversimplifies ideas that he uses to create “easy-to-quote-
and-remember ideas.”93 His figurative and easily-conveyed images perpetuate the 
world of a polarity between “us” and “them” that are supposedly destined to clash. 
Even more questions are brought up and unexplained due to his evidence being found 
to be lacking in scholarly research.  Historical evidence is asserted be to “natural” and 
“epistemological,” when in reality, it is “constructed” and “situational.”94 Mottahedeh 
agrees with Said’s view of Huntington’s sweeping generalizations, yet emphasizes his 
poorly constructed use of examples. As an Islamicist, this is, one who studies Islam 
and Muslim studies, Mottahedeh’s initial dilemma concerns the ambiguous examples 
from the Islamic world. 95 Huntington’s examples do not show a proper theoretical 
correlation between the relationship of “culture” and political behavior. For example, 
Huntington claims that tense relations between the Arab world and the West will not 
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cease due to the history of its centuries-old militaristic hostilities.96 However, 
Mottahedeh casts light on the reality of this historical claim in pointing out that the 
most important conflicts in the past centuries were between the West and the Ottoman 
Turks, who can hardly be classified as “Arab.”97  
 The second dispute shared by Said and Mottahedeh relates to Huntington’s 
neglect in acknowledging the presence of counter-culture in civilizations. Said asserts 
the existence of the counter-culture that must be given importance because there will 
always be a group contradicting to the norm.98 The ultimate fault lies in assuming the 
homogeneity between culture and identity, as doing so ignores the complex 
relationship between them. Mottahedeh sees Islamists as Islam’s counter-culture, who 
“[call] for some degree of reimposition of Islamic law and tend to view the West as a 
more or less unified and universal ‘alien civilization’ to be treated in the spirit of the 
clash of civilizations.”99 Islamists as a counter-culture also have another counter-
culture within themselves concerning opinions of foreign policy, yet remain a 
minority within the larger Islamic ummah, or community. 
 The third complaint is Huntington’s strategy to identify and define 
civilizations. Huntington uses the term, “civilizational identity,” to encompass a wide 
range of people under an umbrella of a stereotypical type of culture. He lists them as 
Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American and 
African civilizations.100 The mere relationship of a culture and a civilization is 
already complex, Said notes, which Huntington ignores as he tries to separate and 
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define each term under one of eight civilizations. Huntington views these two terms 
as “a sort of ontological fact of political existence,” which is far from the truth. As 
François Burgat notes, the West overlooks the negative side of the clash of 
civilizations and “the disturbing effect of marginalization of cultural and linguistic 
codes within these societies [go] virtually unnoticed.”101 
  Additionally, even to define identity is difficult since is occurs as an 
invention and construction. Along with Mottahedeh’s opinions, Said notes 
Huntington’s conflation of Arabs and Muslims that results in the assertion that all 
Muslims behave similarly to Muslim Arabs. Mottahedeh uses numerous examples of 
nations in the Muslim world that did not behave according to Islamic tradition, like 
the election of a woman as prime minister in Turkey in 1996. Thus by assuming that 
every Muslim nation acts like the other is simply ignorant and generalizing. Said also 
refutes Huntington’s claim that the idea of a free market has little effect on Islamic 
cultures. Pre-Ottoman Islamic societies were free market economies, thus 
Huntington’s identification of the Arab civilization as not embracing this market 
strategy cannot be correct.  
 Said’s final disagreement with Huntington follows his own work concerning 
the Orientalist view that creates feelings of hostility against the area of the world with 
a strategic position for purposes of colonization, and more recently, in the oil market. 
The Western portrayal of Muslims as terrorists and fundamentalists creates a dividing 
space. Said’s work creates a discourse that refutes the claim that civilizations and 
cultures are the reason for conflict in our world, which aids the discussion over the 
polarized depiction of the Western powers versus the non-Western powers. Rather 
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than defining the reason for conflict, Said identifies the reasons why conflict is not 
caused by culture or civilization that includes the war over resources.  
 
The location of the holy 
 Both secularization theory and the clash of civilizations represent the 
changing place of the ‘holy’ in people’s lives. The holy, or sacred, arises from human 
experiences reflecting social experiences, alerting one to the changing society that can 
be influenced by a multitude of factors. 102According to secularization theory, religion 
is declining, thriving, or evolving as a result of the current world’s state of affairs.  
 The debates about secularization . . . seem to revolve around the question  
 of whether we are in a state of affairs in which the holy has disappeared 
  from our horizons, or whether the older locations of the holy have proven 
 inadequate and instead those activities which were once deemed secular  
 have now become the marks of the sacred. 103   
 
According to Huntington’s argument, the holy, according to different civilizations, is 
instigating conflicts between groups.  
 Max L. Stackhouse defines the holy in his article titled, “The Location of the 
Holy,” which discusses the justifications for basic moral stances and what it deemed 
“holy” in society. “The sense of holy provides the basis for those ‘background 
beliefs’ that sustain or transform our standards for evaluation, analysis and action, and 
thereby give substance to our basic moral stances.”104 The sense of the holy provides 
the legitimacy for societal structures and the fabric of everyday life.105 The “really 
real”, or the reality that is structured based on one’s insights, sensibilities, traditions, 
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or procedures, is debatable in our time, especially what can be deemed holy.  
Additionally, this notion of the holy is not defined as a spiritual injection or 
attendance of church service, but “in a broader sense present wherever fundamental 
questions of what is ultimately powerful and worth in life are debated.”106 
  Scientists, theorists, psychologists, and philosophers have posed the question 
of the holy’s location since its very existence, inventing and theorizing alternative 
locations for the basic ethical stance. This questioning exists as an expression of that 
individual or group’s psychological predisposition to which they belong: “What is 
deemed holy is ‘actually’ the social, psychological or biophysical conditions out of 
which stances develop as epiphenomena.”107 The 20th century experienced 
widespread social change, which communicates the differing view of the holy in 
accordance with the “drive for social change from the exposure of the biases, the 
interests, the lusts for power, gain, and dominance that are present in widely accepted 
moral stances and in their supporting marks of holiness.”108 Differing views of the 
holy lead to differing moral stances, each considering one’s view as correct and the 
other as incorrect, creating a moral dilemma for the group with differing views.  
 
Conclusion 
 From the above arguments, the root of our world’s numerous conflicts is not 
attributed to the degree of religion’s place in a society, seen in the secularization 
theory, or its opposition to another religion, as Huntington theorizes. The search for 
understanding the reasons for cause of conflict must be directed towards the world’s 
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new type of ‘religion’, one that is grounded in economic and political reasons: natural 
resources. Natural resources support the life of a nation in every sphere, from its 
agricultural sustainability to its numerous forms of energy and power. The following 
section will look at the US’ hegemonic global drive to maintain its status and power 
on the world scene. The protection of access to the availability and flow of resources 
lies at the heart of the US’ influence and position in the Middle East to secure its flow 
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Chapter 2: The View from the US 
 
Introduction 
 Natural resources are vital for every nation in order to carry out basic human 
needs and survive the global economic market. Developed nations that have 
exhausted their own resources are now relying on the resources concentrated in 
developing nations.109 Issues of environmental stress and resource management will 
result because of the widening gap between the industrial, developed nations and the 
developing nations.110 Globalization will bring ‘”deepening economic stagnation, 
political instability, and cultural alienation,’ which will ‘foster ethnic, ideological, and 
religious extremism,’” with the majority of the violence directed against the US.111 
These factors have the power to “divide worldwide publics and challenge US 
leadership.”112 
 As of 2005, the United States’ GDP was the highest in the world, amounting 
to approximately $10.5 trillion compared with the world’s overall GDP of $32 
trillion. “[The US] is in fact the most absolute global power ever seen for its reach, 
influence, and control. The US is rightly regarded as the unchallenged 
superpower.”113 Yet despite the US’ towering economic superiority in the world, in 
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2004 its trade gap was $665.9 billion, a 6% increase from 2003 of $496.5 billion. 114 
The job market also experienced a drop, loosing 1.1 million jobs between 2001 and 
2004, representing 7.4% of the population in contrast to the previous 5.6%.115 The 
relocation of jobs and trade outside the US affected the decline, which weakens the 
domestic market that needs these monetary assets within the US. Structural imbalance 
in the US economy instilled fear in the Bush administration, prompting a possible 
decline in the US’ economic international power and the influence in controlling the 
depleting hydrocarbons. Before the Cold War, the US’ main doctrine was the 
maintenance of a global system of alliances against at the communist Soviet Union, 
subordinating the pursuit of the US’ national interests to protect the world from 
communism. Yet with the end of the Cold War, US security policy changed to 
accommodate America’s security interests, including the access to overseas supplies 
and the production of oil. 116 
 The US’ desire to maintain its hegemonic power through the protection of 
resources is seen with the “war on terror,” which places blame on differing religions 
and civilizations for the conflicts rather than on the control for resources.117 The 
Olduvai theory states that the life of our industrial civilization is only meant to last 
approximately 100 years, from 1930 until 2030.118 While its claims are questionable, 
it highlights the US’ fear of the quick depletion of the world’s oil supplies that could 
cripple the US’ international power. These deceptions must be broken apart that 
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“flow very naturally from the ways in which power is concentrated,”119 must be 
broken apart. The following section will detail the US’ current economic state 
through the discussion of resources and the dollar, followed by the explanation of the 
US’ interventionalist approach to securing these issues.  
 
The US’ driving forces 
Resources 
 The first driving force to protect the US’ hegemonic status in the world is the 
control of the world’s major energy resources, specifically oil as a “stupendous 
source of strategic power” known since the 1940’s.120 Zbigniew Brzezinski notes that 
US control over oil in Middle East “gives it indirect but politically critical leverage on 
the European and Asian economies that are also dependent on energy exports from 
the region.”121 US political leverage allows for a more powerful economy and 
military, which become vital to the US doctrine as a powerful, dominating nation. 
However, to ensure military and economic strengths, the insatiable hunger for oil 
must be satisfied and can only be accomplished by the international quest for energy. 
John C. Gannon, the deputy director of the CIA in 1996 remarks, “We have to 
recognize that our nation will not be secure if global energy supplies are not 
secure.”122 
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 As of 2004, the US made up 5% of the world’s total population that consumed 
25% of the world’s total supply of oil,123 and consumed 30% of all raw materials by 
human population in 1998.124 In 2004, the Department of Energy’s Annual Energy 
Outlook concluded that US oil consumption will rise from 19.7 million barrels per 
day in 2001 to 28.3 million barrels a day in 2025, increasing by 44% in 24 years.125 
At the same time, domestic oil production will decrease from 5.7 to 4.6 million 
barrels a day.  
 The excessive American lifestyle of a large home, large and multiple cars, and 
a never-ending supply of material goods are the motivations for American’s high 
consumption rate. “The single biggest factor in our ever-increasing dependency on 
foreign oil is our seemingly endless capacity to consume,” notes former deputy 
secretary of the Treasury Stuart E. Eizenstat in 2002.126 The current levels of 
consumption are not healthy to sustain any wealth-oriented nation, especially the 
United States.127 Two-thirds of the US’ petroleum usage goes to transportation, which 
only increases as the demand and usage of cars increases, 13.5 million barrels a day 
in 2001 to an estimated 20.7 million barrels a day in 2025.128 
 America is dependent on foreign resources also to support its military that has 
the most technologically advanced defense capabilities.129 The US military provides 
an unrivaled ability to venture across the world unchallenged by any other nation. 
Constant and innovative technology is needed to support the US’ access to resources 
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thus war to protect them is vital for America and its international capitalist 
adventurism. “Most-if not all- technological innovation is driven by the aim of the US 
military establishment to remain far ahead of other nations in the cutting edge of 
military capability.”130  
 
Globalization’s Effect on resource availability 
In the global sense, the world is expanding at an astronomical rate with a 
dramatic increase in the human population that drives the demand for resources. Over 
the past fifty years, the human population grew from 2.6 billion in 1950 to 6 billion 
people in 1999. By 2010, the world’s population is expected to increase to 6.8 billion 
people, and in 2020 to 8 billion people.131 Increased consumption also produces to an 
increase in the gross world product (GWP), which only a portion of the world’s 
population benefits from because of globalization. With an exponential growing 
population, an equally increasing demand for resources will result, putting an even 
larger burden on the world.  
However, with the US’ growing consumption rates and declining domestic 
production, the US will have to look to foreign suppliers, weakening the nation 
through foreign dependence. A deep concern resonates among American leaders 
regarding the US’ dependence on foreign oil, especially since imported petroleum 
crossed the 50% mark in 1998.132 Michael Klare notes, “Most policy makers 
anticipated a deepening dependence on imports, and with it an ever-increasing role 
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for American soldiers in guarding the global flow of oil.”133 Klare also notes that the 
US foreign oil will come from unstable and unfriendly nations in dangerous areas. 
Most of the remaining oil reserves are located in the Middle East, Central Asia, and 
Africa, all areas that have “suffered from instability and civil unrest,” and which have 
“sufficient tapped reserves to satisfy our (and the world’s) rising petroleum demand 
in the years ahead.”134 
  
The Petrodollar 
 The petrodollar is the second driving force to protect the US’ hegemonic 
status in the world. Established at the end of World War II, in 1945 the Bretton 
Woods Monetary Conference set the US dollar as the medium of exchange in an 
international monetary system.135  After the war, the US saw the need for a stabilized 
economy and diplomacy, a perfect vacuum for the US to fill. In addition to the 
international use of the dollar, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) were established to aid the economies of Europe and Asia that were destroyed 
during the war.136  Additionally, NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) was 
established in 1949 to protect against possible Soviet Union dominance in Western 
Europe, which bolstered the US’ power on the international scene. Thus the US 
emerged from the post- World War II period with as a strong economic power as well 
as having the largest gold reserves that allowed the US to trade and export freely with 
Europe and Japan. The US experienced an enlightened age in foreign policy due to 
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their strategic economic dominance, which plummeted in the late 1960’s and 1970’s 
because of the expensive Vietnam War. 
 During the Vietnam War, European countries using the dollar, like France and 
Britain, began to redeem their dollars for gold due to the fear of the floating dollar 
loosing value.137 Floating currencies resulted in 1971 when the US and European 
nations began to drain the Federal Reserve’s gold stocks, transferring US dollars into 
gold bullion (precious metal with high economic value).138 In response, The Nixon 
administration abandoned the dollar-gold link in August 1971, resulting in a system 
of floating currencies to ensure not the total collapse of the gold reserves of the US. 
 To appease the concerns of the European nations, OPEC organized a 
discussion with the G-10, or Group of Ten nations, to deliberate about a transition to 
a basket of currencies.139 Wanting to preserve the international use of the US dollar, 
in 1974 President Nixon arranged an agreement with Saudi Arabia, the largest oil 
producing nation in the Middle East, to purchase $2.5 billion in US Treasury bills 
with their oil funds, and to ensure that oil prices would be in dollars only.140 By 1975 
elite US, UK banking interests, and Saudi Arabia formed an oil-backed dollar known 
as petrodollar recycling, which favored US dollar hegemony.141 Petrodollar recycling 
forced nations to use the dollar when buying oil. Industrial developing nations were 
unable to use the US dollar that forced nations to “recycle” their petrodollars to other 
nations.  
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 The inflated price of oil due the surplus of petrodollars characterized the 
1970’s. The surplus of petrodollars were given back to the US through (first), the 
secret financial arrangement with SAMA (Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency) to direct 
the funds to the US Federal Reserve Banks and the Bank of England, and (second), 
the deposit of surplus dollars by Saudi Arabia and other OPEC producers into US/UK 
banking systems. Gold reserves were transferred into dollar reserves, which became 
the major reserve currency for other nations in the world.  
 The strength of the US dollar maintained US hegemonic power, yet 
introduced a new type of strife for nations that could not survive the US interest rates 
on their petrodollar loans.142 The expansion of developing nations was dependent on 
oil that could only be bought in US dollars, producing large debts for newly 
industrializing nations needing to export goods. The availability of oil allowed 
nations to exist in the international market, yet weakened nations at the same time 
because of their mounting debts that could never be paid off.143 The strategic 
introduction of the dollar as the currency in which oil was to be bought and sold 
maintained the US’ economic and military hegemonic power in the world. 
 Stated by William Clark in Petrodollar Warfare, “the Iraq War was about 
dollars, euros, oil, and geostrategic power in the 21st century.”144 With respect to the 
Iraq War, the debate between the US dollar and the Euro shows the last phase of the 
conflict to maintain the dollar’s international standing, or an “unspoken oil-currency 
war between the US and the EU.”145 The US’ military control of the remaining 
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hydrocarbons and enforcement of the petrodollar arrangement shows the international 
competition to be OPEC’s main currency for oil transactions,146 as well as “to 
preserve the faltering system of American economic hegemony.”147 In September 
2000, Saddam Hussein announced that Iraq would use the euro currency rather than 
the US dollar, a detrimental situation for the US that relies on petrodollar recycling to 
fund its military supremacy. A snowball effect would occur to sell-off the already 
weak dollar by foreign banks and OPEC oil producers. Responding to Hussein’s 
announcement, in 2003 the US military spent $417 billion for the war in Iraq, 
compared to the $120 billion spent by the EU comprised of a twelve-state union.148  
 Thus the US sees the Iraq War as an important strategy to maintain the US 
dollar’s hegemonic force and position as a dominant power in the global economy.149 
The US government’s positioning on an international level gave the administration 
the agency to not be held accountable for its validity, domestically and 
internationally. Through the administration’s origins as an elite culture, it was easy to 
ignore the possibility of a terminal catastrophe, and thus respond with violence and 
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McWorld 
 The demystification of the type of markets must be addressed concerning 
Benjamin R. Barber’s article from The Atlantic Monthly titled, “Jihad vs. 
McWorld.”151 As his example shows, the economic strategies pursued by differing 
markets calls for a critique of the Orientalist view of splitting up these two entities 
represented by Jihad and McWorld into definite terms. In his article, “The Clash of 
Civilizations: An Islamicist’s Critique,”152 Roy P. Mottahedeh contests Huntington’s 
argument that “western ideas of free markets often have little resonance in Islamic 
(culture).”153 Huntington’s sweeping generalization forgets the notion that many 
Middle Eastern societies in the pre-Ottoman period were free market economies, 
many of which still existing today, such as Morocco, Turkey, Kuwait, and most of the 
other Arab Gulf states. 154 Huntington lacks empirical evidence and makes 
assumptions to support his argument. Nonetheless, generalizing assumptions are 
important to remember when looking at the world of Jihad and McWorld that give 
insight into their perceptions. Barber uses the term, “Jihad,” not meaning its original, 
Qur’anic term of “struggle,” but to invoke the notion of “[re-create] ancient 
subnational and ethnic borders from within”, noting that their existence is pertinent to 
the argument of the two differing economic goals in the world.   
 Despite Barber’s seemingly harmless notion of his term in the economic 
sense, “Jihad,” it is important to notice the hidden, possibly purposeful, Orientalist 
concept of the “Islamic threat.” It alludes that every single individual defined as 
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“Islamic” in a religious and cultural sense agrees with the beliefs and policies of 
fundamentalists and their movement. The need to identify every Muslim to determine 
the Islamic threat dates back to the historical events beginning with the Crusades in 
the 11th century resulting in a large generalization and grouping of all Muslims into 
few categories. Fred Halliday, author of Islam & the Myth of Confrontation, argues 
that the responses of the Islamic fundamentalist movement are not specific to the 
Islamic ‘world’ through its complaints concerning current social and political 
problems. 155  
 The use of Barber’s term, “McWorld,” is used to show the US’ current 
economic strategy. McWorld is defined by “the onrush of economic and ecological 
forces that demand integration and uniformity and that mesmerize the world . . . one 
McWorld tied together by technology, ecology, communications, and commerce.”156 
Economic globalism is a sub-definition of McWorld that results in homogeneity and 
uniformity in methods of management as well as in the rules of market 
relationships.157 McWorld’s main goal is nationalism and is achieved through four 
imperatives that, in combination, are victorious over factiousness and 
particularism.158  
 Market, resource, information-technology, and ecological imperatives 
constitute McWorld’s approach to the world market. Seen through market 
imperatives, multinational corporations gain speed in the West and attempt to 
homogenize the world to create a healthy market despite the lack of a common 
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national identity. Yet to unite the multinational corporations, a common resource is 
needed, such as a language or currency, like English and the dollar. Natural resources 
such as arable soil and mineral resources from less developed nations present another 
form of dependence, on which developed nations depend, making them more 
dependent than when they began. As a result, corporations attempt to solve these 
particular, nation-specific problems through Americanized universal solutions with 
the use of information-technology imperatives for generalizing the technology’s 
needs. Globalization and universalism do not solve the ecological imperative that 
creates a greater inequality between nations of differing status. The US’ economic 
position is portrayed through the image of McWorld that clashes with many other 
types of nations and economies characterized with the image of the world of “Jihad.” 
 The “religion of the market,” adopted by A. Rodney Dobell, is an acceptance 
of an individualistic religion of economics and of markets, using Nature as an 
everlasting supply of resources to gain admission into the dominant, global market.159 
Under this economic religion, individual and social incentives succeeded to the point 
of boosting rapid growth of per capita incomes, foreshadowing future possible 
increased incomes that are well received around the world.160 Environmental 
wastefulness, destructive technologies for harvesting renewable resources, and 
extraction of exhaustible resources results as a nation attempts to become a part of the 
world of McWorld. Western nations constitute the majority of devotees to the 
“religion of the market.” 
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 Driven by possible economic advantages of more oil to drive production, such 
as cheaper gas prices, a healthier market, and an overall increase in gross domestic 
profit (GDP), nations ignore the ecological downfalls of their actions, and continue 
the cycle of consumption, dependence, and wastefulness. McWorld is driven by the 
force to unite all nations under the global neoliberal economic regime, which only 
serves the West’s hunger for power leads to dwindling amounts of oil. William 
Clarke supports this notion concerning the US and oil, stating that evidence for the 
Bush administration’s apprehension of losing their dominant international position is 
found in the actions it has taken to maintain the US’s position of military superiority 
and to control the global economic system with the dollar. The increase in national 
security, whether by bolstering military action or strengthening an internal profit, is a 
product of vulnerability.161  
 The McWorld image portrays the American definition and location of the holy 
as the global power and control of natural resources. From the Western perspective, 
the hegemonic power, yielded across the globe, is the American definition of the 
holy, based on the first chapter’s definition that the holy is “present wherever 
fundamental questions of what is ultimately powerful and worthy in life.”162 
America’s neoconservative movement in the later half of the 20th century asks the 
same moral questions, disputing what is classified as “holy” and requesting social 
change for the correct path of American. A look at the neoconservative movement 
will follow, along with a discussion of Leo Strauss and his “natural right.” 
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Neoconservativism and Leo Strauss  
Neoconservatism 
 Since 1930’s and 1940’s, neoconservatism has existed in response to the 
expansionist and totalitarian state of communism.163 Irving Kristol defines a 
neoconservative as, “A liberal ‘mugged by reality,”164 neoconservative views were 
present in New York intellectual circles with individuals such as Sidney Hook, Irving 
Kristol, and Norman Podhoretz.165 The presidential era of Lyndon Johnson in the 
1960’s represents the beginning of the neoconservative presence in the White House 
with the influential roles of late Democrats Hubert Humphrey of Minnesota or Henry 
Jackson of Washington. The US opposed the Manichean struggle with the Soviet 
Union  “to play an important role in improving life and protecting the cultural 
freedom of all citizens at home,”166 and  “to extend America’s unrivaled global 
dominance and to complete the transformation of American conservatism.”167 In the 
late 1960’s, neoconservatism represented a reaction to the 1960’s counter-culture, 
known as McGovernism. The term came from the rise of George McGovern in 1972, 
who defeated former Vice-President Hubert Humphrey for the Democratic 
presidential nomination.168 McGovernism saw America’s international involvement 
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as “immoral, imperialistic, and corrupting,”169 standing for “appeasement and the 
politics of liberal guilt, while the neocons stood for a self-confident and militantly 
interventionist Americanism.”170 A discussion of the neoconservative movement’s 
most influential member, Leo Strauss, will be discussed in relation to the movement’s 
presence in American foreign policy. 
  
Leo Strauss and the “Natural Right” 
 Leo Strauss was a political philosopher in the 20th century who taught political 
science at the University of Chicago, published 15 books, and taught several 
generation of students. His term, the “natural right,” is noteworthy for the discussion 
of modernity and “the entailed crisis of the West that is manifest in the crisis of 
liberal democracy.”171 
 Strauss’s essay, “Political Philosophy and the Crisis of our Time,” explains 
his views about 20th century society. Other than the threat of communism, the basic 
threat is the “internal disability of modern liberal democracy,”172 where the West has 
lost its purpose and faith and needs to return to their “natural right,” as described 
later. The regime of the modern liberal democracy is a limited government with 
public and private sectors, “which in effect means the private (and secret) is above 
(below, or outside) the law and outside the realm of political responsibility in the 
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classical sense.”173 These ideas are reduced to an ideology where Strauss notes the 
importance of its origins and interpretations as equaling as the ideology itself.174 
 Strauss wrote Natural Rights and History that outlines the principles, “to 
argue for a return to truth, to a standard common to all and grounded in nature.”175 
Nature was of the unknown and not of certainty, which “might be known but wasn’t, 
of that which might be known but as not yet.”176 It is also split into the natural and 
unnatural, approached by “a pure and whole questioning.”177 The term, “natural 
right,” expresses a subtle nuance compared to “natural law” that Strauss could have 
used. “Natural right” gives room for interpretation and does not delineate an absolute 
path that “natural law” communicates. “Natural law threatens the political order by 
setting up a moral law that transcends the political order.”178 Additionally, natural law 
subordinates the “prudent statesmen,” forbidding certain actions that would protect 
the state. “Its otherwordly nature places a great strain upon the political order because 
it makes absolute demands on it that are oblivious to its limitations.”179 
 Strauss’s notion of the “natural right” is important for the discussion of 
modernity and democracy. Strauss explains the “natural right” as “the right of the 
wise to rule absolutely or in the absence of law Strauss understands tyranny (as it is 
commonly understood) to be the rule in the absence of law. Classic natural right is, 
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therefore, identical with the tyranny of the wise.”180 Strauss bases much of his 
“natural right” theory from Aristotle that practical wisdom of the wise is better than a 
set of rules, or “provides man with principles of conduct, but with a hierarchy of 
ends.”181 These needs, such as peace, stability, and preservation are hierarchically 
lower than justice and takes precedence in order to ensure the livelihood of the higher 
institution. “Justice may have to be sacrificed for the sake of the public safety, and 
such sacrifices are also in accordance with the requirement of natural right . . . 
Without the preservation of the city, the life of the philosopher would be 
impossible.”182 In the name of the natural right, there are no limits, similar to the 
Machiavellian view that extreme situations allow for the suspension of natural justice 
for the preservation of the state. To conclude Strauss’ “natural right” theory, the 
following quote expresses the views of the neoconservatives in the Washington.  
 Classic natural right maintains the primacy or priority of the good over  
 the right or just. The good is understand as the end to which all action is a  
 means; it is a state of affairs deemed desirable, excellent, noble, or worthy  
 of pursuit of its own sake . . . Right is therefore subordinate to good.183 
 
 Authority in the 20th century has accepted Strauss’s political philosophy too 
often and without needed critical thought.184 The neoconservative position accepts 
Strauss’s “deprecation of morality”185 and overlooks justice in the name of security. 
The natural right becomes the fundamental question that nature authorizes 
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totalitarianism in every aspect of life and allows for US’ interventionist approach to 
politics and economics.186 
 
Neoconservatism in the White House 
 The neoconservative movement began as a reality in response to 
“communism-as-evil, the centrality of military force, and the indispensability of the 
American idea and much else.”187 The election of President Ronald Reagan 
articulated the neoconservative stance on foreign policy with the election of thirteen 
neocons to high-ranking positions in the Republican administration. “Neocons 
provided the intellectual ballast for Reagan’s military build-up and his anticommunist 
foreign policy . . . They argued that a massive military build-up was necessary and the 
U.S. needed to ‘take the right to the Soviets.’”188  
The neoconservative doctrine of totalitarianism supported the US foreign policy as a 
faith. According to the doctrine, during the Cold War the world experienced an 
ideological struggle between ‘good and evil’, or the US and the Soviet Union. The 
Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations left continued this legacy regarding their 
edicts to fight communism and to aid nations that threatened the US’ role of 
dominance.189 However, the neoconservative’s totalitarian faith was contradicted with 
the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 and the election of President George H.W. 
Bush who opposed certain neoconservative viewpoints. As a result, few positions 
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were given to neoconservatives, while keeping yet kept the idea to “create an 
American-dominated world order.”190  
 “Pax Americana” became the new order for American foreign policy in 1992 
in order to put down the US’ remaining rivals and enemies to ensure the US’ total 
control. Paul Wolfowitz, a neocon from Reagan’s administration, supported the idea 
of global control in the Bush I administration, and was supported by Bush’s Secretary 
of Defense, Dick Cheney, a old-style conservative, yet also an ally with many 
neoconservatives. The first Bush administration did not give the neoconservatives 
enough sustaining power, which eventually lead to their fallout with the 
administration.  
 The Clinton administration behaved similarly, clashing with the 
neoconservative’s ideas on foreign policy concerning the level and control of 
American’s hegemonic power.  Interesting to note is the change in the meaning of 
strength for a nation that resulted in the 1990’s represented in the Clinton 
administration. Before and during the Cold War, a nation’s strength was based on its 
military power and its alliance system that proved that one’s nation could stand alone 
in a turbulent world society. Yet the end of the Cold war heralded in a new definition 
of a nation’s power, one that emphasized its economic dynamism and the cultivation 
of technological innovation.191 According to the Institute for National Security 
Studies, “national security depends on successful engagement in the global 
economy.”192 A resilient and powerful domestic economy meant that a nation could 
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compete with other nations to develop and export high-tech goods, which turned into 
the characterizing feature of what a powerful nation meant. In 1993, President Bill 
Clinton articulated the need for an “econocentric” approach to national security, 
which was executed initially through expansion of international trade in Latin 
American and Asia and investment in his foreign policy goals.193 By linking 
economic interests with security interests, it was only a matter of time that the push 
for a protection of oil was enforced due to its importance to both interests. Thus, 
military enforcement to guarantee its security was implemented in order to continue 
the economic growth and production needed to compete on the international market. 
 The election of George W. Bush in 2000 represented a second chance for the 
neoconservatives to put unipolarists and realists in high-ranking positions. A global 
empire strategy was emphasized outlined in a PNAC (Project for the New American 
Century) position paper stating issues regarding defense systems, defense spending, 
defense allocation, and the reinvention of the U.S. military. In 2001, the attacks of 
September 11 provided the perfect excuse for the administration’s hopes. “The 
neocon fantasy of military expansion, preemptive warfare, and regime-changing 
unilateralism became American policy.”194 The Bush administration was concerned 
with overthrowing Iraq, Iran, and Syria, and knew that an Islamist multinational 
extremist Sunni movement, Al-Qaeda, could blamed as the perfect scapegoat during 
the turbulent period after September 11. “It didn’t matter if Iraq had nothing to do 
with September 11; what mattered was getting rid of Saddam and imposing a pro-
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American regime in the middle of the Middle East.”195 Additionally, “Bush officials 
wanted to change the Middle East, creating a pro-American Iraq that gave the U.S. a 
direct power base, ensured the oil supply, set off a chain-reaction of regime changes, 
gave relief to Israel, and got rid of a thuggish enemy.”196 The US government uses the 
popular reason of conducting the “war on terror” to explain its involvement in the 
Middle East and downplays its true reasons for the Western cravings for global 
empire superiority, the supreme security of resources, and the power of the dollar. 
The government’s real task and aim is protection of its interests, usually represented 
as “noble intent and self-defense” in place of geopolitical or strategic objectives in the 
Middle East.197 
 As stated by leftist commentator and blogger Matthew Yglesias, 
neoconservatives “‘believe that America should coercively dominate the world 
through military force’ and ‘believe in a dogmatic form of American exceptionalism’ 
and ‘favor the creation of a U.S.- dominated ‘universal empire.’”198 
 
Doctrines supporting the US’ hegemonic power 
Universality 
 The hegemonic power of the US rejects universality, the idea that every nation 
is held accountable to the same standard regarding political, economic, and social 
rights. Beginning in 1945, the United Nations entrusted the US to end the second 
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world war and gave the US the title of “the supreme law of the land.”199 However, 
according to Noam Chomsky, this principle “is flatly rejected in the elite intellectual, 
moral, and political culture of the most powerful states,”200 and is often ignored and 
excluded from public discourse. US’ policies on environment degradation and foreign 
affairs exemplify the US’ denial of universal laws that supports the US’ idea of 
militaristic superiority.   
 The Group of Eight summit of 2005 in Gleneagles, Scotland shows the Bush 
administration’s neglect of responsibility pertaining to the global warming crisis. The 
summit’s goal was to bring the rich countries together in order to discuss and 
implement urgent action concerning cost-effective techniques to reduce net global 
greenhouse gas emissions. The Bush administration did not respond properly to the 
growing concerns of human impact on global warming, nor did it acknowledge that 
the US had a part to play in the environmental issue.201 The Bush administration 
doubted the validity of the summit’s argument due to the fact that we “do not know 
enough about this literally world-changing phenomenon,” and that global warming is 
“too uncertain a matter to justify anything more than voluntary measures.”202  
 The Bush administration acted similarly in 2005 at an annual meeting of the 
American Association for the Advancement of Science. The meeting concluded to 
have found “the most compelling evidence yet” to support the need of humanity to 
take responsibility for their ecological footprint. The meeting received little attention 
in the US media despite its correlation to the Kyoto protocols, which the Bush 
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administration rejected even with supporting evidence from highly recognized and 
revered researchers. This dismissal of universality and disregard for the world’s 
environmental stability shows the US’ rejection of the world’s acknowledgments 
concern for the security of the world. The US cannot forget that it plays a significant 
role in destroying the environment through its production and unstoppable 
consumption of oil. Ignoring its significantly harmful role in environmental pollution 
and consumption is unforgivable, which emphasizes their global universality.  
 In 2004, Bush’s policies concerning the use of force show the US’ rejection of 
universality concerning foreign policy. A report in 2004 by the UN High-level Panel 
on Threats, Challenges and Change states that “force can be lawfully deployed only 
when authorized by the Security Council, or under Article 51”, which gives the “right 
of individual or collective self-defense if armed attack occurs against a Member of 
the United Nations.”203 Article 51 is interpreted as the justification for self-defense 
and gives no restrictions or reinterpretations. The UN World Summit in September 
2005 endorsed the provisions of the Charter, neglecting to grant other individual 
states or regional alliances the same type of treatment. Bush’s doctrine of 
“anticipatory self-defense” highlights the Western-centric and elite perception of “the 
right of the United States to attack a county that it thinks could attack it first,”204 
stated by Condoleezza Rice. Condoleezza Rice also supported the US’ unilateral right 
on numerous occasions, stating that the US does not need to “conform” to 
international behavior or international agreements, unlike the rest of the nations and 
allies.  
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 Finally, the justifications for the Iraqi war symbolize the US’ rejection of 
universality. The US did not see itself as being held to the same accountability as 
other nations when it declared war on Iraq.  The US clasped onto its militaristic 
domination and saw itself in a higher position and status compared to other nations in 
the world regarding its military power and responsibility. Foreign policy documents 
and studies on the Bush administration have surfaced that demonstrate the US’ 
aspiration for geostrategic dominance and prohibition of other nations to compete 
with US domination.205  
For example, the major policy study in March 1992 by the Project for a New 
American Century (PNAC) titled, “Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategies, 
Forces and Resources for a New Century,” emphasized the neoconservative view of 
US dominance, stating “no other nations will be allowed to ‘challenge’ US 
hegemony.”206  
  
Promotion of Democracy 
Iraq was also justified by Bush’s doctrine of “promoting democracy abroad.” 
This doctrine “has been a primary goal of US foreign policy ever since Woodrow 
Wilson endowed it with a ‘powerful idealist element.’”207 According to Raja Bahlul, 
the democratic West claims that democracy “is the only morally defensible political 
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order, the only political option for societies and states that do not want to be left 
behind in the rapidly evolving world in which we live.”208  
Bush’s messianic message of bringing democracy to the Middle East 
expresses this hopeful tone of an idealistic war.209 Thomas Carothers, the director of 
the Democracy and Rule of Law Project, is a witness to Bush’s mission. “American 
exceptionalism” gives reason and meaning to the doctrine, creating misimpressions 
about itself and its enemies to ensure that the correct interests receive the most power. 
“‘Preemptive’ state terror”210 further separates nations from each other, dividing them 
into “failed states” or “outlaw states”.  
 The US’ fear of independent nationalism goes to “impressive lengths”211 to 
remain the ‘masters of the hemisphere.’  Historical ties with Cuba, Iran, and Syria 
exemplify the US’ fear of rebelliousness and the possibility of the nation’s 
exponential growth without the help of the US. These doctrines of the ‘rogue’ nations 
would spill into other nations, “corrupting” their governments and creating a larger 
force against the “unquestioned power” of the US.212  
 The strategic military response to remove of weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD) became the justification for the Iraqi War to mask the US’ hegemonic 
foreign policy.213 By ensuring the removal the WMD from a country that the US 
feared could interrupt their influence over resources, mainly oil, the Bush 
administration gained support from congress to wage war in Iraq. Bush’s vision of 
                                                
208 Raja Bahlul, “Democracy without Secularism? Reflections on the Idea of Islamic Democracy,” in 
Islam, Judaism, and the Political Role of Religions in the Middle East,edited by John Bunzl, 99-117. 
(Florida: University Press of Florida, 2004),100. 
209 Noam Chomsky, Failed States: the abuse of power and the assault on democracy, 130 
210 Ibid. 89. 
211 Ibid. 112. 
212 Ibid. 121. 
213 Ibid. 25. 
  68 
democracy soon followed, tailing behind the need to remove a harmful power ruled 
by a dictator and replace it with a democracy. According to Richard U. Ullman’s 
article, “Redefining Security,” the US government focused energy towards the easier 
depiction of an ideology of military dangers for the inattentive public rather than 
Washington’s true interests. With the war in Iraq, no WMD’s were found despite the 
Bush administration persuasive arguments to the public. Deception by the 
government went so far as to distort, manipulate, and ignore actual intelligence under 
false pretenses in order to gain the support of the nation to invade Iraq.214 The 
reasoning for the US presence in Iraq was modified to bring democracy to the Middle 
East and according to Augustus Richard Norton, jumped onto the “democratization 
bandwagon.”215 Articulated by Noam Chomsky, “So understood, ‘promotion of 
democracy is central’ to Bush strategy in a kind of postmodern interpretation, in 
which we restrict attention to narrative and text, recoiling from “Truth,” perhaps a 
social construction.”216 
 
An image for a hidden agenda 
 The support of the badly uninformed American public is inadvertently the 
most powerful tool for the US’ foreign policies, allowing for “a rational planning to 
promote dominant domestic interests.”217 The US government is able manipulate its 
own power because of the public’s ignorance and unawareness concerning foreign 
issues, allowing evidence to be misconstrued and falsified in order to support their 
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own interests of geopolitical strategic power. Demonic messianism of the ‘enemy’ is 
the result, a perceptions captured by the US government and supported by the 
influence of American popular culture.218  
 The ‘veil of deceit’ originates during the Cold War beginning with the 
Truman Doctrine to portray the Soviet’s as a diabolic being that must be stopped by 
any means necessary. During the Reagan era, the Soviets were the focus of evil in the 
modern world in contrast to the US,219 seen as an “evil empire.”220 Samuel 
Huntington expressed similar views in 1981 focusing on the need to create an image 
of the Soviet threat to ensure the conflict’s acceptance by the public and media. “ 
‘You may have to sell’ intervention or other military action ‘in such a way as to 
create the impression that it is the Soviet Union that you are fighting.”221 At the same 
time, the “war on drugs” in Latin America “served to frighten the domestic 
population into obedience”222 and was to ensure the public’s total submission to the 
huge government-media propaganda campaign. 
 With the fabrication of a demonic enemy, a savior or messiah was conjured to 
protect the US public, a vacuum that US politicians and powerful policies agreeably 
filled.223 “Demonic messianism is a natural device for leadership groups that are at 
the extreme of the spectrum in their dedication to the short-term interests of narrow 
sectors of power and wealth, and to global domination.”224 Politicians portray 
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themselves as rescuing the public from a nightmare of international terrorism, an 
illusion they created themselves. Due to the public’s lack of knowledge, the fashioned 
terror encourages the battle between good and evil, a fear that is essential to the 
neoconservative movement for world hegemonic dominance.225  
 In Bernard Lewis’ article in 1991 titled, “The Roots of Muslim Rage,” the 
Soviet threat is transformed into the Muslim threat, capitalizing equally on the 
obliviousness of the US public. The initial battle between good and evil was a war 
that was never suppose to end, its goals largely misconstrued in order to maintain the 
US’ dominate world status, and perpetuated with the “war on terror” with Arab 
nations. With the fall of the Soviet Union after the war in Afghanistan, the US-allied 
Arab warriors, known as the “Afghan Arabs,” became the new threat to US interests 
in the Middle East. The Afghan jihadists, lead and financed by Osama bin Laden, 
became the new targets of the US against terrorism, which will be discussed further in 
Chapter 3. Saddam Hussein in Iraq became equally menacing for the US due to his 
growing power in the Gulf that could undermine the US’ oil and power interests. 
Images of “Great Satans” were invoked to further the menacing image.226 The US 
became dedicated to defending the world for an “inspiring vision” against the polar 
opposite of the “Great Satan”.227  
 The US created a “phantom enemy” to mask its true interests in Gulf Region’s 
natural resources, “a fantasy serving the interests of many.”228 Providing an ideology 
of a tangible phenomenon, the US gained the needed support in order to engage in 
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Middle Eastern conflicts that would ensure the protection and security of the flow of 
power and resources.  
 
Conclusion 
 The US’ hunger for total domination and control of resources are the most 
formidable of its ideological weapons.229 The US is the corporeal reality of Barker’s 
McWorld that masks its true nature at any cost and ruled by its hunger for 
consumption and power guided by the “religion of the market.” However, with the 
existence of US’ worldly status, another force is developed to counter the strength of 
the US and its policies: Islamic fundamentalism.  
 The following chapter will discuss the Islamic response to the changing world 
instigated by the US and its consequences on the world. Conflict does not result in 
response to differing civilizations, as highlighted in chapter one, yet is produced from 
the growing tensions surrounding the security and protection of resources. Political 
Islam’s response to the modernizing world is often correlated and mistaken for a 
response to differing religious beliefs, when religious justifications are used for the 
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Chapter 3: The Response to Modernization 
from the Muslim Perspective 
Introduction 
 From the radical, sometimes termed fundamentalist, Muslim perspective, the 
world is in a state of jahiliyyah, or a state “characterized by ignorance of the divine 
truth”230 that opposes the Islamic constitution, state, and laws.231 According to John 
Esposito explaining the Muslim perception of conditions of the world, the world is 
dominated by “corrupt authoritarian governments and a wealthy elite concerned more 
in economic prosperity rather than natural development.”232 These effects result from 
the influence of Western, European colonialism beginning in the 18th century. As a 
result, a radicalized Muslim minority combines militancy with messianic visions to 
inspire “an army of God whose jihad they believe will liberate Muslims at home and 
abroad.”233 
  Islam is used to legitimize the complaints of the world’s current political state 
that resulted from the effects from Western culture and life. Islamic fundamentalism 
designates Islam to provide solutions to the world’s problems that Muslim societies 
are facing today.234 The Qur’an designates Islam’s place in the world through da’wa 
as “God’s ‘call’ to human society to find in Islam the true religion,” in Qur’an 
                                                
230 William Shepard, “Age of Ignorance,” in Encyclopedia of the Qur’an, ed. Jane McAuliffe, Vol. 1 
(Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, 2001), 37. 
231 Wanttoknow.info. DaanSpeak. “Power of Nightmares-The Rise of the Politics of Fear.” Episode 1, 
“Baby It’s Cold Outside.”  
232 John Esposito. Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam. (New York: Oxford University Press), 
27. 
233 Ibid. 
234 Fred Halliday, “The politics of Islamic fundamentalism,” In Islam, Globalization, and 
Postmodernity. (London: Routledge, 1994), 93. 
  73 
(14:46). 235 Islamic fundamentalists become the vanguards to ensure that the world’s 
current pace of change will not wipe out their culture and tradition from the seventh 
century.236 This Islamic imperative is often misconstrued for fanaticism and 
intolerance due to the world’s media237 that often advertises individuals that are on 
the “radical fringe of a broad-based Islamic jihad.”238 The perceived images of 
Islamic fundamentalists and jihad result from Islam’s power and idealistic concept 
that transforms into the primary idiom of Muslim politics into a created perception by 
“rulers and the ruled, be reformers, political opposition, and terrorists.”239 The 
following chapter will look at two prominent thinkers that have contributed to Islamic 
fundamentalism, Muhammad Ibn al-Wahhab and Sayyid Qutb. The ideologies of the 
two individuals are framed around Western European colonialism that calls for a 
ridding of alien influence in the ummah, or the community or nation. A radicalized 
form of Islam uses the call to jihad to bolster and legitimize the rejection of Western 
influence. Following the discussion of the influence of Muhammad Ibn al-Wahhab 
and Sayyid Qutb, Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda will be looked at to discern the 
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Gramscian approach 
 When looking at the responses of Islamic fundamentalism, the Gramscian 
approach is used as a form of methodology to understand the ideas and processes that 
fundamentalist Islam employs. Antonio Gramsci was an Italian theorist in writing at 
beginning of the 20th century who contributed to the Marxist critique of hegemony. 
The theory states “that man is not ruled by force alone, but also by ideas,” and that it 
is “political leadership based on the consent of the led, a consent which is secured by 
the diffusion and popularization of the world view of the ruling class.”240 In Thomas 
J. Butko’s article, “Revelation or Revolution: A Gramscian Approach to the rise of 
Political Islam,” political Islam is framed according to the blending of Islamic ethic 
and Gramscian theory, outlining the countering force of political Islam as a response 
to the ‘passivity of the Islamic state,’ 241 which responds to the Western, hegemonic 
powers who see the shari’a and Islamic way of life as problematic. 
 Political Islam, or Islamic fundamentalism as it is known in the West, is the 
counter to a hegemonic force “with the sole and ultimate objective of overthrowing 
the current elites and the present political, economic, and social structure.”242 With 
the establishment of a viable revolutionary force, or a “political organization erected 
upon religious foundations,”243 which eradicates the old form of rule creating a 
political vacuum, an expected new form of society will result, “a new morality and, 
                                                
240 Thomas R. Bates, “Gramsci and the Theory of Hegemony,” Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 36, 
No. 2 (Apr.-Jun., 1975), 351. 
241 François Burgat, Face to Face with Political Islam, 76. 
242 Thomas J. Butko, “Revelation or Revolution: A Gramscian Approach to the Rise of Political 
Islam,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 31, No. 1 (May, 2004), 41. 
243 Ibid. 42. 
  75 
most fundamentally, a new type of man.”244 An alternative to this hegemon will allow 
for a new way of thinking and the success of a revolution. The forms and problems 
that an individual faces when attempting to bring about a change through political 
Islam, or his “true consciousness,” will be discussed, looking at the power and 
legitimacy of the elites in their sociopolitical order. 
 The elite’s view of “common sense” poses the problematic issue of forcing its 
conception of the world onto the masses, which prevents them from realizing their 
“true consciousness.” Human nature is open to influences by dominant forces of 
society and thus can be compliant to new ideas or beliefs. The elites, or the most 
educated members of society, “will determine the general orientation and beliefs of 
the masses,”245 which, through the breakdown of this elite power, can be transported 
to the revolutionary movement. The state, and thus the elite power, is made up of 
political society and civil society, which exists as their “armour of coercion.”246  
 However, if the support civil society is gained, the attempt to control state 
power can be accomplished. The support of civil society is gained through the 
understanding of the “collective man,” or the formation of a larger group with similar 
aims and goals as an ideology. “Shared perceptions of repression, exclusion, and 
marginalization,”247 as well as the “[search] for greater meaning in life, brought about 
by increased feelings of ‘spiritual inadequacy,” unite the common man, rather than 
the Marxist’s reason due to economics.  The ideology of the ruling class, or the 
structure, is in tern more important for the hegemon’s supremacy in a society. With 
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this understanding, instruction and education must be invoked for supporters of the 
counter-hegemonic force, “while exposing the ‘evilness’ of the regime and the 
surrounding jahiliyyah society.”248 
 According to Gramsci, this counter-hegemonic force is made up of three 
pieces: a coherent and attractive ideology, a political organization expressing that 
ideology, and a well-developed strategy. An ideology is an instrument for unifying 
the masses of divergent interests, usually through “their opposition to the current 
elites and desire for its overthrow.”249 It also must provide an alternative to the 
conception of the world, as well as an answer to the problems faced by a society.  
 An organizational structure is the “concrete expression” of the ideology’s 
goal, made up of three types of groups: the leadership, the vanguard, and the 
individual members. The type and level of leadership determines the cohesiveness 
and potential success of the movement, seen with leaders such as Hassan al-Banna 
(1906-1949), Khomeini (1902-1989), and Mawdudi (1903-1979). The vanguard, or 
the inner circle of individuals, is “a group of the most dedicated and active members, 
on whom could be placed the primary burden of serving God and the message.”250 
Sayyid Qutb, a 20th century Egyptian Islamic revolutionary, refers to the necessity 
and importance of a vanguard during the march against the jahiliyyah in his book, 
Milestones, in which the vanguard ensures the confrontation and possible destruction 
of the jahiliyyah society. Gramsci stresses the individual members, or the mass, and 
believes in the “inherent value of each and every individual by declaring that since 
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‘all men are philosophers’, they should be considered ‘intellectuals’ in the grander 
sense.”251 Individual self-dedication and discipline, like the five daily prayers, make 
up Islam, while faith and firm conviction ensure the success of the aims of the 
movement. “Hence, if the seed (Islam) is planted and creates strong roots of 
leadership, the branches and its leaves (individual members) cannot avoid being 
nourished and, thus, spreading the word and message of Islam throughout the entire 
world.” 252 
  Finally, a well-developed strategy is needed, which Gramsci names as the 
‘war of position,’ as “to infiltrate civil society through the dissemination of new ideas 
and, in the process, to intellectually and culturally prepare the ground for the 
revolutionary movement’s assault on hegemonic dominance.”253 A re-education in the 
core principles of Islam has been the cornerstone to the 20th century Islamic 
movement since Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood In Egypt, 
and comprises the strategy of the ‘war of position.’ Qutb agrees with this type of 
strategy, stating, “Our aim is to first change ourselves so that we may later change the 
society.”254 Muslim societies are equally capable of committing acts similar to the 
jahiliyyah society, thus require equal energy in the reeducation.  
 The confrontation of opposites will ensure the movement’s success to counter 
the present power in the world, first to separate and then eventually to completely 
destroy. “Consequently, the aim of this movement must be to consciously separate 
itself from the current social order, while simultaneously attempting to destroy it 
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entirely.”255 This separation also includes a rejection of the hegemonic ways and 
power, followed by the total adoption of the counter-hegemonic forces. Values are 
“rewritten” within the Muslim culture, “participating in a complex process of 
reconciliation which actually extends the boundaries of modernization rather than 
causing it to stay or preventing its progress.”256 Through the achievement of political 
power in all of the movement’s methods, political Islam will bring about a 
fundamental change in the sociopolitical sphere.  
 The following section will look at two prominent thinkers who have had a 
substantial influence on the current Islamic fundamentalist movement, Muhammad 
Abd Ibn al-Wahhab and Sayyid Qutb. From these perspectives, the Muslim response 
was aimed at European colonialism beginning in the 18th century and the failure of 
modern Muslim states, which hastened the debate of the meaning of jihad.257 By 
delving into the Gramscian theory that explains Islamic fundamentalism, one can 
understand the ways in which a movement is established. To oppose the “ruling” 
hegemonic force that imposes their conception of the world, a counter-hegemonic 
force is realized as “a demand for the present and a hope for the future,”258 
accomplished through an ideology, political organization, and strategy.  
 Al-Wahhab and Sayyid Qutb played crucial roles in the development of the 
Islamic fundamentalist mindset through their use of religion to justify their response 
to European colonialism. As discussed later in the chapter, Osama bin Laden 
contends that promotion of the education of Islam is vital for all Muslims in order to 
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realize the jihad against the aggressive US government and its policies259. In the 
context of discussing Afghanistan, bin Laden notes:  
 So we advise Muslims both within and outside Afghanistan to help these  
 students [the Taliban’s subjects in Afghanistan], and we advise Muslims 
  outside [Afghanistan] that much of the effort that is being made is doing  
 hardly anything to promote the existence of a state of Islam . . . And we  
 call on Muslims to help this state [Afghanistan] with all their might, their  
 ideas, their charitable donations and funds, for which God’s will it represents  
 the banner of Islam today.260 
 
According to bin Laden, a jihad  is used in self defense, and is the only way to obtain 
a faithful strength to unite Islam against the enemy.261 In an interview between Al-
Jazeera and bin Laden in 1998, bin Laden stated that the call to jihad needs to occur 
now, contrary to many scholars who believe “now is not the time.”262 All individuals 
from the Muslim world are “obliged to strive” for a jihad to rid the ummah of 
unfavorable powers. The example of bin Laden is used to show the evolution and 
progression of Islamic fundamentalism in the 21st century from the teachings of al-
Wahhab and Sayyid Qutb. Both thinkers emphasized the rejection of Western 
influence, which interferes with the education and proselytization of Islam in a world 
that is supposedly in a state of jahiliyyah. The term will be used to refer to the world 
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Jahiliyyah 
 The question of faith between the divine and the human, or din, characterizes 
Islam’s jahiliyyah.263 The first evidence of jahiliyyah is in pre-Islamic, pagan Arabia 
and found in pagan poetry. “Jahiliyyah is not lack of knowledge on the part of the 
jahili poet or on the part of his jahili masters, but simply disobedience to God’s law 
and order. These jahili poets worshipped idols and not Allah, thus not following 
God’s order.”264 Pagan scholars and poets are seen as committing jahiliyyah who do 
not fully submit to Allah. 
 With the birth of Islam and the Qur’an in the seventh century, individuals not 
following God’s orders are seen as disbelievers, using a variation of the term 
jahiliyyah, such as jahil for individuals, and jahilun and juhhal for them as a group.265 
Jahiliyyah took on its own meaning in the Qur’an as a result of the Qur’an’s usage of 
the word from the pre-Islamic period. The term is to denote a contrast to Islam, seen 
in Qur’an 39:63-64 with, “Say [O Muhammad}: Is it some one other than Allah that 
you order me to worship, oh jahilun ones?’”266 Thus, “the term was a religio-political 
concept used oppositionally to the Islamic constitution, state, and laws.”267  
 
Wahhabism 
Origins of Wahhabism 
 Today, Wahhabi Islam is known because of its Saudi origins and affiliation 
with the bin Laden family.  Initially known as the Wahhabiyya, or Wahhabism by the 
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West, it exists as an 18th century Islamic revivalism “that [sought] to purify Islam of 
any innovations or practices that deviate from the seventh century teachings of 
Prophet Muhammad and his companions.” 268 According to the Encyclopedia of Islam 
and the Muslim World, Wahhabism was “the last significant reformist effort in the 
area before European imperialism.”269 It holds puritanical and iconoclastic 
philosophies forbidding saint veneration, the celebration of the Prophet’s birthday, 
some mystical teachings of Sufism, and the loathing for music.270 These bans often 
clash with many of Islam’s other non-Wahhabi sects, like Sunni Muslims, Shiite 
Muslims, and non-Muslim neighbors that participate in shrine veneration. According 
to John Esposito, Wahhabism today “continues to be a significance force in the 
Islamic world, informing both maintstream and extremist movements from Africa and 
Central Asia to Europe and America.”271 A discussion of the Wahhabi movement’s 
origins will follow, first by looking at its founder’s theoretical positions for its 
justifications and ending with the movement’s historical context until the present day.   
 Wahhabism’s origins can be traced to an 18th century thinker named 
Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1971) from Najd in the Arabian Peninsula. 
Al-Wahhab held strict convictions that differed from mainstream Islam, 
“disillusioned by the spiritual decline and moral laxity of his society.”272 He called for 
“a return to tawhid” (strict monotheism) and viewed society as moving away from the 
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pure Islam he called for.273  He also called for a fresh interpretation of Islam that 
returned to its revealed sources, seen through the Qur’an and hadith.274 Muslims 
should read the Qur’an for their own interpretation and disregard other human 
insights into the interpretation of scripture. Similarly as regards the hadith, its content 
must be analyzed by the individual rather than using the interpretations of 
transmitters. Literature by hadith commentators made it difficult to see the difference 
between the actual story and the commentary of the authors.275 According to al-
Wahhab, through the study of the Qur’an and hadith, contextualization and the search 
for purpose are the proper ways to understand Islam, rather than just with 
memorization and analysis of other interpretations.276 Al-Wahhab’s book titled, Kitab 
al-Tawhid, or the Book of Monotheism, outlined his basic teachings and describes the 
themes of his work with the Qur’an and hadith.  
 In Kitab al-Tawhid, an entire treatise is dedicated to tawhid, which al-Wahhab 
describes as the sole characteristic of Islam “reflected in the Wahhabi’s self-
designation as ‘unitarians.’”277 The treatise attributes Christianity and Judaism’s false 
monotheism to their “ordained clergy, papacy, or binding interpretations of scripture 
written by rabbis or priests.”278 Kitab al-Tawhid represents al-Wahhab’s manifesto 
for action and a justification for fighting those with different beliefs.279 The idea of 
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tawhid “makes it clear that correct belief is intended to lead to correct behavior,”280 
since knowingly violating tawhid is a greater sin than unknowingly.  
 The Wahhabis are known for their clear definitions of faith (Iman) and 
unbelief, or kufr, which is “any failure to follow the teachings of the Wahhabis.” Al-
Wahhab teaches that non-Muslim individuals must be educated on the Islamic way of 
life, and will be excused from ignorance.281 He agrees that faith “cannot exist without 
proper instruction in the Qur’an and Sunna,” 282 To aid this practice, al-Wahhab 
taught that guiding individuals to Islam is the most worthy action a Muslim can do 
through the infusion of knowledge and education through proselytization.283 This 
education occurs through steps, beginning with the acceptance of tawhid284(the 
monotheistic belief in Allah). The opposite of tawhid, shirk, is taught as “a violation 
of and departure from tawhid,” and assigns power and sovereignty “to someone or 
something other than God,” which was the greatest sin of all according to al-
Wahhab.285 According to the Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim World, Al-
Wahhab’s teachings “provided the ideological basis for the militant conquest of the 
Arabian peninsula that had been undertaken by the Sa’ud family.”286 
 In addition to the impacts of al-Wahhab’s work on the current Islamic 
fundamentalist movement, the evolved Wahhabi appeal seen in Saudi Arabia adds to 
the discussion of the Islamic fundamentalist origins. The development of the Wahhabi 
movement in Saudi Arabia is notable due to its deeply intertwined status with the 
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politics of the kingdom, turning into a religio-political movement.287 The Arab clan of 
Al-Saud was the Wahhabi rival in the region, which eventually joined forces in 1745. 
Through the formation of the al-Wahhab-Saudi alliance, “Ibn Sa’ud pledged to give 
military support for the propagation and enforcement of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s 
teachings,” 288 elevating Wahhabism to a sizeable position in the kingdom. The 18th 
century alliance represented the symbiotic relationship of the two powers in Saudi 
Arabia, which Ibn Saud employed Wahhabism “as a religious ideal to legitimate his 
jihad to subdue and unite the tribes of Arabia, converting them to this puritanical 
version of Islam.”289  
 While attempting to establish power in the region in the 18th century, Western 
imperial powers, like the British, capitalized on this strong alliance due to its 
resistance against the Ottoman Empire for the availability and protection of its 
resource interests in the Arabian Peninsula. In conjunction with imperial powers, the 
ultimate goals of the al-Wahhab and Ibn Sa’ud alliance, was to “undermine the 
Ottomans, subdue the Two Holy Places, and impose the Wahhabi dispensation on the 
entire ummah.”290 As a result, the Saudi ruling class formed a commanding, 
influential, and wealthy elite that “legitimated its domestic and foreign policies by 
claiming to govern and be governed by the Qur’an and sharia.”291  
 Until Saudi Arabia’s founding in 1932, the region was constantly in conflict 
with foreign powers and influences, like the Ottoman Empire and Britain. First, in the 
early 19th century, the Ottoman sultan permitted the governor of Egypt, Muhammad 
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‘Ali (1769-1849), to destroy the Wahhabi state by the Ottoman sultan, which was 
later revoked in 1822.292 Second, in the 20th century during the First World War, the 
British curtailed the Wahhabi expansion in Arabia, which was revoked later in 1925, 
regardless of their previous cordial relationship.293 
 In response, the Wahhabi movement contributed a totalitarian system based 
on the Ikhwan al-Muslimin (Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood), which established its 
own form of fascism “based on a monopoly of wealth by the elite, backed by extreme 
repression and a taste for bloodshed.”294 The Ikhwan’s doctrine called for a rejection 
of non-Qur’anic or non-Wahhabi texts and music, alongside a skeptical view of 
modern technology. Nonetheless, with the discovery of oil in 1938, the Wahhabis and 
the Saud family became “the world’s richest and most powerful ruling elite,”295 as 
well as initiating the clash “between the Sa’audi family and clerical establishment and 
the most zealous Wahhabi loyalists.”296 
 Further foreign presence occurred in Saudi Arabia in 1945 with the Roosevelt-
-Ibn Sa’ud alliance on the USS Quincy, with the US’ promise of American military 
aid to Saudi Arabia in return for the kingdom’s business and security of interests. 
American dollars spilled into Saudi Arabia because of the oil industry, which also 
brought American interests and influence, angering many of the Wahhabi 
fundamentalists present in Saudi Arabia. “Airport Wahhabis,” characterized as Saudi 
aristocracy who engaged in non-Wahhabi activities, emerged from Saudi Arabia as a 
result of this influx of wealth that “became an unparalleled symbol of debauchery, 
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obstentation, and waste, as well as ignorance, prejudice and brutality.”297 This influx 
of money, technology, and interests angered the Wahhabi society, thus globalization 
“inevitably [undermined] Wahhabi domination in Arabia.”298  
 Wahhabi strength maintained its presence in Saudi Arabia through the boom 
in the oil industry in the mid 20th century. With the war against Soviet Union in 
Afghanistan in 1979, the Wahhabi campaign extended its reach. The mujahidin, or 
the ‘Afghan Arabs,’ 299 were the young and restless youth fighting in the Afghanistan 
jihad who used religious reform to instigate political mobilization. According to 
Stephen Schwartz, Afghanistan gave the Wahhabi-Saudi power a chance to “impose 
[its] own form of Islam under the pretext of defending Muslims . . . launched [its] 
most ambitious attempt to date at direct religious colonization of a Muslim country 
that was neither Arab nor a neighbor of Arabs.”300 The US also supported the war in 
Afghanistan through financial aid and military support for the mujahidin, training the 
young soldiers American tactics in warfare, such as the use of the car bomb.301 
However, after the Soviet retreat from Afghanistan, the ‘Afghan Arabs’ switched 
their efforts from fighting the Communists to bringing about the global Wahhabi 
campaign to revive Islam in Muslim communities. The Wahhabi-Saudi movement 
“attempted Wahhabization of these countries and the destruction of their indigenous 
Islamic cultures, which were and remain mainstream Sunni, Suffi, and pluralist.”302 
Iran, the Shi’a radical Islamic state, posed a threat to the Wahhabi-Saudi movement, 
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as well as to the US because of Khomeini’s aggressive rule. Iraq, ruled by Saddam 
Hussein, also opposed Iran, which the US quickly sent aid and arms to in support of 
the invasion of Iran. Consequently, the US supported Iraq and the Saudi line, however 
unaware of the real Wahhabi agenda against Iran.303  
 The world of Wahhabism separated reality into two human societies, the 
“house of war” and the “house of peace,” similar to the Communist’s divided world 
between capitalist and socialists.304 “They sought an ummah sufficient unto itself, 
with no ‘external’ relations except those between Wahhabi rulers and the minority in 
their subjects . . . all others were to be liquidated, beginning with the Shi’ia and 
Sufis.” 305 Arabian youth, specifically in Saudi Arabia, blamed the decline in 
civilization, Western colonization, and disenfranchisement of the Palestinians on the 
Saudi rulers who relied heavily on Western influence.306 
 The 18th century Wahhabi movement stressed the need for a strict 
interpretation of the Qur’an and hadith to mobilize a political movement against the 
Ottomans and the British, which is often perceived as puritanical and extreme. In 
addition to the conversation on al-Wahhab’s ideologies, Sayyid Qutb, the most 
powerful Egyptian voice of radical Islam that protested against both Arab nationalism 
and Western hegemony in the 20th century307, must be looked at to 
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Sayyid Qutb 
 While many great Islamists supplemented the Islamic fundamentalist 
movement in the 20th century, Sayyid Qutb is known as the “godfather and martyr of 
Islamic radicalism.”308 Sayyid Qutb Ibrahim Husayn Shadhili was born October 9th, 
1906 in a small town in Upper Egypt called Musha. Throughout Qutb’s childhood 
and early adulthood, Egypt was under foreign occupation by the British until 1955 
when with the British withdrew from the Suez Canal. Egypt was bombarded with 
modernization because of its control under a Western monarchy, which was resisted 
with Islamic resurgence. In his youth, he was educated the traditional Islamic form, 
and later in the secular form while in college in Cairo.  One can see the linear 
progression of Qutb’s ideologies of militant jihad that stem from his response to the 
repressive Egyptian state reacting from British rule, and past French rule,  in the late 
1950’s and 1960’s.309 
  After completing his education, Qutb traveled to America in 1948 to study 
school curricula. While at first an admirer of the US, Qutb became disillusioned by 
the American vices in society, which were comprised of the “combination of 
secularism and materialism that in his opinion had resulted in moral laxity, 
exploitation, oppression, and racism.”310 Religion was not a guiding factor in the 
American public life, where human laws and thought were given more precedence 
than divine revelation and law. John Esposito notes that Qutb’s experience in 
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America “produced a cultural shock that made him more religious and convinced him 
of moral decadence of the West.”311 
 After traveling to the US, Qutb began to invoke jahiliyyah, to denote the 
condition of the world312 rather than the period before the rise of Islam. Seen in the 
introduction of an Indian Muslim thinker colleague’s book, What Has the World Lost 
as a Result of the Decline of Muslims, Qutb freely uses jahiliyyah to show the 
condition in which the world is without Islam, “humanity [being] corroded by a 
criminally luxurious and wasteful life on the one hand, and hopelessness and 
frustration and despair on the other.”313 Previously, Qutb had used synonyms of 
jahiliyyah in the historical sense, like jahalah, jahilin, and jahiliyyah.314 
 After his experiences with jahili society in the US, in 1951 Qutb joined the 
Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamist organization in Egypt founded by Hassan al-Banna. 
His membership was a result of the blending of his distate for the Western culture, the 
US support for the state of Israel in 1948, Egypt’s alignment with Russia, and secular 
nationalism in Egypt.315 As a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, Qutb filled the 
vacuum left after the assassination of al-Banna and “became an editor of its journal 
and established himself right away as Islamism’s principal theoretician in the Arab 
World.”316 After World War II, several organizations were born in response to their 
post-war status still under imperial authority, like the Ba’ath party as a anticolonialist 
                                                
311 John Esposito, Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam, 57. 
312 Natana J. Delong-Bas, Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad, 149. 
313 Ibid. 149. 
314 Ibid. 156. 
315 John Esposito, Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam, 57. 
316 Paul Berman, “Why Radical Islam Just Won’t Die,” New York Times, March 23, 2008, Opinion 
section. 
  90 
party.317 All organizations demanded Egypt’s full independence from Britain 
following World War II in 1952, which paralleled with other Egyptian groups’ 
interests, such as the Free Officers led by army colonel Gamal Abd al-Nasser.  
However, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Free Officers clashed because of their 
differing ideologies. The Free Officers were secular in orientation, following Arab 
nationalism, with Nasser’s ideas “[centering] on the unification of the Arab nation 
and modernization of Arab society, under Egyptian leadership, as a means of reviving 
their past greatness.”318 Nasser also did not believe that the fight for an Arab revival 
was through the religious purification of fundamentalism, but rather as a consequence 
of ethnic solidarity and social reform.319  On the contrary, the Muslim Brotherhood 
favored Islam as the basis for the identity and construction for Arab alliance. Qutb 
firmly believed in the Egyptian Ikhwan, or totalitarian system of an ideological 
militia, filled with the fundamental separatism and supremacism similar to 
Wahhabism.320  
 Tensions between the Brotherhood and Nasser erupted in 1954, leading to 
Qutb’s subsequent imprisonment because of his prominent position in the 
Brotherhood. Qutb was tortured extensively in prison where he wrote, “In the Shade 
of the Qur’an” using Qur’anic commentary.  Qutb wrote extensively in prison where 
he became progressively more radically Islamist, including his views on jihad to 
oppress Western influences and the secular regime that grew from it. “His hostility to 
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the West expressed itself in an exaltation of his concepts of ‘jihad.’”321 In 1966, 
Nasser executed the incarcerated Qutb as an attempt to quell the emotions that Qutb 
had instilled in the Islamic fundamentalist movement.  
 A shift is seen in Qutb’s work in the 1960’s from moderate to radical in his 
two books, Social Justice in Islam and Milestones. Qutb’s criticizing writing style 
evoked a “profound anger and revulsion, which translated into a revolutionary 
vision.322 In his later years, he “disowned” most of what he had written during the era 
of his secularist views, which included Social Justice in Islam, which he then rewrote.  
 Sayyid Qutb wrote Social Justice in Islam, or Al-‘Adalah al-Ijitima’iyyah fi 
al-Islam, in 1949, representing his initial political and theoretical position of Islamic 
society in the modern world.323 After traveling to the US, Qutb wrote, Social Justice 
in Islam that came out of his concern for the political corruption, social stress, 
economic inequality and the continuing European imperialism in Egypt. Each of the 
book’s six versions show the progression of Qutb’s changing views from his life in 
Egypt with the Muslim Brotherhood and during his incarceration.324 “He took the 
lead in attacking the social conditions and in preparing the ground for social 
reform.”325 Yet the real evolution of Qutb’s views came with the publication of 
Milestones.  
 Qutb’s Milestones, written in 1948, was (and still is) one of the most 
influential primary sources for Islamic fundamentalism. It was his first Islamic book, 
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and continued to be published until 1964 that subsequently lead to his re-arrest for an 
accusation of conspiracy against Nasser.326 Qutb introduces the book by calling on 
Islam to revive the world from the Western system that possesses values and a way of 
life not warranted to be the leader of mankind.327 The documentary, God’s Warriors, 
states that the “vanguards” of the Islamic world saw Milestones as “the manifesto of 
the jihadi movement.” Kamal Al-Saad Habib, an individual interviewed in the 
documentary, was a member of an Islamic jihadist group in Egypt during Qutb’s 
lifetime. Habib sees Qutb’s work as a call to arms: “America and the Western world 
have a moral problem. They look at the human being only from a materialistic point 
of view.”328 Fawaz Gerges, a CNN Middle East Consultant, also noted Qutb’s work, 
specifically Milestones, concerning the Muslim mission in life: “Your mission in life 
is to replace the secular, non-Muslim society-government that exists in this part of the 
world with authentic Islamic state, and you must do it. You must do it using all means 
at your disposal.”329  
 According to the Muslim minority of Islamic fundamentalists, Milestones was 
to engage the beginning of a revolution “to be carried out via jihad as holy war, 
which was declared to be the ongoing, permanent duty of Muslims as they engaged in 
the cosmic battle of good versus evil, played out in every life.”330 To the current 
Islamist community, it is a classic manifesto for action framed around Qutb’s 
rejection of Western influence in Egyptian life in the 1960’s.331 
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 Milestones is made up of a three--part analysis: the ills of modernity 
(jahiliyyah), a cure to jahiliyyah in the form of Islamic law, and a method of 
implementing the cure.332 Islam is vital to the jahiliyyah society so that the “humanity 
of man” can be awakened and developed, seen through the invocation of jihad. Jihad 
is used to eliminate the jahili authorities, such a political systems or material powers, 
which remove individuals’ freedom from forming Islamic ideas and serving Allah, 
known as Islamic din. According to Roxanne Euben, Islam “seeks to abolish all those 
systems and governments that are based on the rule of some men over others.”333 
Institutions and traditions that limit the freedom of human beings and distorts human 
nature should be destroyed, serving as an obstacle for individuals from humanity’s 
freedom and choice.334 Roxanne Euben also notes that “this leaves no option for 
Islam but to fight against them in order to remove all obstacles from the path to 
universal human freedom. Only this manner can life be wholly dedicated to Allah.”335  
 Jahiliyyah society must follow Islam’s declaration of faith, “La ilaha illa 
Allah” (no god but Allah) to create a foundation for a true, Islamic community based 
on the worship of Allah alone. According to Qutb, societies that do not fully submit 
to Islamic din are jahili societies that do not dedicate themselves to the submission of 
Allah alone in ideas and beliefs are a jahili society.336 Qutb also declares that “all 
existing so-called ‘Muslim societies’ are also jahili societies”337 due to the lack of 
absolute submission to Allah. The world becomes divided into separate states of dar-
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al-Islam (home of Islam) where Islamic shar’iah law is enforced, and dar-al-harb 
(home of hostility), where Islamic shar’iah law is neglected,338 neither being able to 
coexist with the other. 339 Qutb’s worlds of darl-al-Islam and darl-al-harb “recast the 
world into black and white,”340 with no shades of gray. With the success of a state of 
dar-al-Islam, Allah and the Qur’an will remove all forms of jahiliyyah to make that 
land pure.  
 At the end of Milestones, Qutb addresses the vanguards for which the book is 
dedicated to. The vanguard is charged with understanding the struggle on earth as a 
triumph of faith as well as a struggle perceived by Allah in the Thereafter that dictates 
humanity’s purpose.341 Vanguards are called to enact religious reform that is meant to 
establish political mobilization favorable to Islamic fundamentalism. Qutb warns 
vanguards that enemies will try to change the struggle into an economic or political 
issue to “deprive them of their weapons for true victory,”342 which he commands 
believers to disregard. Islam is to take the world out of disparity, notes Qutb, and 
must not be “a camp follower.”343 Qutb’s final words are used to bolster the 
vanguards when empowering the dar-al-Islam against the dar-al-harb, described as 
the “spirit of materialism,” inspiring the heart of the Islamic fundamentalist to strive 
against jahili society that has held a predominant position in world affairs.  
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Qutb’s other works 
 In addition to Social Justice in Islam and Milestones, in 1951 Qutb wrote two 
books that discuss the liberation of man from controlling and dominating forces, The 
Battle between Islam and Capitalism, and Islam and Universal Peace. 
 The Battle between Islam and Capitalism shows his interest in understanding 
and describing the problems of the royal, Western capitalist system and its negative 
impact on Egyptian society.344 Egypt must distance itself from hegemonic forces, 
such as France, that do not understand the tension between the legislation and the 
spirit of the people. To respond to the problems of the capitalist system in Egypt, 
Islam must be used to disregard all the other powers in the world that are attempting 
to do the same thing. The only way for the ummah to prosper is to be ruled by 
shari’ah law,345 emphasizing religion to initiate political mobilization. It must go 
back to the great ‘aqidah (creed): “This great ‘aqidah today, in the case of Egypt, is 
not anything but Islam.”346  
 Islam and Universal Peace notes that “Islam, unlike secular ideologies, is 
divinely inspired guidance and is able to establish both justice and peace in the 
world.”347 The world will continue to suffer until Islam is given the leadership to 
“lead the perplexed (ha’ir) humanity to justice, order, and peace.”348 This peace will 
arise from the Islamic liberation of man, which is the religious duty for every Muslim 
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to liberate the world from the unjust rule, regardless of religion or predominant 
governance. The path to peace will be through jihad against the jahili society.349   
 The perspective of Qutb’s influence on the Islamic fundamentalist mindset 
against jahili society concerning jihad varies in degree and purpose. According to Bin 
Jani, author of Sayyid Qutb’s View of Jihad, Qutb did not believe in the armed 
struggle per se, yet called for an alternative method. First, a vanguard of Islam must 
be set up as a “catalyst for the creation of an Islamic society that is suppose to replace 
the existing jahili society,” to unite all Muslims under a single Islamic organization. 
Its main duty is the propagation of da’wah through persuasion, argumentation, and 
education to oppose jahiliyyah. Only with the help of the vanguard will an authentic 
Islamic society be accomplished to transform their movement into a religio-political 
unit, separating completely from the jahili society. However, according to John 
Esposito in Unholy War, Qutb’s jihad was more radical in nature. While explained as 
an “armed struggle in the defense of Islam against the injustice and oppression of the 
West and the East,” it stands as an important ideology to numerous radical jihad 
extremist groups. A jihad is to be waged against the “Western threat as a political, 
economic, and religio-cultural conflict,”350 in addition to the elites of the Muslim 
world that support them. 
 Roxanne L. Euben sees Qutb’s experience with Nasser in Egypt as a clue to 
understanding and discussing the world and jahili society. Qutb’s aversion to 
modernity is not due in part to technology, progress, or worldliness, but to the 
openness to Westernization and commitment to secularization imposed by previous 
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imperial rule.351 Man-made sources of authority become Qutb’s true rival, like the 
Egyptian President Nasser who believed in secular nationalism. Additionally, an 
authentic Islamic society will only be accomplished through the active participation 
“in the realization of the Islamic way on Earth,”352 through the enactment of a jihad.  
In this strange paradox, Islam brings freedom to the jahili society yet insisting that 
Allah’s sovereignty must be accepted. This turns into an unapologetic offensive, 
which is necessary to bring about a more Islamic way of life to the world. Even while 
reading Qutb’s Milestones, his language gradually develops an image of a winnable 
battle between good and evil for the vanguards, calling for a jihad against the jahili 
society rooted in materialism, sexual permissiveness and permiscuity, free use and 
abuse of alcohol, and its racism.353 
 The resonating theme between al-Wahhab and Sayyid Qutb is their emphasis 
on religious reform for freedom (to follow Islam) that is hindered by invading forces 
reminiscent of colonial powers. A call for a religious revival merges with the concern 
to change the political influences that attempt to modernize societies in the Middle 
East. For this reason, a jihad against the jahili society that supports these powers is 
perceived as just and gives a tangible purpose. Through our development of the 18th 
and 20th century thinkers’ ideologies, a discussion of the current response of Islamic 
fundamentalism resulting from the previous ideologies can be examined.  
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The current Islamist mindset 
 After September 11, an examination of Saudi Arabia was instigated by the 
fact that 15 out of the 19 hijackers were of Saudi background. With this said, the 
current demographics of Saudi Arabian society must be looked at in order to piece 
together one perspective from the Middle East. This is not making the assumption 
that all hijackers are Saudi, or that all Saudis are hijackers, yet brings to light certain 
factors of Saudi Arabia that can influence the Islamic fundamentalist perspective.  
According to Michael Klare, despite the US’ hesitance to admit the instability of 
Saudi Arabia, the kingdom “[became] a scene of social, economic, political, a 
religious ferment.”354 From 1950 to 2002, Saudi Arabia’s population grew from 3.2 
million people to 21.7 million people with 75% of the population under the age of 
thirty and 50% under the age of eighteen.355 The kingdom also experienced a drop in 
its per capita income, from $28,600 in 1981 to $6,800 in 2001, followed by an 
approximate 30% unemployment rate under thirty that, according to Richard Booney, 
“may fuel support for militancy.”356 Well-educated and ambitious men were left often 
alienated and “with high expectations and few economic opportunities- perfect fodder 
for political or religious extremists.”357  
 Saudi Arabian society in the 21st century became discontent for three reasons 
due to the emerging Western presence and influence in their kingdom. First, the 
continuing US military presence left over from Operation Desert Storm in 1990 
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angered some in the Saudi community, who saw the occupation as a stab to the 
spiritual heart of Islam with the dwelling infidels. Second, the Saudi state was 
angered by the US’ continuing support for Israel and the war against the Palestinians, 
which directly refuted the Saudi-US alliance to consider Arab interests in addition to 
Israeli ones. Third, some in the Saudi society saw the royal family as having been 
corrupted due to Western petrodollar wealth, which caused it to move away from the 
path of Islam, losing “its mantle of legitimacy.”358 “The result [was] the intrusion of 
Western values at the expense of Muslim principles, the corruption of Saudi princes 
and officials, and dependence on the United States.”359   
 In addition to adopting Western lifestyle habits, the royal family received 
“commissions” from foreign companies, usually Western, to secure interests and 
allies. Commissions were passed on to Islamic fundamentalists to reconcile their 
conflicts with the Saudi regime because of their fear of losing power. Unfortunately, 
the reverse happened with “an explosion of anti-Americanism, a deepening anger at 
the royal family, and a steady stream of recruits to Al Qaeda and other extremist 
organizations.”360 From the Western perspective, the only way to combat these 
resentments was to support the Saudi regime and royal family.  
 Still to this day, the Saudi royal family lives a life of contradictions. It 
attempts to appease the Saudi Wahhabi campaign and maintain an alliance with the 
US at the same time,361 which is the exact complaint that many current Islamic 
fundamentalists hold as a justification for their global jihad.   
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 While the teachings and theories of al-Wahhab and Sayyid Qutb have 
strengthened the Islamic fundamentalist movement’s justifications concerning the 
ummah, jahiliyyah, and jihad, the real strength lies in their representation of 
contemporary Western societies as well as the “Muslim sense of historic oppression, 
occupation, and injustice at the hands of the West.”362 In 18th century Saudi Arabia, 
the Wahhabi movement developed from a reaction against the Ottoman Empire and 
the British, similarly to the 20th century Egyptian reactionary movement against 
British rule. Relgious reform becomes alike with political mobilization. The examples 
of Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda will be used to demonstrate the evolved power of 
the movement in the 21st century responding to a “centuries-long tradition of reform 
in Islam, most of it aimed at the last one hundred years toward the struggle over 
Muslim oppression by the West.”363 Through bin Laden’s identification with many 
mainstream and extremist Muslim grievances and perceptions, he seeks to legitimate 
and mobilize the “’Muslim street’, or general population.”364  
 
Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda 
 Osama bin Muhammaed bin Laden was born in Saudi Arabia in 1957 to a 
wealthy family with close ties with the ruling al-Saud family. Osama Bin Laden was 
educated in economics but preferred Islamic studies, and was taught by Abdallah 
Azzam and Muhhammad Qutb (the brother of Sayyid Qutb). After briefly working in 
Saudi Arabia for his family’s construction empire, bin Laden experienced a “turning 
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point”365 in his life when became involved with the jihad in Afghanistan and helped 
organize the flow of Saudi funds and equipment to the mujahidin in addition to US’ 
support in Afghanistan. After the war ended, the mujahidin were “left orphaned and 
warring amongst each other in Peshawar,”366 prompting bin Laden to return to Saudi 
Arabia. Upon return, bin Laden was initially viewed as a hero, but gradually became 
in conflict with the royal family when he felt bound within the confines of a regime 
whose policies and alliances he more and more came to despise as corrupt and un-
Islamic. However, in light of the invasion of Kuwait, bin Laden offered the Saudi 
kingdom the protection of the ‘Afghan Arabs,’ and in place took the support offered 
by the US. This period in the kingdom’s history represents the defining moment for 
bin Laden in his anger towards the US, Saudi Arabia, and the encroaching powers of 
the US. With this brief summary concerning bin Laden’s disagreement with the Saud 
family, we can begin to understand the origins of bin Laden’s fundamentalist 
perspective, where he and other Islamic radicalists “[paint] their liberal rivals and 
opponents as traitors to Muslim civilizations.”367  
 The teachings and theories of Muhammad Ibn al-Wahhab and Sayyid Qutb 
represent earlier grievances against Western influence in the Middle East, which 
influence the perception of the current Islamic fundamentalist movement. As a 
current example of the Islamic fundamentalist resistance to the effects of 
contemporary Western society, Osama bin Laden exists as a vanguard to address the 
radical grievances and to bring the Muslim world back to the traditional Islamic ways. 
Similar to Huntington, he portrays the conflict as being between the Judeo-Christian 
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West and Islam: “America escalated its campaign against the Muslim world in its 
entirety, aiming to get rid of Islam itself. Its main focus in this was to target the 
scholars and the reformers who were enlightening the people to the dangers of Judeo-
American alliances.”368  Using Islam as a justification and a unifying force, bin Laden 
calls for the Arab world’s rejection of Western influences that restrict an individual’s 
rights to accept Islam as a religion and way of life, seen in a call for jihad.369   
 As a result, bin Laden is portrayed in the Muslim world as an archetypical 
Islamic warrior fighting a ‘battle between good and evil,’ akin to the Western’s notion 
of Robin Hood, which supports the proliferation of Western interests that reflects 
Huntington’s theory. According to Natana DeLong Bas, Huntington’s clash between 
East versus West turns into a ‘rival exceptionalism,’ which “implies a portrayal of the 
reality, or a false consciousness on the part of militant Islamists and their militant 
equivalent in the United States.”370  The image of bin Laden as either a “freedom 
fighter” or “terrorist” obscures the underlying basis of conflict for the clash of 
interests over power and resources effected by Western influences.  The elevation of 
bin Laden to a mystical status and position detracts from the reality of the conflict for 
power and resources. 
 Bin Laden’s primary focus was targeted at Saudi Arabia’s incorrect regime, 
leading to the kingdom’s erosion of Islamic morals and lifestyles as a result of these 
Western influences. Stated by bin Laden, the kingdom’s neglect of religion and 
weakness of faith has led to the fall of the ummah. The following is a description of 
the kingdom’s current state through the perception of bin Laden: “You are all aware 
                                                
368 Osama bin Laden, Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama bin Laden, 39. 
369 Richard Booney, Jihad: from Quran to bin Laden, 320. 
370 Ibid. 365. 
  103 
of the degree of degradation and corruption to which our Islamic ummah has sunk, in 
its government and in the feebleness and cowardice of many of its scholars in the face 
of its enemies, as well as its internal divisions.”371 However, during the Afghan jihad 
in the 1980’s, the US supported Saudi Arabia who backed the ‘Afghan Arabs,’ led by 
bin Laden’s jihad against the Soviets. The symbiotic relationship between the US and 
Saudi Arabia (and its “freedom fighters”) lasted until after Operation Desert Shield in 
1991, when bin Laden felt betrayed by Saudi Arabia, which preferred US troops over 
the ‘Afghan Arabs’ to protect the kingdom from invasion.  
 Bin Laden perceived this act as a betrayal of its Muslim brothers and 
demanded a total elimination of US interests and presence from the ummah. In this 
complaint he also held contempt concerning the US’ place in the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict. “’To erase this blight on the Muslim world’, he thundered, it was ‘an 
individual duty for every Muslim’ to ‘kill the Americans’ and drive their armies ‘out 
of the lands of Islam.’”372 In 1994, King Fuad of Saudi Arabia revoked Osama bin 
Laden’s citizenship after his establishment of a mujahidin in Sudan from where he 
then returned to Afghanistan. This furthered his revulsion and hate for the Saudi 
leadership.  
 Bin Laden’s secondary focus are attributed to hostility towards the US, or 
Western abuses,  and the presence and preference of US troops in Saudi Arabia 
during the Kuwaiti war with Saddam Hussein. The phenomenon of US presence in 
the kingdom is not new due to the historical precedence of the Roosevelt-Ibn Saud 
meeting in 1945 that legitimizes the kingdom’s protection from invading forces. 
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Klare acknowledges the influence of bin Laden’s growing rage against (first) the 
economic globalization and (second) the continued US support for Israel. A more 
cognizant influence is attributed to the effect of resources in Middle Eastern societies, 
namely oil, which makes the kingdom wealthier and more indulgent in Western 
practices.  
 After Operation Desert Shield, bin Laden was tied to numerous attacks 
targeting the US, beginning in 1995 with the bombing of the SANG headquarters in 
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. ‘Fourth-generation’ warfare373 describes Osama bin Laden and 
Al-Qaeda’s strategy as unconventional warfare to protect an imbalance of power, 
seen in the attacks of September 11. ‘Fourth-generation’ warfare is the use of small-
scale devices and light weaponry concerning the struggle against the “best-armed, 
best-trained, and most experienced armies in the world (the USSR in Afghanistan, the 
US in Somalia, Russia in Chechnya, and the Zionist entity in Lebanon).”374 It is also 
characterized by its ghost-like presence, appearing and disappearing at whim. The 
confrontation of  ‘fourth generation’ warfare becomes extremely difficult due to its 
alternative strategies for a “struggle for justice or a struggle for self-determination, or 
contained elements of both.”375  
 By looking at two of bin Laden’s speeches around the time of his  
campaign against the US in 1995, his future  ideological motives can be foretold. 
While bin Laden made statements prior to 1994, Bruce Lawrence concurs that the two 
following speeches after 1994 were intended for a wider public audience. Following 
his exile from Saudi Arabia, bin Laden’s public declarations addressed his view of the 
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transformation of the Middle East as a betrayal to the ummah. First, in 1994 he 
addressed Chief Mufti, the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia, or bin Baz, concerning his 
endorsement of the Oslo Accords in 1993 between Israel and PLO. Bin Laden saw 
the Saudi princes and officials as renouncing Islam, and considered them “sell-outs” 
of Palestinian rights to Washington. The following quote illustrates bin Laden’s anger 
with the Saudi government, which sided with the peace agreements with Israel. 
 And it seemed as if you were not satisfied with abandoning Saudi Arabia,  
 home of the two Holy Sanctuaries, to the Crusader-Jewish forces of  
 occupation, until you had brought another disaster upon Jerusalem, the  
 third of the Sanctuaries, by conferring legitimacy on the contracts of  
 surrender to the Jews that were signed by the traitorous and cowardly  
 Arab tyrants. These contracts constitute a serious and dangerous calamity 
 containing deceit and deception from a member of different perspectives.376  
 
Accordingly, bin Laden contends that Palestine must be liberated from the ‘Jewish 
enemy’ in order to return the ummah to Islamic sovereignty, enacted by a jihad as the 
legal duty of Muslims.  
 In 1995, bin Laden sent a letter to bin Baz in Saudi Arabia denouncing the 
stationing of American and foreign troops in the kingdom using scriptural support 
from the Qur’an. ‘Honourable and righteous scholars’ are told to remember the 
covenant made with God: “God took a pledge from those who were given the 
Scripture-‘Make it known to your people; do not conceal it.’”377 Bin Laden designates 
unnamed Saudi rulers and scholars “apostate collaborators with Western powers”378 
who have brought about the fall of the ummah due to their neglect of religion and 
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weakness of faith.379 The following quote illustrates bin Laden’s accusations of the 
Saudi rulers’ bad behaviors.  
 All this happened on the watch of the region’s rulers, and with their  
 active participation--in fact, these are the people actually implementing 
  the plans for our umma’s enemies. This invasion was financed by these  
 rulers using our umma’s wealth and savings.380  
 
Bin Laden accused the Saudi family of partaking in the fall of the ummah, which 
turns the kingdom into an enemy equal to that of the US and its government. 
Numerous quotes from the Qur’an are used to inspire sense of devotion to God for the 
call to jihad to “spread knowledge, enjoin good, and forbid evil.”381 Similarly to al-
Wahhab and Qutb, bin Laden employs religious reform for political mobilization.  
 Bin Laden uses the tenents of Islam (that people are familiar with) to 
legitimize his efforts.382 In 1997, while discussing the justifications for the aggressive 
jihad in Afghanistan, bin Laden attributed driving the Soviets out of Afghanistan and 
establishing the Taliban government to God. “After the collapse of the Soviet Union--
in which the US has no mentionable role, but rather the credit goes to God and the 
mujahidin in Afghanitan . . .”383 Bin Laden does not acknowledge the CIA’s influence 
in the success of driving out the communists from Afghanistan,384 and sees God’s 
instrumental force as the contributing factor to the mujahidin and the Taliban 
government. In 1998, Osama bin Laden emphasizes with the success of the Muslim 
impact, and ignores the America influence: “[it] is not a force influenced from the 
outside, as the Crusader Western media would have it, but a force that has come from 
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within.”385 On October 7, 2001, Al-Jazeera aired a video recording of Osama bin 
Laden expressing his praise for the attacks on September 11 as carrying out God’s 
will. He avows, “God has struck America at its Achilles heel and destroyed its 
greatest building, praise and blessings to Him.”386 He also refers to the ummah as 
experiencing humiliation and contempt in the past eighty years, referring to the fall of 
the Ottoman Empire and the development of Western influence in the Middle East 
concerning power and oil.  
 The stylized themes of al-Wahhab and Sayyid Qutb are apparent in numerous 
speeches by bin Laden, which further support the legitimation of justifications for his 
global jihad. Whether or not bin Laden’s justifications for citing these two sources are 
valid, their presence is felt in his speeches, which are broadcasted to millions of 
Muslims and non-Muslims throughout the world.387 In his declaration of war against 
the US, he brought together numerous elements from Muslim history with the 
globalization for terrorist groups to enhance its global power, seen in “the ability to 
harness religion and modern technology to strike anywhere, anytime, and 
anyplace.”388 
 Bin Laden employs similar characteristics to al-Wahhab’s work when 
discussing the need for moral reform in Saudi Arabia,389 seen in his interview with 
Al-Jazeera in 2001.390 With al-Wahhab’s origins in Saudi Arabia, he underscores the 
importance of the education of tawhid, which if violated in an act of shirk 
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(polytheism), is an unforgivable sin. The proselytization of Islam is the mandatory 
duty of all Muslims, which protects and enhances the Muslim community. In the 
interview, bin Laden discusses generally the leaders in the Islamic world that are 
being “tricked” by other leaders, alluding to the Saudi--US alliance that prevents the 
proper proselytization of Islam. While arguing that peace will not end until Islam 
prevails over the enemies of Islam, he quotes:  
 this situation is prevailing upon the Islamic world today, with its big  
 leaders, and its famous rulers--it is a trick; they [the rulers] trick people and 
 lie to them, but, with the permission of God, God’s liberation and release is  
 close, and the promised victory is close- God willing.391  
The removal of the US from its presence in the ummah is the solution to the “ordeal,” 
stated by bin Laden, emphasizing a battle between the Muslims and the global 
Crusaders.  
 With respect to the influence of Sayyid Qutb in bin Laden’s mission, one must 
look at the correlation between the two men. First, bin Laden’s most important 
associate and ‘righthand man’, Ayman al-Zawahiri, was an Egyptian student and 
follower of Sayyid Qutb since the age of 14, a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, 
and is said to have a direct influence on bin Laden’s global jihad strategy.392 Second, 
while in attending university, Bin Laden also was a student of Sayyid Qutb’s brother, 
Muhammad Qutb. According to John Esposito, Sayyid Qutb’s work was a staple in 
Islamic education, thus bin Laden must have been well versed in Qutb’s work. The 
timing of bin Laden’s education also coincided with the time when Islamic 
                                                
391 Osama bin Laden, Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama bin Laden,127.  
392 Ibid. 58.  
  109 
movements and religious extremists, or jihad movements, were on the rise in the 
broader Muslim world and within Saudi Arabia.393 
 Bin Laden uses similar thematic styles as Qutb, seen in his use of jahilliyah, to 
describe the ills of modernity, and jihad, the strategy to rid the world of these 
obstructing ills to allow for freedom to form Islamic ideas. In Milestones, Qutb 
portrays the battle as a triumph of faith against the jahiliyyah society, and calls the 
vanguard of Islam to empower the darl-al-Islam (home of Islam) against the darl-al-
harb (home of hostility). In an October 2001 interview with Al-Jazeera, bin Laden 
emphasizes the West’s detrimental influence on the ummah: “It is that this Western 
civilization, which is backed by America, has lost its value and appeal,”394 and 
hinders the freedom, human rights, and equality of Muslims in the world. The 
Western civilization, and the US government, is blamed for taking the world into a 
“choking life”395 that the Muslim world cannot tolerate. Jihad becomes mandatory for 
all Muslims to rid the Islamic lands from the infidels of Western culture, which Qutb 
similarly calls for. 
 While recognizing the similarities in ideological principles between the three 
revolutionary thinkers, a more elusive predicament occurs from the mixture of 
Islamic fundamentalist thought. The public perception in the minds of Muslims and 
non-Muslims occurs between the Islamic fundamentalist movement of al-Wahhab, 
Sayyid Qutb, and bin Laden. By using similar themes to previous revolutionary 
thinkers from the Muslim world that use religious reform for political mobilization, 
bin Laden seeks to support and legitimize his radical Islam to the listening world.  
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 Bin Laden also further supports Huntington’s “West” versus “East” paradigm 
by portraying the conflict as a ‘heavenly battle’ between the US and the Arab-Islamic 
world. Commenting on the American and British attacks in Iraq in 1998 called 
Operation Desert Fox, bin Laden notes the American excuse of “bringing Iraq to 
account and to justice”396 and ridding Iraq of Saddam Hussein, yet claims that its true 
motives are to strike the “growing power of the Arab and Islamic world.”397 Bin 
Laden sees the US and Israel as a growing ‘tyranny’ with great contempt for 
Muslims. He asks the Muslim peoples to act upon these injustices by any means 
necessary, even with jihad where death “is predestined and decided,” as a duty to 
“motivate our ummah to jihad for the sake of God against Americans and Israelis and 
their allies.”398 Similarly in his interview in October 2001, bin Laden perceives the 
US as fighting against Islam under the pretext of fighting against terrorism,399 
furthering the image of the evil US fighting against the pure, moral Muslim society of 
the Middle East. However, Osama bin Laden downplays the importance of oil that 
influences US interests in the region, and instead explains the US interests as fighting 
against Islam to bolster support from Muslims around the world.  
 In order to declare a jihad against the Jews and Crusaders, bin Laden issued 
the World Islamic Front declaration in 1998.400 With this declaration, he was able to 
stir the Arabs and Muslims’ sentiments through religious discourse when speaking 
about American presence in the Gulf and Palestine. Bin Laden uses the justifications 
that “Muslims were under siege, their lands occupied in a world dominated by their 
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historic enemies, militant Christianity and Judaism.”401 bin Laden’s declaration of a 
fatwa (authoritative legal opinion) was to detail obligation to wage jihad against 
“Americans, military and civilians, until they quit the lands of the ummah.”402 
However, the fatwa was signed by four  otherindividuals to reinforce its power due to 
the concern over bin Laden’s lack of necessary religious qualifications to issue a 
fatwa. Al-Zawahiri was one individual who signed the fatwa in addition to the three 
leaders and representatives from Egypt and Pakistan. Despite the portrayed image of 
bin Laden as a vanguard for the Muslim world, many discrepancies exist with his 
image and the Islamic tradition that he proselytizes. The manner in which he is 
portrayed by the neocon interests of Western European cultures is to mask the source 
of conflict in the Middle East as one over resources. A phantom enemy, coined by the 
documentary The Power of Nightmares, is created.  
 Three factors show the inaccuracy of the image of bin Laden. First, the US 
created the tangible character of bin Laden to explain the attacks on the US from the 
Muslim world. In order to prosecute bin Laden for the 1998 bombing in East Africa 
that killed over 200 people, American law required evidence of a criminal 
organization “that would allow them to prosecute the head of the organization even if 
he could not be linked directly to the crime.”403 The testimony of a witness named 
Jamal al-Fadl was used to bolster the image of Al-Qaeda as bin Laden’s organization, 
showing enough evidence to materialize an organization. “The reality was that bin 
Laden and al-Zawahari had become the focus of a loose association of disillusioned 
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Islamist militants who were attracted by the new strategy.”404 Before the US’ use of 
Al-Qaeda, it acted similar to a venture capital firm “providing funding, contacts, and 
expert advice to many different militant groups and individuals from all over the 
Islamic world.”405 Interestingly, Jamal al-Fadl was an enemy of bin Laden’s, and was 
granted witness protection along with thousands of dollars for his testimony about Al-
Qaeda. With the US’ creation of Al-Qaeda  as a global organization, the US was able 
to prosecute individuals much more easily, turning bin Laden into an internationally 
identified radical Islamist. Bin Laden agrees that the West named Al-Qaeda as an 
international organization, when the name actually originates from a military base in 
Afghanistan to train men during the Cold war that translates into, “The Base.”406 
 Second, Osama bin Laden influences the global jihad movement through 
economic involvement rather than anything else. Khalid Sheik Mohammed, an 
Islamist militant, was the planner behind the attack on September 11, not bin Laden 
who provided funds and help in finding volunteers. Here again, due to bin Laden’s 
“link” to Al-Qaeda, he became the central focus.  
 Third, the inconclusive hunt for bin Laden and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan 
shows their thoroughly elaborated portrayal by the Western media and the US’ 
foreign policies. Bin Laden and his organization were thought to be in the mountains 
of Tora Bora, which was enlarged even more with depiction of a secret, underground 
hideout in The Times of London. As the mountains of Tora Bora (Afghanistan) were 
bombed, caves thought to be hiding Al-Qaeda network members proved inconclusive. 
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Al-Qaeda as the global organization did not exist, and became a phantom enemy. The 
documentary, The Power of Nightmares, asserts that the “idea of a coherent, 
structured terrorist network with an organized capability simply does not exist.” 
 From the Muslim perspective, the perceived battle between the West/US and 
the Middle East is seen as a ‘cosmic’ and perennial battle,407 regardless of the 
Qur’anic forbiddance of the unjust killing of anyone seen in Q. 5:32: 
 . . . if any one slew a person--unless it be for murder or for spreading  
 mischief in the land--it would be as if he slew the whole people: and  
 if any one saved a life, it would be as if he saved the life of the whole  
  people.408  
 
There is no moral justification for the leadership of Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda 
in Islam, which uses ruthlessness and cost-effectiveness to carry out its tactics rather 
than new technology. 
 The Power of Nightmares uses the label of a “phantom enemy” to express the 
mystical entity that the US (and the Muslim world) have fed into that reinforces the 
US’ hidden agenda for international influence and power over resources. The twisted 
image of a phantom enemy strengthened the neocons in the White House due to the 
dichotomy of good and evil forces. The representation of a phantom force seen during 
the Cold War continued with the figure of bin Laden and Al-Qaeda, corporeal forces 
that the US could construct in order to maintain a favorable world order and destiny. 
The fundamentalist response of bin Laden and Al-Qaeda to the changing world 
confirms the “East” versus “West” paradigm from Huntington’s “clash of 
civilizations” theory, which does not make a valid argument.  
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Conclusion 
 Muhammad Ibn al-Wahhab (the Wahhabi movement) and Sayyid Qutb used 
methods of the Islamic revival to coerce a political mobilization against foreign 
powers and influence. Foreign powers included the Ottoman Empire in the 18th 
century and the British in the 20th century, which also framed their ideological 
positions concerning Islamic fundamentalism. In the 21st century, the Islamic 
fundamentalist movement built upon these ideologies to form a resistance to the 
modernization of societies resulting from Western, mainly US, influence. 
Huntington’s theory of religion as the source of conflict is proved false, and conflict 
is instead produced by structural pressures exerted on Middle Eastern societies seen 
through the development of the two natural resources in the region, oil and water. As 
a result of these two influences, a change in power occurs that transforms political, 
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Chapter 4:   
Resource Wars: Conflict over Oil  
 
Introduction 
 The Persian Gulf remains the world’s largest oil producing region to supply 
“the burgeoning American and international [oil] demand” in the 21st century.409 Iran, 
Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates hold the region’s, and the 
worlds, largest proven reserves, the untapped petroleum reserves known to exist that 
can be extracted through existing technology. As of 2003, these six nations “jointly 
posses 664 billion barrels of proven reserves, or about 64% of the world’s known 
supplies,”410 while the US and European powers combined only hold 18%. 
Surprisingly, the Gulf’s production capacity is lower than many other oil producers, 
such as the United States, Mexico and Russia because of its relatively new oil 
extraction technology.  
 In the years to come, the Gulf region will be capable of increasing its oil 
production and output, to be exported to nations, like the US, that continue to rely 
heavily on imported oil. As a result, as the resources of the older oil--producing 
nations dwindle in availability and amount, the Gulf nations will become even more 
important for the international oil industry. According to Michale Klare,  “With each 
passing year, the Gulf producers will supply an ever-increasing share of the world’s 
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oil intake.”411 The Gulf region will be the sole majority supplier of oil to other 
nations, and will be able to do so because of its relatively small domestic demand 
compared to larger nations like the US.  
 Conflict will arise from the struggle over resources rather than Huntington’s 
problematic “West” versus “East” paradigm. The chapter will outline how the US 
became dependent on foreign oil and its relation with Middle Eastern nations before 
and after its dependence on Middle Eastern oil, specifically from Saudi Arabia. 
  
History of Oil and its US-Arab relationship 
America’s dependence 
 The year of 1859 marks the birth of the US’ dependence on oil for its 
booming economy, domestic and foreign policy, and population “drunk in 
consumption.”412 The domestic discovery of oil was made in Titusville Pennsylvania 
in 1859, leading to the first large-scale petroleum industry.413 In 1901, the US became 
the world’s dominant oil producer with the discovery of oil in southeast Texas.414 
Various large-scale organizations developed to capitalize on the discovery, like John 
D. Rockefeller’s Standard Oil Company, which was the base for Exxon Mobil, 
Chevron, Amoco, and Atlantic Richfield. Cheap and abundant supplies of petroleum 
raised America’s domestic and foreign status as the most powerful world leader 
allowing for its quick dominant position during World War II. 
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 In 1942, the US was the leader in oil production with 20 billion barrels of oil, 
allegedly half of the world’s total oil reserves.415 In addition to oil’s domestic use to 
support the ‘American dream’, allied victory was assisted by US oil, allowing for the 
invention and usage of exceptional warfare weapons such as tanks, airplanes, 
submarines, aircraft carriers, boats, and armored troops carriers in addition to the 
capability to support these modes from domestic reserves.416 Oil turned into a 
national security matter as the war progressed during Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 
administration. By 1942, the US was using four million barrels of domestic oil per 
day, which would be consumed in thirteen years at that rate.417 Roosevelt’s concern 
lay not only in the rapid depletion of US oil reserves, but the acceleration of US’ 
dependence on foreign oil once domestic supplies ran out. Commodore Andrew F. 
Carter of the Army-Navy Petroleum Board is quoted as concurring that the known 
petroleum US reserves are “inadequate to meet over a period of years either the 
wartime needs of the United States or the needs of the civilian economy once normal 
conditions are established.”418 The Middle East’s untouched land and large supplies 
of oil became the US’ primary concern for national security. 
 The biblical story of the Eternal Fires during Nebuchadnez’zar’s rule reveal 
the thousands-year-old existence of oil in the Middle East.419 Oil was first discovered 
in the Middle East in Iran in 1908, yet the first substantial oilfield was discovered in 
1927 in Iraq’s Kirkuk, 2,500 yards from the site of the Eternal Fires. On the western 
side of the Persian Gulf however, the real oil profits of the Middle East lay in Saudi 
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Arabia, explored 30 years after the discovery in Iran. The US government did not 
forge any formal diplomatic relations until 1939, nor post a residential ambassador in 
the kingdom until 1943. The end of World War II heralded a new era of resource 
management that determined the US’ resource interests abroad, especially towards 
Saudi Arabia. 
 
Oil in Saudi Arabia 
 Saudi Arabia’s oil legacy began in 1923 with the New Zealander, Major Frank 
Holmes, who was the first person to suggest the exploration of oil in Arabian 
Peninsula.420 Holmes established the first oil concession in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern 
Providence in 1925, which was handed over to Gulf Oil, a global oil company, who 
proclaimed that the area did not contain adequate levels of oil for extraction. With 
this concession, numerous American and British officials argued with Saudi King, 
Abdul Aziz Al Saud, over the permission for oil exploration. 
 In 1933, the American group, named SOCAL (Standard Oil of California), 
allied with two of the best geologists in Bahrain and made a sixty-year concession 
with Saudi Arabia that granted them the rights to search for oil in the kingdom. 
Western interest in Saudi Arabia came at a perfect time for the one-year-old kingdom 
and King Saud. During King Saud’s first year of rule, Saudi Arabia’s economy 
weakened because of the drop in Muslim pilgrimages to Mecca, the kingdom’s main 
form of revenue, bankrupted Saudi Arabia.421 US groups also faced the effects of the 
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global depression, seen in the drop of the gold standard and the closing of U.S. banks, 
which surprisingly didn’t stop their exploration.  
 SOCAL directed its exploration efforts towards al-Hasa, a promising area 
along the kingdom’s Persian Gulf coast (first) because of its geologically similar 
qualities to Kuwait, Iraq, and Persia, and (second) because no European companies 
held any land in this area. In 1936 SOCAL struck oil at the oilfield known as 
Damman No. 7 in the eastern province of Saudi Arabia, which led to the 
establishment of the state-owned national oil company, the Arabian American Oil 
Company, or Aramco.422 To help fund these oil campaigns, Texaco, Exxon and Mobil 
Oil Company became shareholders of the Aramco nation in 1946 to “provide more 
investment capital,” they being three out of the original “Seven Sisters” (Exxon, 
Shell, BP, Mobil, Chevron Texaco and Gulf).423  SOCAL established the California-
Arabian Standard Oil Company (CASOC) as an infrastructure to develop the field, 
which later struck oil in 1938 on the Persian Gulf coast opposite of Bahrain.424 An 
aggressive search for oil began in the Middle East that quickly escalated to match the 
increasing demand for oil from the US. Saudi Aramco quickly became one of the 
most sophisticated petroleum organizations in the world.425 
 In 1945, Franklin D. Roosevelt and King Saud met on the USS Quincy in 
Egypt, representing one of the few trips that King Saud made outside of his kingdom. 
There are no official transcripts from this meeting, but it can be deduced that the two 
men discussed issues pertaining to the kingdom as well as the US-Saudi relationship. 
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According to Michael Klare, King Saud warned FDR of the conflict over the Jewish 
homeland that would escalate if Israel were established due to the Jewish culture that 
would differ greatly from other Arab cultures.426 It is debated whether or not the two 
men discussed the issue of oil, but is highly likely due to Saudi Arabia’s large oil 
reserves and the US’ urge to develop and “uphold the American firms’ dominance of 
the oil fields.”427 A strong friendship emerged after the 1945 meeting between the two 
men, most remarkably with FDR noting the importance of the Arab opinion 
concerning issues over Palestine in addition to the Jewish one.  
 The kingdom of Saudi Arabia allowed the US to develop its oil fields due to 
the wealth that Saudi Arabia would experience from the modernization. Before the 
influx of wealth from oil, its GDP was “50% less than that of the poorest countries of 
the OECD,” on a per capita basis.428 After the surge of wealth, its GDP “now pales in 
comparison to some of its neighbors, such as Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and 
Qatar.”429 According to Michael Klare, oil has become the backbone of Saudi Arabia, 
which experiences a similar reliance, like the US’ dependence, on its natural resource. 
The Saudi backbone supports modernization of the oil industry and economy, social 
services, debt handling, employment, and the development of new industries.430  
 
US’ attempt at economic and political stability in the Middle East 
 To ensure the business relationship between the US and Saudi Arabia, in 1941 
FDR approved the Lend-Lease Act that “gave the president the authority to sell, 
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exchange, lend, lease, or otherwise transfer military equipment to ‘any country whose 
defense the president deems vital to the defense of the United States.”431 Developing 
the case to aid to Saudi Arabia was an American national security issue, and in 1943 
FDR finally declared the Lend-Lease act to the kingdom. However, the president felt 
that the extension of the Lend-Lease act was insufficient for the protection of Saudi 
oil from other interested nations, like Great Britain. Instead, the US government 
“chose to collaborate with rather than supplant the giant American oil companies,” 
through the public-private partnership. The partnership gave private interests the 
power to enforce US foreign policy while the US government remained involved with 
the security and stability of oil-producing regions in which private companies 
operated.432 However, even with the Saudi-US alliance of 1945, the Lend-Lease Act 
was problematic because “U.S. officials were constantly being forced to reconsider 
their approach and launch new initiatives to bolster America’s position in the [Persian 
Gulf],”433 in order to protect the region of Soviet influence during the cold war era. 
Three great presidential edicts responded to this crisis: the Truman, Eisenhower, and 
Nixon doctrines. 
 In 1947, the Truman Doctrine stated that America would assist any nation 
threatened by Communism. The US saw the Soviet adventurism in the eastern 
Mediterranean and northern Gulf states as a geopolitical threat, which was very close 
to the Saudi Arabian oil fields. From the American perspective, oil supplies in the 
Gulf region were compromised by the Soviet influence in the region, which prompted 
US aid to the three nations most vulnerable to Soviet expansionism: Greece, Turkey, 
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and Iran. Iran had the most controversial history with the Soviet Union due to its 
occupation after World War II, especially due to its status as the Gulf’s leading oil 
producer at the time.434 The strength of these northern nations would protect the 
vulnerable and valuable oil-producing, Western-friendly nations in the Persian Gulf. 
Subsequently, Saudi Arabia began to receive more aid from the Truman Doctrine to 
buttress it for defensive capabilities in order to bolster its protection from Soviet 
expansionism. As a result, the second form of presidential edicts resulted, the 
Eisenhower Doctrine. 
 In 1957, the Eisenhower Doctrine was developed also in response to the threat 
of Soviet expansion but focused on strengthening military forces against the Soviet 
Union and Nasser’s Egypt. As discussed in Chapter Two, Nasser supported Arab 
nationalism and despised the West, resulting in Egypt’s purchase of arms directly 
from the Soviet Union. In response, the Eisenhower Doctrine “authorized the 
president to use American combat forces to defend friendly Middle Eastern countries 
against Soviet-backed aggressors and to provide additional arms and military 
assistance to pro-American regimes.”435 The majority of this aid went to bolstering 
and modernizing the Saudi military and air force, including the Department of 
Defense’s support of the Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG). Yet again, another 
presidential edict would ensue, here as a result of the Vietnam War’s effect on the 
American public regarding the foreign policy of American bloodshed in developing 
worlds. 
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 In 1969, President Nixon knew that the nation would not support another 
foreign war, yet needed to secure the US’ oil interests in the Persian Gulf. The Nixon 
Doctrine was enacted to support the Persian Gulf oil interests through the indirect 
economic and military backing of threatened nations, like Iran and Saudi Arabia. The 
US wanted these nations to be responsible for their own security and defense and “to 
cooperate among themselves to insure regional peace and stability.”436 Billions of 
dollars of advanced weaponry were sent to Saudi Arabia and Iran in addition to 
thousands of American military advisers and technicians to oversee the instruction of 
the new weapons. In the following years, the relationships between both governments 
of Saudi Arabia and Iran and the US would wither due to Saudi Arabia becoming 
more suspicious of the US’ false alliance, and in Iran, the overwhelming distaste and 
opposition for the American-imposed shah. 
 
Backlash and the “Oil Sword” 
 The Saudi-imposed oil embargo of 1973 and the Iranian Revolution in 1979 
show the effect of the fallout of the presidential edicts to protect their interests in the 
Middle East. The two events are symbolic of the aversion to the Nixon Doctrine that 
was not well received in the Middle East. 
 The Saudi-imposed oil embargo occurred in October 1973 at the time of the 
world’s greatest growth in global oil demands, a 250% increase from 1960 to 1970 
from 20 million barrels to 60 million barrels.437 (The US reached maximum domestic 
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production the year before,438 and Saudi Arabia had to increase its oil production in 
order to supply the world’s oil needs.) The same year, King Faisal warned President 
Nixon to rid Israeli occupation of the territory acquired from the Sixty-Day War in 
1967, or else Saudi oil production would be curtailed. King Faisal turned Saudi oil 
into a weapon, or the “oil sword,”439 used to threaten and manipulate the US’ foreign 
policy. In order to preserve Saudi interests and the Saudi-US relationship, American 
oil companies would have to “prove their loyalty” to the kingdom.440 Their strategic 
position as the leading oil supplier and producer allowed them to act in this manner, 
which gave them the rights to withhold trading with whomever they pleased. 
 Saudi Arabia’s three most productive oil fields, Ghawar, Abqaiq, and 
Safaniya, produced 88% (2.973 million barrels a day) of the total 1970 oil output 
(3.296 million barrels a day), led by Aramco.441 The West’s reliance shifted from 
domestic to foreign oil in the 1970’s, which gave Saudi Arabia a tremendous amount 
of power, capitalizing on the American-induced oil vacuum from its resource 
potential. As a result, millions of dollars amounted in Saudi Arabia due to their 
increase in the price of oil from $1 in 1970 to $12 in 1974, changing the kingdom’s 
economy overnight.442 However, the overproduction of the three most viable oil fields 
led to the dropping pressure and production of water in oil wells that added to the oil 
shock of 1973.   
 Exacerbating to the problem was King Faisal’s increasingly skepticism of 
Saudi Arabia’s American alliance for two reasons. First, the American dollar was 
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weakening due to the soaring inflation rates, which strained many Middle Eastern 
economies. Second, the American-Saudi alliance established by King Faisal’s father 
and FDR was not maintained due to the US’ stance on  Palestine when  President 
Truman supported the UN resolution of the creation of Israel that directly countered 
the Arab agreement of 1945. Nixon supported Israel in 1973 when he announced his 
re-arming of the state during the Yom Kippur War, greatly angering King Faisal as 
well as destroying the trust between Saudi Arabia and the US.443 The oil shock 
explanation changed from over-production to a Saudi-controlled reduction. 
 Saudi Arabia used the “oil sword” against the US when Saudi Arabia and nine 
other oil ministers cut back oil production by 5% every month resulting in a dire 
effect on the international oil market. “Though the amount of oil OPEC withheld was 
small, its impact on the price of oil was enormous and more violent than most Arab 
oil ministers had expected.”444 Looking at the economic and environmental problem 
of the Saudi oil wells, according to certain sources, many Aramco officials were 
aware of the problem. According to an article written by Seymour Hersh in the New 
York Times, titled, “Saudi Oil Capacity Questioned,”445 the testimony of Aramco’s 
owners agreed that the damage done to Saudi Arabian oil wells was due to the 
increase in production to meet the world oil demand from 1970-74. Whether or not 
these accusations are correct, the topic of the Senate hearing represents the US’ fear 
of losing Middle Eastern interests that should be avoided at any cost. Hersh’s article 
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was the only one to report the findings from the 1974 report, which even included 
quotes from James B. Knight, Aramco’s vice president, stating that the oil well levels 
were at acceptable levels, despite the report’s compromising claims. 446 At the end of 
1973, the price of oil had increased fourfold to $11.65.  
 The Saudi-imposed oil embargo was eventually lifted. However, oil prices 
continued to rise throughout the 1970’s. Simmons notes that the real reason for the 
increase in oil prices was not King Faisal’s doing, but because of “the converging 
trends- increased demand, shrinking market liquidity created the formula for 
increasing prices.”447 By 1975, Saudi Arabia’s oil production was lowered to 6.6 
million barrels a day by Aramco; however, this was changed a year later when the 
kingdom and Iran became the sole oil producers in the world with adequate spare 
capacity.448 The embargo highlights the West’s dependence on foreign oil, noting the 
political relationship that oil held with economics.  
 The slow rejection of Western policies in the Middle East is also seen during 
the Iranian Revolution when the American-imposed shah abdicated from the throne in 
1979, and was replaced by Ayatollah Khomeini. “Iran was no longer a reliable shield 
against Soviet incursion into the Gulf.”449 The Islamic militant takeover of the 
American embassy in Tehran in 1979 further emphasized the loss of the delicate 
relationship that the US had with Iran, which could no longer be counted as a reliable 
source for protecting oil resource in the Persian Gulf.  
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 Responding to the overwhelming surge of needed security in the Persian Gulf, 
in 1980 President Carter established the Carter Doctrine. Carter noted that access to 
the Persian Gulf was a vital national interest, and the US would use “any means 
necessary, including military force,” to protect these interests.450 The Rapid 
Deployment Joint Task Force was established, “responsible for managing the U.S. 
combat operations in the region.”451 The US sent military defensive support to Saudi 
Arabia during the Iran/Iraq War to protect the Saudi oil fields close to the border with 
Kuwait. In a similar tone as many of the past presidential promises vowing to protect 
Middle Eastern nations, in 1981 President Reagan stated the importance of the US’ 
protection of Saudi Arabia’s oil.452 
 The Iran-Iraq War represents the US’ fear of another obstacle in between their 
free flow of oil from the Middle East. When Iraq invaded Iran, the US remained 
neutral, creating an international oil embargo on Iraq exports, including Kuwaiti 
exports as well. However, once Iran gained the upper hand in 1982, the US “tilted” 
towards Iraq, sending loans, intelligence support and arms.453 In light of maintaining 
the Saudi-US alliance, the US “made it clear that the United States would protect 
Saudi Arabia”454from attacks attributed to the war. War erupted in 1990 with Saddam 
Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait due to reason over oil, which was perfect for American 
leaders who wanted Saddam to be thrown from power for various reasons. Iraq was 
translated into an indisputable threat to American oil interests in the Persian Gulf. To 
protect Saudi Arabia’s major oil fields in Eastern Province, American troops were 
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sent to Saudi Arabia. The Bush administration, specifically Dick Cheney in 1990, 
justified the invasion of Kuwait based on the Roosevelt—Ibn Saud meeting regarding 
the deployment of American troops into the kingdom.455  
 Despite the Saudi King Fahd’s hesitance to allow the deployment of American 
troops into the kingdom, Dick Cheney convinced the King to allow American forces 
into the kingdom, yet under the condition that troops “must be withdrawn from Saudi 
Arabia the minute the danger from Iraq had passed.”456 At the same time, the 
“Afghan-Arabs,” led/financed by Osama bin Laden, leant their support to the 
kingdom. However, King Fahd rejected the offer from the ‘Afghan-Arabs’, and 
turned to the US for protection.457  
 In 2004, the Florida-based Centcom, or U.S. Central Command, was 
established as the current implementation to protect Western security and power in 
the Middle East regarding oil. It is the “nerve center for all U.S. military operations in 
the Persian Gulf region.”458  The Carter Doctrine of January 23, 1980 originally 
enunciated Centcom.459 Under the doctrine three years later, the Reagan 
administration established the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) at the 
MacDill Air Force Base to increase the number of forces in the Gulf region, which 
eventually turned into the Central Command by President Ronald Reagan in 1983. 
Both Reagan in 1987 and Bush in 1990 used Centcom forces to instill the American 
hegemonic fear in the Middle East in hopes of expressing the “U.S. commitment to 
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the flow of oil through the Gulf.”460 During and after the Persian Gulf War in 1990, 
Centcom forces occupied the region, with its most memorable leader, Generel H. 
Norman Schwazkopf, playing a large role in the defeat of Iraqi forces. Operation Iraqi 
Freedom , begun in 2003, used Centcom forces to protect and defend “Iraq’s highly 
vulnerable petroleum infrastructure.”461 
 As of 2005, Saudi Aramco had roughly 5,000 to 8,700 oil wells in Saudi 
Arabia. However, Saudi Aramco statistics are debatable because of the lack of 
credible evidence sent from the Saudi kingdom.462 Matthew Simmons’ book, Twilight 
in the Desert, discusses the given evidence from Saudi Aramco detailing information 
on Saudi oil fields. Simmons used SPE technical papers authored and published by 
Aramco officials that detail facts and issues concerning the kingdom’s most 
productive oil fields, as as Gwawar, as well as its attempt to find new oil fields. 
Despite Aramco’s fallacious evidence and reports of oil production, Simmon notes 
that the underlying tone of the reports reflect the Saudi and US companies’ fears of 
the reduction of oil production and eventual depletion, oil on which the kingdom 
relies heavily  to support every aspect of its economy. Oil reserves are the main 
indicator of an oil company’s worth, which “makes the task of estimating reserves far 
more a matter of probability and than certainty.”463 This poses a serious problem for 
the US due to its dependence on Saudi oil, and on which rests the Saudi-Western 
alliance. 
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 When looking at the relationship between the US and powers in the Middle 
East, the relationship is complex and becomes political rather than economic, 
succumbing to petrodollar pressure. “Arab financial transactions have often been 
accompanied by a political dimension tied to foreign policy interests.”464 According 
to Steven Emerson, ta pro-Zionist, the power of the petrodollar influences the Arab 
world’s contention with the Zionist movement’s efforts to establish a Jewish state in 
the Middle East. He also ntoes that from the beginning of Saudi Arabia’s history as a 
kingdom, King Saud cautioned against the establishment of a Jewish homeland. King 
Saud’s strong opposition is seen in his interview in 1943 with Life magazine in 
Riyadh, where he “retold the history of the region and gave his reasons for rejecting 
all arguments used to validate the Jewish claim to a homeland in the region.”465 
Regardless of validity of King Saud’s historical facts concerning the contention 
between the two religions, it is important to note the king’s strong opposition to a 
peace conflict and negotiation, which further complicates oil’s position in the 
kingdom and in the world.  
  
Conclusion 
 The Middle East’s thriving oil industry has brought a great amount of wealth 
to many of its nations and positions them at the top of many industries. Nations 
dependent on Middle Eastern oil then become deeply connected with the politics and 
economics of the region. Subsequently, the social fabric of these thriving economies 
is changed due to the modernization and development that oil brings. In certain eyes 
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from Saudi Arabia and other parts of the Middle East, this is seen as the decline of the 
world that needs to be brought back to the correct path as discussed in Chapter Three. 
Conflict does not arise from differing cultural and religious reasons, but as a conflict 
over the effect of modernization and development in the oil-producing Arab states. 
Oil as natural resource lies at the heart of this internal debate, feeding the voracious 
struggle between the state as it tries to maintain a hegemonic power and Islamic 
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Chapter 5:  
Resource Wars: Water in Palestine 
 
Introduction 
 This chapter discusses the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in terms of a struggle 
over water as a dwindling resource in the arid region of the Middle East. Water rights 
in Palestine that influence the economic, social, and political play a crucial factor in 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for a nation state. Conflict over water, not because of 
religious differences, becomes one of the contested issues between the Israelis and 
Palestinians. Hillel Shuval agrees and sees the disputes over water resources as 
“becoming a major roadblock in the final stages of the path of peace.”466 The “oil 
sword” of Saudi Arabia parallels with the Israeli power of water security due to its 
heightened position in the region after the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 
by the United Nations (and support from the US.) 
 According to Samuel W. Lewis in his article, “The United States and 
Israel,”467 there are five elements that rest at the basis of the unofficial and unspoken 
US-Israeli alliance. First, the US was absent during the murder of 6 million Jews 
during holocaust of World War II. As a result, US foreign policy regarding the 
creation of and the existence of Israel instilled a sense of humanitarian effort. US’ 
efforts in Israel resulted to help the European Jews displaced from Hitler’s regime. 
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Second, donations from wealthy American Jews played a large role in the US 
political scene, specifically with the Democratic Party. Third, the American sense of 
idealism “contributed admiration for the founding of a new democratic state which 
proclaimed a Declaration of Independence redolent with phrases drawn from that of 
the United States.”468 Fourth, American Christians identified with the Jews due to the 
“common Judeo-Christian Bible and heritage,”469 that supported the return of the 
Holy Land. Fifth, widespread ignorance of the US public regarding the Arab people 
and cultures intensified the support for Israel against the Palestinians.  
 The chapter will begin with a discussion of Israeli and Palestinian desire and 
right for a national identity, followed by Palestine’s available water resources, each 
group’s access to these resources, ending with a discussion of the US-Israeli 
relationship that affects the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  
 
National Identity 
 For the discussion of the rights to the Holy Land, Israeli Zionism and 
Palestinian nationalism evolved as the justifications to modernization in the late 19th 
and early 20th centuries.470 In their article, “Religion, State, and the International 
System in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,” Hillel Frisch and Shmuel Sandler support 
the notion that the conflict is not based on ideology with religious justification, but 
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rather, is focused on the statist relations between Zionism and Palestinian 
nationalism.471  
 Nationalist and statist relations result from the struggle over national identity. 
National identity cannot be negotiated, and individuals will not easily give up their 
core identities, such as their sense of peoplehood, attachment and historical 
authenticity to the land, and commitment to national culture.472 Each identity 
“[claims] the same territory, and each seeks ownership of that territory and control 
over its resources as the basis of an independent state that gives political expression to 
its national identity.”473 A national identity is also legitimzed by the mere existence of 
another national identity that challenges their claim to ownership of the land and its 
resources. The act of an identity’s negation of another shows the power of even 
acknowledging the existence of a contrasting identity. The existence of each identity 
becomes an existential threat to the meaning and collective purpose of the other. “All 
issues tend to become existential-matters of life and death for each side.”474 An 
exclusive and monolithic nature results as a defining characteristic of each identity 
making conflict resolution difficult. As a result, a group’s identity is defined by 
several dimensions, “such as ethnicity, religion, and language,”475 all of which are 
highly correlated. 
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 When claiming the land, each identity also has its own historical narrative 
regarding the creation of the State of Israel in 1948, with both sides negating the other 
“to bolster the justice of their own cause.”476 From the Israeli point of view, the 
establishment of the State was the rightful return of the Jews, a chosen people, to their 
ancestral homeland, holding the “incompetent” Palestinian leaders responsibility for 
the Palestinian refugee. The United Nations cited the establishment of a Jewish state 
in Palestine as “’unassailable’: ‘it is the natural right of the Jewish people to lead, as 
do all other nations, an independent existence in its sovereign state.’”477 From the 
Palestinian point of view, Western European colonialism displaced the Palestinian 
population for the immigrating Jewish population who were only a religious group 
and not a nation entitled to its own state. The Zionist movement, established by the 
First Zionist Conference in 1897 by Theodor Herzl, began the movement’s “vision of 
national revival.”478 
 The justifications for Palestine according to the Israelis and Palestinians are 
equally just and reasonable, yet ripe with problems. From the Israeli perspective, the 
Zionist movement justifies the creation of the State of Israel, one that “[identifies] the 
Jews as a political, not solely a religious group, and maintained that the Jews’ 
problem was a political one.”479 According to Alexander Flores, its principle goal is 
building a Jewish state in Palestine, which is a political and secular problem.  
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 The Zionist movement remained secular and rejected religious discourse and 
reasoning to ensure its international presence. Zionists only used Judaism to rally the 
support of other European Jews in addition to separating themselves with a religious 
divide from everyone else.480 In 1919, Chaim Weitzmann, the president of the World 
Zionist Organization and the first president of the State of Israel481 wrote to the 
British Prime Minister David Lloyd George regarding the requirements for a Jewish 
State.482  Such requirements included territories in the valley of Litani and the western 
slopes of the Hermon range, which are “imperatively demanded by the requirements 
of modern economic life,”483 and represent a “return to the soil.”484  
 Weitzmann emphasized the territories’ importance to establish a on modern 
Jewish, economic life that must be met in order to gain a Jewish state. To achieve this 
goal, it was necessary to development of an agricultural sector, which, clearly would 
require an adequate amount and source of water to support the agricultural industry. 
Adequate and fair water rights are crucial for the Zionist movement’s goal for a 
Jewish state in Palestine to protect the state’s existence. 
 However, similar to the Israeli concern is the Palestinian right to a state. 
Palestinians use a form of Arab nationalism to justify the Palestinian claim to the land  
“based on majoritiarian rule that [reflects] the culture and proclivities of the vast 
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majority of its inhabitants.”485 Arab nationalism is driven by the urge for autonomy 
that initially remains as a political tool to ensure rights and needs, but still focused on 
receiving independence.486 Originating in Egypt, Arab nationalism was invoked by 
nations in the Middle East as a uniting tool to claim rights over the Holy Land that 
contended with the Zionist movement. According to the Encyclopedia of Islam and 
the Muslim World, Arab nationalism shaped the political ideologies of postcolonial 
nations in the Middle East through the rejection of Western influences to instill the 
values of Muslim unity that would restore the region morally and politically.487 
Initially used by Arab nations to reject the rule of the Ottoman Empire, Arab 
nationalism evolved through World War I to eventually become an anti-imperial 
opposition movement against British rule during the British Mandate period. 
 Seen during the rebellion of 1946-49, Arab states in the Middle East extended 
their influence to the affairs in Palestine through their initial negotiations and then 
military force against the newly declared State of Israel488that was established by 
brute force by the British, both for inherently secular reasons.489 “The reaction of 
Palestinians to the realization of the Zionist project in turn was nationalist and hence 
secular.”490 Finally, in 1964 the establishment of PLO, the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization, represents the Arab’s view of a unified Palestinian-centered territorial 
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nationalism and gave a voice to Palestinian refugees in neighboring nations who were 
silenced and/or displaced by the creation of Israel. 
 The Palestinian Arabs refer to the creation of the state of Israel in 1948 as al-
Nakbah, or the ‘disaster’. The indigenous population was uprooted from their home 
of 1,300 years, while 55 percent of Palestine was given to the Jews who had 
previously owned less than ten percent of the land, representing only one third of the 
population.491 As a result, between 1948 and 1950, 930,000 Palestinian Arabs became 
refugees in addition to Israel’s doctrine of defense of the “iron curtain”492 to curtail 
the number of refugees allowed to return. Other Arab states did little to aid the 
Palestinian Arabs after 1950, seen Egypt’s rejection of nationality to Palestinians.  
 According to Asem Khalil, Egypt’s hesitates to grant Palestinians citizenship 
is due to the unwanted blending of Egyptian and Palestinian cultures, languages and 
ethnicities. If a Palestinian were to be given Egyptian citizenship, they would not 
“necessarily coincide with the totality of the citizens of [the Egyptian] state.”493 
Additionally, with the emergence of a large Palestinian population, this constituent 
power could exercise sovereign power over a territory and create a Palestinian state. 
“Once the Palestinian state is created, the relationship between the Palestinian 
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Sources of water in Palestine 
 The indeterminate boundary lines in Palestine of the Jordan River and the 
Mountain Aquifer complicate the issue of water rights, and represent Palestine’s two 
main water resources. Water sources are not confined to one authority or state, which 
further complicates negotiations for the distribution of water.  
 The Jordan River creates severe problems because of its geopolitical status. 
Before the Six Day War in 1967, proper borders were delineated by water sources 
and used by all surrounding nations, such as Lebanon, Syria, Israel, and Jordan. Each 
possessed rights over streams/tributaries that lead into the Jordan River, which 
crosses the four state boundaries.494 Lebanon’s tributary, Hasbani, originates on the 
Hermon mountain range with a flow of 157 million cubic meters per year (mcm/yr). 
Syria’s tributary, the Banias, originates on the Golan side of the Hermon range with a 
flow of 157 mcm/yr. Israel holds the Dan tributary with an annual flow of 258 
mcm/yr, and originates deep within the Hermon mountain range. The largest 
tributary, the Yarmouk, with a flow of 400-500 mcm/yr, flows through Syria then 
along the Syrian-Jordanian border, then into Israeli territory before joining the Jordan 
River. The river flows from 2,200 meters above sea level to 400 meters below sea 
level, creating a natural flow of water downstream.  
 The system of the Mountain Aquifer is made up of natural springs and drilled 
wells that extend to both sides of the central territory of the Judaean and Samarian 
Mountain range in Israel, from the Jezreal Valley to the Beersheba Valley, and from 
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the foothills of the Judean Mountains to the Jordan River.495 The aquifer is divided 
into three general zones, the Western Aquifer Basin (Yarkon-Tanninim), the 
Northeastern Aquifer Basin (Schem/Nablus-Gilboa), and the Eastern Aquifer Basin. 
 The Western aquifer has an average of 350-360 mcm/yr and resides in Israel. 
Before the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, the aquifer was used by Jewish 
farmers, which evolved after statehood to become a major supplier of water through 
the Yarkon-Negev Pipeline in 1954. Within the Israeli border, 300 wells are used to 
tap the aquifer’s resources, yet some wells were dug by Israel for Israeli settlements 
outside the Israeli border.496 The Northeastern aquifer is used within Israel and has 
about 130 mcm/yr, 100 mcm/yr sourced to Israeli forces and 30 mcm/yr to 
Palestinians. The Eastern aquifer is made up of two strata, the Upper Cenomanian and 
the Lower Cenomanian, both under Palestinian control. The Upper Cenomanian is 
made up of springs, yet is highly affected by inter-seasonal fluctuations, especially 
during droughts seen in 1988-91. The Lower Cenomanian is a much better source of 
water, being a deep fresh water aquifer. The two strata add up to the Eastern aquifer’s 
total yield of 150-200 mcm/yr, which remains in Palestinian control.  
 Wells and springs of the Mountain Aquifer are used for additional water 
resources. Yet this channeling of resources is not equal between the Israelis and 
Palestinians due to the amount of production, regardless of the number of 
mechanisms. With respect to wells, Palestinians are in control of 519 wells, while 
Israelis hold 42 wells. Of the 519 Palestinian wells, only 353 are water producing 
wells with a total yield of 72.3 mcm/yr, with only 70% meeting World Heath 
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Organization (WHO) standards for drinking water. Of the 42 Israeli wells, 38 are 
production wells with a total yield of 50 mcm/yr, while 94% of them meet WHO 
standard for drinking water. From water allocation through springs, Palestinians are 
in control of 146 springs with a total yield of 65.9 mcm/yr, while Israelis control 11 
springs yet with a total yield of 88.3 mcm/yr.497 On the surface, it appears that Israel 
and Palestine have equal rights to the water resources, when in fact each region’s total 
yields are starkly different. These disparities in water allocation heighten the dispute 
over water security and stabilization. 
 According to speculative information on Israel’s water usage, an average of 
45-60 mcm/yr is diverted by Israeli forces for Israeli settlements in the West Bank 
“diverted by Israeli wells”.498 According to Hillel Shuval, since 1967 Israel has 
tapped even more sweet water sources through new deep wells that supply water to 
Israeli settlements.499Error! Bookmark not defined.  Israel’s development of deep wells has 
reduced the Palestinian flow from traditional springs and wells.500 Currently, there is 
a total of 630 mcm/yr of known potential yields of the Mountain Aquifer, while Israel 
uses 410 mcm/yr and Palestine uses 110 mcm/yr, with the remaining 50-100 mcm/yr 
left for Palestinian deep well drilling. Both Israel and Palestine allocate water from 
other aquifers drilled after 1967, yet the major portion of the recharge area of the 
aquifer lies in Israeli hands, with an estimate of 672 mcm/yr, giving them more 
control over the water flow.  
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 The Jordan River and the Mountain Aquifer both provide a substantial amount 
of water to Israeli and Palestinian regions, yet the rights to each water resource are 
widely debatable. Regardless of who has the rights to Palestine, from the previous 
conclusive evidence, Israel has the upper hand over water rights in Palestine.  A 
general summary of the argument between the Israelis and Palestinians in the 20th 
century will be outlined in the following section that complicates the authority of 
these two sources of water. 
 
Israel’s use of water 
 The immigration of the Diaspora Jews to Palestine in the 19th and 20th century 
was focused in urban locales, such as Jerusalem and Hebron. These locales became 
the center of Jewish society in pre-Zionist Palestine, and were called the Old Yishuv. 
After World War I, in 1929 Palestine allowed the Old Yishuv to organize an 
autonomous body with a national assembly and executive council, the only Jewish 
community allowed to do so. 501 The Old Yishuv became the heart of the region that 
helped to influence the initial Zionist ideology of nation building through social and 
territorial causes. Using the ideas of the pre-Zionist movement, the Old Yishuv made 
the move from the urban core to the peripheral core due to the abundance of land and 
the emerging allure of the developing societies. The now “New” Yishuv’s population 
increased astronomically from 1929 to 1939, with the population beginning at 
160,000 and jumping to 500,000.502 One fourth of this Jewish population lived in 
cooperative farming communities in 1939, beginning the development of a Jewish 
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society in the State of Israel. The New Yishuv’s goal was to establish a society of 
agricultural workers and to demonstrate that the new generation of Jews was a strong, 
confident, and Hebrew-speaking people. 502 To attract more of the European Jews to 
these societies, Jewish settlers needed a minimal standard of living, housing 
availability, and job opportunity for further incentives other than just to join the 
Jewish state. 
 The access and availability of water became an important factor the 
establishment of the State of Israel to assure the successful absorption of the Jewish 
population. Nadav Morag concedes that a strong settlement is crucial for the Jewish 
nation.  “Without settlement, the Jews would have no hope of changing the 
demographic balance in Palestine in their favour and hence laying the basis for a 
claim to sovereignty over Palestine.’ 503 Irrigation answered the problem of how to 
establish a vibrant Jewish society in the Jordan Valley. Stable and efficient water 
availability would allow for a stable agricultural segment to provide job opportunities 
and food resources bringing more people to the regions and increasing the land’s 
population. 
 In order to fulfill the creation of a Jewish nation and ensure its sustainability, 
two issues resonate within the nation to ensure nationhood existence: the ability to 
provide security from external threats and to build a society through economic and 
social policies. Agriculture directly affects both the economic stabilizing of a Jewish 
state that help to remove Israel from a dependent relationship with neighboring 
nations. 
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 Israel’s agricultural sector relies on Palestine’s water availability. Israel uses 
over 95% of its available water, about 1,650 mcm, which does not provide enough 
extra water supplies incase of a sudden change in availability. 1,650 mcm is about 
one third of Israel’s total rainfall due to the 60% evaporation rate of its semi-arid 
conditions. This portion of available water is partitioned through the state’s needs: 
75-80% for agriculture, 15-18% for domestic use, and 4-7% for industrial use.  
 The stability of Israel’s agricultural sector is vital for of its right to statehood 
and security sector.  The development of Israel’s economy is supported by its 
agricultural sector due to the state’s goal of self-sufficiency that is crucial to its 
protection of food supplies from a possible partial Arab blockade. 503  In the 1950’s, 
Israel was unable to produce enough food for its growing population, and had to 
institute food rationing from 1949-1952. However, with the cultivation of land 
through irrigation and the establishment of water channels, Israel’s food production 
increased.504 Water availability inevitably determines the production rate, growth, and 
prosperity of the agricultural sector vital to Israel’s livelihood.  
 To further help the state of Israel, a stable society must be built through the 
development of agriculture and settlement. The ability to create a physical basis for 
an independent state and to establish a society of agricultural workers are primary 
factors for developing a land for the Jewish population. These two factors would 
allow the settlement of larger Jewish populations in Palestine, as well as the extension 
of the Jewish population into scattered areas of the country. 
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The Palestinian state’s use of water 
 Similar to the Zionist movement that depends on water resources for the 
development of a Jewish homeland, adequate water resources for the Palestinian 
movement support a strong economy and population, which is vital for an 
independent nation in the Middle East. The history of the Palestinian request for 
autonomy begins with the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 by the United 
Nations who demoted the Palestinians to a second tier status. Therefore, Palestinian 
justifications for water rights often focus on rights that balance out the power given to 
Israel from the events of 1948 through 1974. “During this period, the source of power 
became firmly embedded within Israel . . . the 1967 war increased the asymmetrical 
nature of power relations in Israel’s favour, such that the latter was able to impose 
unilateral solutions.”505  
 Palestine’s economy in the later 20th and early 21st century represents the 
effects of an imbalanced power as a result of the influence of foreign powers, i.e. the 
state of Israel established by the UN. Water rights are crucial in a peace agreement 
because of agriculture’s place in the Palestinian economy. However, the Palestinian 
agricultural industry is unable to move past its small-scale status due to the 
requirement of Israel’s approval in most activity.506 Irrigation is a vital component to 
the agricultural industry, mainly situated in Gaza, the Jordan Valley, and the northern 
districts of the West Bank, over which Israel ultimately has control. As of 2002, 
Palestine’s GDP was estimated at $1.8 billion in contrast to Israel’s around $18 
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billion507, with a contribution of 28% by the industrial economy, 63% by services, 
and 8% by agriculture.508 Any change in the water availability would not only affect 
the agricultural sector that provides needed securities for the population, such as a 
secure food source, but would also affect other industries that support the GDP that 
are crucial for a thriving society. Important to note is the 2.8% contribution of Israel’s 
agricultural economy to the total GDP, despite its use of 50% of total water supply for 
irrigation purposes (Palestine uses 11% of total water supply for agricultural 
industry). Agriculture also produces vital job opportunities that raised Palestinian 
employment from 12.7% in 1995 to 16% in 2004.  
 To counteract the imbalance of power, international contributions have helped 
the plight of the Palestinians, seen in the PLO’s efforts as well as the current 
influence of the United Nations. With the establishment of PLO in 1964, Palestinian 
rights were given international recognition through PLO’s position as the “sole 
legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.”509 Israel’s position within the 
international community was undermined by the Palestinian cry with its part of the 
international agenda.510  In 1974 with the United Nations General Assembly 
Resolution 3236, the UN identified the Palestinian right to return as an “inalienable 
right,” which leads to the Palestinian justification for water rights as an international 
necessity.  
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Palestinian rights to water 
  The right of every human being to have water to sustain life is the 
Palestinians’ first justification for secure access. The Palestinian question over water 
uses several international human rights treaties that put peoples needs for water 
first.511 International human rights groups, such as like the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural rights, defines the human right to water thus: “The 
human right to water entitles everyone to sufficient, safe, acceptable, physically 
accessible and affordable water for personal and domestic uses.”512  
 The second right to water relates to international water law regarding 
territorial disputes. According to Hillel I. Shuval, four out of the eight Palestinian 
claims to water rights involve territorial disagreements.513 The claims focus on 
Israel’s improper and unfair extraction of water from Palestinian territory that, if 
extracted completely, could harm the Palestinian economy severely.514 To help 
appease these water disagreements, the International Law Association in 1966 
established the Helsinki Rules that were a peaceful approach that determined the 
concept of “equitable apportionment,” meaning that, “Each basin state is entitled, 
within its territory, to a reasonable and equitable share in the beneficial uses of the 
waters on an international drainage basin.”515 Although the Helsinki Rules only 
applied to ground water usage, other policies were later made to include surface water 
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that, for the purpose of this paper, would include the Jordan River in addition to the 
Mountain Aquifer.516 
 
Conflicts in Palestine 
 The first Palestinian intifadah took place in 1987 and recognized the PLO as 
“the sole, legitimate representative of ‘our people, all our people wherever they 
congregate in our homeland or outside it,’”517 giving PLO more recognition. To help 
the Palestinian plight, slightly similar in its goals for an Arab Palestine, Hamas was 
established a year earlier as an outgrowth of the Muslim Brotherhood who did not 
favor a US-PLO dialogue. “The fear was that the peace process would merely serve 
to legitimize the ‘Zionist entity’- Hamas refused to call Israel by its name; in its view, 
there could be a truce (hudnah) with it, but never a settlement.”518 
 The second Palestinian intifadah, or al-Aqsa intifadah, commenced in 
September 2000 prompted by Ariel Sharon’s electioneering visit to the al-Aqsa 
Mosque, affirmed by Imad Al-Faluhi, the Palestinian Authority’s Communications 
Minister.519 Yassar Arafat was unhappy with the peace process of the Camp David 
negotiations that year due to the relatively little importance given to the rights of 
Palestinians. In 1993 with the Oslo Accords, Palestinians were awarded the West 
Bank and Gaza, representing 22 percent of Palestine, and then in 2000 at the Camp 
David negotiations, Palestinians were given 80 percent of the 22 percent of the 100 
                                                
516 Hillel Shuval, “A Proposal for an Equitable Resolution to the Conflicts between the Israelis and the 
Palestinians over the Shared Water Resources of the Mountain Aquifer.” 45. 
517 Richard Booney, Jihad: from Quran to bin Laden, 307. 
518 Ibid. 309 
519 Ibid. 313 
  149 
percent of their original homeland.520 ‘Martrydom operations’ were instituted by 
Hamas in March 2001 to “strike within Israel’s heartland” in order to protest the 
Jewish nation. According to Ritchie Ovendale, from the Muslim perspective, jihad 
was a viable response to the infidels in control of Muslim land furthered by the 
‘martyrdom operations.’ The suicide bombing carried out by Palestinians in Israel 
became the conflict’s distinctive characteristic and was a form of resistance against 
the infidels included the strategies utilized for jihad.521  
 From the statistics above, it is clear that Israeli forces are in control of water 
allocation in Palestine due to their dominant political presence and power in the 
region because of foreign involvement. The following is the history of the US-Israeli 
relationship that strengthens the state of Israel to hold an authority over water rights 
in Palestine.  The US has given economic and military aid to Israel over the latter half 
of the 20th century first, to stop the expansion of communism (and thought to be allied 
Arab nationalism) seen during the Cold War, and second, to establish a Western ally 
in the Middle East. 
 
The history of the US alliance with Israel  
 While referring back to Samuel W. Lewis’ five elements that rest at the basis 
of the unofficial US-Israel alliance, a discussion of the region’s historical ties with the 
US must be elaborated on.  
 The US-Israeli alliance began in February 1957 during the Eisenhower 
administration. Until the Carter administration, much of the historical narrative 
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concerning the Arab-Israeli conflicts revolves around US-Soviet global rivalry.522 The 
US would only support the United Nations sanctions regarding the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict if Israel withdrew from Gaza and other Egyptian territory from the seizeure 
in 1956 during the Suez Crisis. Israel agreed under the condition that Egypt would 
allow Israeli vessels free passage through the Straits of Tiran in addition to an UN-
supported force to protect the Israeli-Egyptian border. Israel’s economics and 
military-strategic circumstances were allied with those of the US,523 which led to the 
subsequent withdrawal of Israel that set a diplomatic tone524 as a “deepening US 
commitment to Israeli security.”525  
 The US saw Israel’s strength during the Suez Crisis as a vital addition to the 
US’ desire to contain radical Arab nationalism thought to be allied with communism. 
Congress supported the US involvement in the Middle Eastern nations threatened to 
fall under the influence of communism through military and economic aid, as seen 
with the Eisenhower doctrine of 1957.526 In 1959, the US gave into Israel’s request of 
financial and military support against Soviet aggression with $100 million in 
technical and financial assistance, and in 1960 with $10 million worth of radar 
equipment. Fearing the backlash from certain Arab nations against the US for their 
generous contribution, Eisenhower rejected Israel’s last request of HAWK missiles to 
maintain a neutral yet tilted status in the Middle East. The interests of protecting US 
oil flow and maintaining political support from wealthy Jewish Americas lay at the 
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base of the US’ stance on the Israeli-Palestinian problem seen in its partial support for 
both sides. Broadly speaking, US involvement in the Middle East was to ensure the 
protection of its interests from communist Soviet Union. 
 During the Eisenhower administration of the 1950’s, the President viewed the 
Israelis as “potential allies in his struggle to contain Soviet-backed revolutionary 
Arab nationalism.”527 During the Kennedy administration of the 1960’s, Israel began 
to develop weapons, igniting the US to continue its pledged assistance in the event of 
Arab aggression to protect Israel and the US interests.  Egypt also received MIG’s 
from the Soviet Union that worried Washington, causing debate over the amount of 
security and protection that Israel should receive from US without compromising US 
relations with Arab nations in the Middle East. Kennedy facilitated the situation in 
1961 by using a comprehensive regional settlement to handle the disputes rather than 
providing more military support to Israel to use against Egypt.  
 However, after the Arab-Israeli War in 1973, the US held a peace-seeker 
status and tried to negotiate with Israel to withdraw from certain territories in order to 
bring peace to the conflict. In exchange for the surrender of Israeli territory, the US 
would support Israel to create a strong tie in the Middle East to ensure the protection 
of  US interests in the region. This Western alliance was discussed frequently, yet in 
an informal and implicit way.528  
 The era of President Jimmy Carter represents a move away from support of 
Israel for anti-Soviet reasons into one focused on bringing peace to the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. In the past administrations, the Palestinians were ignored, thus 
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Carter incorporated them into American interests through the meeting at Camp David 
in 1978 to make the Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel. Yet Carter still kept in 
mind US interests in Israel, sending more economic and military aid and cooperation 
to Israel.  
 Israel’s position in US foreign policy changed with the Reagan administration, 
which reverted to viewing the alliance with Israel through a Cold War lens. Israel was 
a friendly and democratic ally with the US, amidst some hostile Arab nations allied 
with the Soviet Union. However, the US could maintain a simultaneous relationship 
with both the Arabs and the Israelis through the Reagan era’s “strategic cooperation.” 
During the 1980’s the US maintained a “military-to-military” relationship with Israel, 
while also strengthening ties with Gulf nations like Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Yet with 
the commencement of the Palestinian intifada in 1987, American public support for 
Israel dwindled due to the image of the Israeli army as a “brutal occupier” supported 
by with US financial and military aid.  
 The US outlook on the Arab-Israeli problem reverted to protecting Israeli and 
US interests during the Bush I administration from 1989-1993. A peace negotiation 
was not “only in Israel’s interest and that of the long-suffering Palestinians, but also 
very much in the American interests.”529 The Madrid Peace Conference in late 1991 
represents the culmination of the US’ newfound power and interests in forging peace 
in the region, with the commencement of face-to-face meetings of Arab and Israeli 
leaders. At the same time, the position of the Israeli prime minister was changing, 
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from Minister Yitzhak Shamir to Yitzak Rabin, who held a much more supportive 
stance on the relations between Israel and the US. 
 With the election of President Clinton in 1993, the US-Israel relationship 
changed dramatically. President Clinton and Minister Rabin extensively discussed 
plans and strategies for peace, establishing a deep diplomatic relationship that had not 
been seen before. The US also fervently supported the Israeli-Palestinian agreement 
signed in Oslo in 1993, leading to the large US donation of two billion dollars to the 
West Bank and Gaza in order to help establish the new Palestinian authority 
described in the Oslo Agreement. 
  Continuing through the Clinton, Bush and into President Obama’s 
administration, peace to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict ceases to be fully realized. In 
April 2003, the Quartlet, made up of about 40 nations including the United States, the 
European Union, and the United Nations, released a ‘Roadmap’ that “outlines a three-
stage program leading to an independent Palestinian state and a ‘final and 
comprehensive settlement for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict’ by 2005.”530 The 
roadmap was titled, “Performance-based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State 
Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Crisis.” Their obligations under the Roadmap were 
enacted on November 27, 2008 when leaders of the United States, Israel, and the 
Palestinians agreed to establish a peace treaty by the end of 2008 through the creation 
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of a Palestinian state.531 Yet to this day, a peace treaty has not been made between the 
Israelis and Palestinians despite numerous efforts to institute a two-state solution.532  
 
Conclusion 
 Water rights in Palestine hold a substantial position concerning the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. Religious and cultural differences are not the sole reason for 
conflict, which are often the perceived visage. The creation of the state of Israel in 
1948 augmented the power structure in Palestine, giving Israeli forces more power, 
influence, and control over the region’s resources. As a result, a struggle continues to 
exist between the Israelis and Palestinians for equal rights to a nation that can only be 
accomplished through adequate natural sources to support the economic, social and 
political growth of a nation. Noam Chomsky notes the US’ persistence to maintain an 
influential role in the region, “and to a search for a ‘hidden agenda, for example to 
help Israel control the Palestinians, to control Iraqi oilfields, or generally to extend 
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Conclusion to Thesis 
 
 The purpose of my thesis was to counter Samuel Huntington’s argument that 
the world’s conflict is over differing civilizations, religions, or cultures. Whether or 
not religion is declining or growing, it cannot be used to portray the world in a 
‘cosmic war,’ or a battle between ‘good and evil’. Natural resources, not religions, 
rest at the basis for the Islamic fundamentalist and militant movement due to its 
response to the Western structural pressures that are modernizing Muslim societies. 
Oil and water become vital tools for exercising power and authority of one nation 
over another, and are identified as the true culprits for a conflict that is often furtively 
concealed.  
 Chapter One discusses the true nature of religion’s place in a society, whether 
the amount of religiosity or a differing religion had a true effect on conflict. World 
order was to be determined by the access and power to natural resources rather than 
opposing civilizations or religions. Chapter Two developed the US’ structural 
pressure in the Middle East as a result over the access to natural resources and the 
challenge to maintain itself as a hegemonic force over resources in the modernizing 
Middle East. Chapter Three presents a parallel discussion of concerns that delves into 
the predominant Muslim thinkers and movements that have influenced the modern-
day Islamist Muslim response to globalization and modernization because of US 
influence. Chapters Four and Five explain the resources of oil and water as tangible 
forces that are used to exert certain influences a structural powers for a one-sided 
agenda of total wealth, power, and knowledge.  
  156 
 According to the article by Fareed Zakaria titled, “Learning to Live with 
Radical Islam,” a different kind of strategy to combat radical Islam needs to be 
adequately developed in order to deal with and understand the world’s conflicts. In 
2009, President Obama emphasized his concern for foreign policy in the Middle East 
seen in his inaugural address that “reached out to the Muslim world calling for a 
relationship based on mutual respect.”534 According to President Obama, a 
“differentiated approach”535 towards Muslim nations needs to be made before a 
substantial and enduring change can be considered. Even words or phrases that sound 
similar to Samuel Huntington’s sweeping generalizations, like “ ‘war on terror,’ 
‘global insurgency,’ even ‘the Muslim world,’”536 must be avoided to ensure a 
change. The quest for oil and water are portrayed as a clash of differing civilizations 
and religions rather than the true nature of a clash of interests. With an accurate 
consideration for the motives behind radical Islam and Islamic fundamentalism, the 
true nature of the conflict can be attempted to be resolved. 
 The most powerful tool that the Islamic fundamentalism movement holds is 
its position as a phenomenon. The obscure and theoretical view of Islamic 
fundamentalism makes generalized connections to individuals and movements that 
largely have little connections to each other, such as the created correlations of 
Osama bin Laden and the Taliban in Afghanistan537 or between bin Laden and 
Saddam Hussein. The distortion of radical Islam has become so great that Muslim and 
“Western” imaginations have been altered far from the truth of reality, creating the 
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theory of “Bin Ladenism.”538 Much like the highly skeptical “clash of civilizations,” 
the “West” has been placed in “armed opposition” to Muslim fundamentalists that 
further perpetuates the view of the struggle from Muslim and “Western” 
viewpoints.539 As stated by Roxanne L. Euben, a scientific study of Islamic 
fundamentalism needs to occur to distinguish the correlations among urbanization, 
expanding education, commercialization, industrialization, and alienation that 
“‘produce’ Islamic revival.”540 
 Equally alarming is the assumption similar to Huntington’s regarding the 
support of radical Islam in the Middle East. According to the article by Fareed 
Zakaria titled, “Learning to Live with Radical Islam,” a clear distinction needs to be 
made and understood regarding the involvement of local militants and global 
jihadists. Out of all the people “we” call a member of the Taliban, “less than 10 
percent are ideologically aligned with Quetta Shura or Al Qaeda,” while 90 percent 
are tribal fighters or Pashtun nationalists.541 Islamicists and jihadists have become the 
two common “interchangeable”542 buzzwords, and need to be properly clarified to 
understand their divergent goals. Islamicists ask for the plausible goal of their own 
nation while jihadists  demand an inconceivable and infeasible goal of destroying all 
‘evil’ forms of power. Jihadists and radical Islam do not provide the answers to 
modern-day problems, the exact antithesis to what radical Islam dictates as its 
purpose in the world. “They do not have a world view that can satisfy the aspirations 
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of modern men and women. We do. That’s the most powerful weapon of all,”543 notes 
Resa Aslan, Iranian-American Muslim author of No god but God and Cosmic War. 
 Oil and water stand as two of the most important resources that a nation or 
civilization depends on in the modern world. Both resources nourish the modern 
world in ways that are inextricably linked together to ensure the stabilization and 
growth of a civilization. Oil’s versatile use in the world allows it to play a role in 
almost every aspect of a modern society, ranging from the agricultural, industrial, 
energy, social and political sectors. On the other hand, water is the fundamental 
component to life that ensures the growth and development at the biological level of 
every single human being and living creature on earth. The two resources are 
influential and attentive to every single aspect of humanity’s progression thus are able 
to shape the changing society and world. The power over change rests at the basis for 
conflict’s motives, arising over the undeniable power over resources and therefore 
ability to transform the world. 
  The rise of the Islamic fundamentalist movement cannot be looked at from 
the critical point of view, seeing the Middle East as entity composed of violence, 
hatred, and unjust. From the Western, academic point of view, the Islamic 
fundamentalist viewpoint must be looked at in its own terms in order to understand its 
evolving state of mind. As President Barack Obama stated in a speech given before 
the Turkish parliament on April 6, 2009, “America’s relationship with the Muslim 
community, the Muslim world, cannot and will not just be based upon opposition to 
terrorism. We seek broader engagement based upon mutual interests and mutual 
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respect.”544 Its complaints about modern civilization are valid due to the speed at 
which the world appears to diminishing. While many of the movements’ actions and 
ideologies are violent and unjustifiable, attention must be given to the origin of 
concern derived from the modernization and globalization of the world. Speaking 
broader than losing the Islamic culture in the Middle East, local and indigenous 
traditions are being neglected for more globalized and homogenous tradition. 
Hopefully in the years to come, the world’s leaders will hear and respond to the cries 
of the Muslim world that are attempting to open our eyes to the damaged world in 
need of great change. President Barack Obama has begun this transformation with his 
concern and attention towards relations with the Middle East, overcoming the 
stigmatized image of the conflict in the region over differing civilizations and culture. 
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